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Abstract
What is the reason behind the current fascination with and heightened expectations from
international legal accountability? Are we indeed faced with an unprecedented increase in the
volume of egregious crimes committed, condoned, or initiated by states and high ranking
officials, bureaucrats and soldiers, the kind of multiplication and spread that fundamentally
challenges our faith in the capabilities of domestic jurisprudence? Is international criminal law, as
it applies to categories of crimes such as war crimes and crimes against humanity, equipped to be
a panacea for all ills of the recalcitrant nation-state system? Could we curtail mass assaults on
human dignity, the kind of violence that flourished in myriad forms with the advance of late
capitalism, through international courts alone? What is the ultimate aim of adjudicating the most
egregious infractions of the internationally sanctioned human rights regime? Is it simply a matter
of coming up with the newest methods and most efficient strategies of codification to punish the
protagonists of organized political violence? Is international criminal law striving to develop a
shared understanding of, and golden standards for, acceptable behaviour of states and
governments, their agencies and institutions? Do these efforts not suffer terribly from the
institutional idealism pertaining to current accountability regimes in public international law?
Where do judges, activists, scholars, public intellectuals, NGOs and INGOs stand in a truthful
appraisal of the complex amalgam of international criminal law and the dynamic processes of
globalization? Do relations between the core and periphery, the Global South and the centres of
traditional international law, post-colonial societies and neocolonial powers, matter at all in this
state of euphoria concerning developments in international criminal law pertaining to universal
jurisdiction?
I start this work by answering this last question in the affirmative. In Chapter I, I examine the
emergence of a transnational regime of accountability in international law and reevaluate the
claim that, at least in principle, universal jurisdiction overrides private legal norms. After
introducing the debate on legal pluralism and Third World Approaches to International Law
(TWAIL), I redefine the concept of international law as transnational law within the context of
globalization, with particular emphasis on the situational qualities attributed to states and
societies in the Global South. I then discuss distinguishing features of international accountability
regimes and the mechanisms used by institutions such as the International Criminal Court (ICC)
for the production of legal and jurisdictional certainty under diverse circumstances. I conclude
this debate with a critical evaluation of accountability regimes in international law concerning
universal jurisdiction. I use the premises of the third wave of legal pluralism and purport a theory
of reflexive transnational law that could re-contextualize universal jurisdiction, an issue further
debated in a later chapter on Hybrid Courts. In Chapter II, I analyze universal jurisdiction in
international law with reference to debates on the State as a privileged legal actor. I rely on the
body of work associated with critical international relations scholarship and look for alternative
approaches to the static perception of the state in international law. In Chapter III, I strive to
provide an inlet for universal jurisdiction in certain cases of criminality while identifying a
framework that is not of dubious normative or legal validity. In effect, reformulating universal
jurisdiction anew is a necessary shift of focus given the contested history of the very enterprise of
international law in the Global South. To this end, I again look at TWAIL scholarship and other
contesting voices emanating from the Global South that relate to international criminal law in
ii

challenging ways. In Chapter IV, I examine the historical and political underpinnings of the legal
definition of crimes against humanity. Crimes against humanity are supposed to have a collective
legal dimension with respect to both their victims and their perpetrators. These crimes take place
only in the context of a widespread or systematic attack, and in a societal setting that condones or
supports their committal. Instead of a static interpretation of these crimes, I offer a historicized
conception and propose a wider justification for their prosecution through locally adapted
universal jurisdiction measures. This caveat has important implications as to which crimes could
be justifiably prosecuted and punished by domestic, hybrid or international courts, as discussed in
Chapter V on Hybrid Courts. I also contend that the scope of the area of international criminal
justice that deals with basic human rights violations should be wider than is currently
acknowledged, in that it should include violations that have a collective dimension. These
arguments are then further developed in Chapter VI, on collective responsibility. The conclusion
of the thesis offers a debate based on examples from transitional justice settings, and suggests
that fragmentation in international law is not only a fact but also a necessity to overcome the
impasse of its tainted legacy in the Global South. Crimes against humanity and the universal
jurisdiction dictum pertaining to their adjudication constitute no exception to this state of affairs,
and if we are to proceed with adjudication of the most egregious and heinous crimes, we must
allow for localized and domesticated interpretation of these crimes rather than strict legislative
dictation ordered by international institutions such as the ICC. As such, limitations to universal
jurisdiction lead us to a reformulation of accountability from within international criminal law.
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Introduction

APRIL is the cruellest month, breeding
Lilacs out of the dead land, mixing
Memory and desire, stirring
Dull roots with spring rain.
Winter kept us warm, covering
Earth in forgetful snow, feeding
A little life with dried tubers.
What are the roots that clutch, what branches grow
Out of this stony rubbish? Son of man,
20
You cannot say, or guess, for you know only
A heap of broken images, where the sun beats,
And the dead tree gives no shelter, the cricket no relief,
And the dry stone no sound of water. Only
There is shadow under this red rock,
25
(Come in under the shadow of this red rock),
And I will show you something different from either
Your shadow at morning striding behind you
Or your shadow at evening rising to meet you;
I will show you fear in a handful of dust.

5

T.S. Eliot (1888–1965). The Waste Land. 1922.

1

This work is a concerted attempt to achieve an informed interpolation between ethics,
politics and legal scholarship on international law, with reference to the specific category of
universal jurisdiction as it pertains to crimes against humanity. It posits that critical perspectives
from the Global South, combined with a transnational understanding of international law and a
committed inclusion of political judgment and collective responsibility for mass crimes, would
create a radically different framework for the debate on the normative underpinnings and
procedural qualities of universal jurisdiction in international criminal law.
In this vein, the dissertation in hand brings together three seemingly distinct areas of
scholarly endeavour: jurisprudential debates on international criminal law, international relations
and international law scholarship on state sovereignty, and applied political philosophy. It strives
to offer a compelling view of the future of international legal reasoning and legal theory
concerning the workings of accountability regimes in the Global South. It purports a critical
analysis of the prescriptive norms and institutions of modern international criminal law in the
area of universal jurisdiction, and argues with courage and caution that international law has the
capacity to advance values concerning the sanctity of human life, as long as it is not regarded as a
closed and rigid system leading to the perpetual victimization of states and societies in the Global
South.
Numerous international lawyers approved of the 1999 bombing of Serbia by the members
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, despite the fact that some felt it was not compatible
with a strict reading of the UN Charter on matters of concern for state sovereignty. 1 The
argumentative techniques through which international law scholars tried to abide by their moral
intuitions despite the obvious legal incoherence pertaining to the case of Yugoslav wars signifies
a general turn to ethics in legal theory, especially in the field of international criminal law. The
shallow and often hazardous moralization involved in justifying pro forma application of
jurisdictional maxims such as those present in crimes against humanity legislation constitutes a
similar challenge. If we are to avoid the danger of international criminal law becoming a
behemoth of an oppressive instrument, put to the service of the foreign policy choices of states

1

See Martti Koskenniemi, "‘The Lady Doth Protest Too Much’: Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in International
Law" (2002) 65 The Modern Law Review 159.
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and constituencies marked by power and privilege, it must assume the prowess of deliberation
and persuasion rather than relying entirely on heavy-handed institutionalization and codification.
The question is, in the absence of widespread consent and with minimal threat of
coercion, why sovereign states are expected to obey international law. This dissertation
approaches the subject matter from a different angle: rather than why they should, I venture to
ask why states choose to embrace certain core principles of international criminal law. In the
following pages, the question of what compels domestic constituencies to owe allegiance to a
higher set of rules, when each country has its own law of the land, will be treated with care, given
the damning history of international law as seen from the Global South. The prevailing legal
realist view holds that countries act simply out of self-interest, and that if they consent to
international law, they only consent to norms and principles to regulate matters of common
interest in which they are involved. Here, the emphasis remains squarely on the state as the
ultimate unit of international law. This dissertation is written against such a presumption; it
purports to understand international criminal law as a transnational phenomenon shaped by
multiple legal actors, the state being only one of them. At the same time, international courts such
as the International Criminal Court (ICC) should not be made into a modern-day messiah of
international criminal law. This debate is very difficult to hold, more so even than questioning the
sanctity of the state in international law, particularly in an area such as crimes against humanity,
given their heinous nature. In the following pages, these two debates—namely, criticism of statecentric views of international law, and considerations of the limits of universal jurisdiction in
international criminal law—inform each other and are brought together under the aegis of the
concept of political judgment. Though rich in examples from the field of international law and
international institutions pertaining to adjudication of crimes against humanity, the theoretical
contribution of this work lies in the challenges it poses for received wisdom on the foundations of
international criminal law, and its critique of the practical ambitions of the international legal
system of accountability established since World War II.
In this vein, in the first half of the dissertation, the concept of state sovereignty and its
derivatives in international law are unpacked using the tools of comparative politics and
international relations scholarship, as well as pioneering work in the area of international law.
The second half is allocated to the debate on adjudication of crimes against humanity in the post3

ICC era. The lens through which this composite analysis is achieved is the jurisprudential basis of
crimes against humanity legislation in international law. Since 1945, the role played by political
judgment in the deliverance of justice in international criminal law has assumed unprecedented
proportions, given the extreme nature of the crimes listed under this body of laws. This
dissertation, however, takes issue in this regard with both of the existing models, namely, the
dualist and monist renditions of international law. Briefly, the dualist perspective claims
international law to be alien to domestic law.2 It characterizes international law as imposing and
undemocratic, and thus only appropriations of it through internal deliberation are deemed
acceptable. This approach is typical of the dominant trends in American and German
jurisprudential thought, as well as some of the emergent critiques from the Global South,
particularly among the Muslim-majority countries and East Asia. The monist perspective, on the
other hand, is the darling of international law scholars with an institutionalist bent, particularly
regarding the issue of universal jurisdiction. Monism advocates 'universal principles,’ applicable
in all contexts due to their claimed normative superiority. In this regard, the ICC’s embrace of
crimes against humanity constitutes a prime candidate for critical analysis, as the core crimes
enlisted in the Court’s enabling statute are indeed a colossal affront to the whole of humanity,
and yet there are significant problems regarding the path followed by their adjudication.
According to the monist perspective, particularly in international criminal law, no caveats should
be accepted or even proposed, and the standards set by institutions such as the ICC are to be
accepted as non-negotiable in their nature. Exceptions are made only due to procedural delays,
and even then these are regarded a matter of providing sufficient evidence in due time, rather than
affecting the normative and legal validity of the legislation itself.
In this context, the present work poses the question of whether a third perspective is
possible—not as an in-between, but as one based on a more dynamic understanding of
international criminal law. The discussion presented in each of the six chapters indicates that,
especially in the Global South, if international criminal law’s adjudication mechanisms and
procedural aspects are emphasized at the expense of its core normative premises, the whole
2

See Harold Hongju Koh, "Trasnational Legal Process" (1996) 75 Neb. L. Rev. 181, and Abram Chayes & Antonia
Handler Chayes. The new sovereignty (Harvard University Press, 1998).
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enterprise runs the risk of becoming suspect. Specifically, this work is constructed around two
methodological investigations. The first one attempts to unpack the normative framework within
which international law is commonly perceived. This effort guides the line of questioning
framing the first three chapters of the thesis. The presumed alignment of international and
domestic law in the area of universal jurisdiction constitutes the example on which such an
inquiry is based. The second methodological investigation is built upon the Arendtian notion of
political judgment, as opposed to the procedure-oriented understanding of international criminal
law. Here, the aim is to shed light on how different interpretations of core jurisprudence could be
reconciled without excessive dependency on an overarching institution such as the ICC. The case
in point is again crimes against humanity legislation and its multiple reiterations at the level of ad
hoc, regional, and hybrid courts. This latter methodological investigation is undertaken in the last
three chapters of the present work.
All of the chapters of this dissertation deal with concerns about the larger debate on
international law and problems of incongruity among the spheres of domestic and international
law. This is done with a desire to move forward, as the case at hand is that of egregious and
unforgivable crimes committed by states against their own people. To this end, the chapters on
universal jurisdiction and hybrid courts present findings from criminal law trials and case law in
order to showcase the interaction and fluidity connecting these two spheres of juridical action—
the domestic and the international. Vis-à-vis the domestic sphere, one is forced to acknowledge
the importance of national norms about the constitution of criminality, due to their socio-political
effectiveness and long-term legitimacy. Meanwhile, when the frame of analysis is shifted to
international [criminal] law, one has to deal with an uncomfortable reality that marks the field: it
does not have a history of egalitarian decision-making, equal participation, or transparent and
regulated relations.3 Secondly, there appears to be a problem concerning the unaddressed nature
of the divide separating international humanitarian and human rights law from other spheres of
international law, in terms of whether and when one can put a caveat on value pluralism. Thus
far, the question of whether jurisprudence pertaining to erga omnes crimes could be legitimately
relativized—just as states negotiate trade or labor laws, for instance—has largely been avoided

3

See Jean Cohen, "Whose sovereignty? Empire versus international law" (2004) 18 Ethics & International Affairs 1.
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due to the very nature of the violence embodied by these acts. There are certain absolutes in these
select areas, absolutes that could go against demands emanating from local circumstances. On
these issues, international criminal law avoids the notion of political deliberation like the plague,
for fear of allowing future reversals or tempering with the unacceptability of crimes that fall
under crimes against humanity legislation. What we are faced with on the ground, however,
reveals a rather different reality of the adjudication of these egregious crimes.
At this point, Hannah Arendt’s work is introduced in earnest to the debate on international
criminal law. In Arendt’s analysis of crimes against humanity, the Aristotelian notion of politics
as engagement and the Kantian notion of reflectiveness in judgment are brought together to make
sense of how to put the unforgivable to trial. Though Arendt's work on political judgment was
left unfinished, as she was working on it at the time of her death, she left us enough to work with,
especially when read alongside the work of Karl Jaspers and others on the notion of collective
responsibility for societal and political crimes. Here, a distinction is made between the validity of
all possible moral persuasions—the old-fashioned legal pluralism argument—versus adherence to
an overall jurisprudential framework while remaining open to pluralistic participation and
interpretation of legislation at the domestic and regional levels. Specifically, this dissertation
posits that the Arendtian notion of political judgment allows for engagement, deliberation and
involvement, and thus offers us a democratic promise for the global application of international
criminal law. Its cutting-edge quality can be identified as that of politics of persuasion. Here,
judgment would not allow for absolutes. In cases such as crimes against humanity, however, one
is obliged to consider certain absolutes in order to establish criminality and thresholds of
admissibility for evidence. The only way to resolve this dilemma is to claim that taking an
absolute stance against such crimes is morally defendable. In other words, everyone would as a
matter of the very basis of their humanity potentially agree that certain acts constitute egregious
crimes. This is perhaps similar to the universal codification of murder—other than in proven
instances of self-defense—as a crime within the domestic sphere. However, another difficulty
emerges here: how to separate the jurisprudential approach that accepts differences in normative
political judgments pertaining to the adjudication of crimes against humanity from the
aforementioned monist defense of universal jurisdiction? This is the critical junction that the
debate on universal jurisdiction has arrived at in the post-ICC era. As argued in the following
6

pages, formations such as hybrid courts in the Global South attending cases of war crimes and
crimes against humanity point to possible new directions that could be taken.
The main practical concern fueling all of these inquiries is the following: one cannot force
jurisprudential maxims of international organizations such as the ICC upon societies that are
violating the basic principles framing crimes against humanity legislation unless there is a degree
of value convergence in place. The issue them becomes how to find a normative common ground
upon which domestic courts would willingly incorporate bodies of international law such as ICCled legislation if and when the need arises, and also hand over criminals to venues like the ICC
for trial if they are unable to pursue the case, without such cooperation being seen as yet another
hegemonic intervention.4 Instead of appearing as a stable set of normative demands, international
law is better understood as an aspect of hegemony-building and maintenance, but which can also
be used as a technique of articulating political claims in terms of legal rights and duties against
the powers that be. Accordingly, the looming controversies in international law concerning the
use of force, the law of peace, human rights, trade and globalization in effect reflect strategies
through which political actors seek to make their preferences appear to be universal, or to
confront the universality claims of others. However, how much purposive ending of life through
organized political violence, and its justification by the very institutions responsible for
protecting individuals and communities, could be open to negotiation? Thus, the question
remains: how can one proceed from the Arendtian notion of the involved, negotiating, persuasive
strategy/act of producing judgments to the adjudication of justice in cases of crimes against
humanity? Unless one is open to institutional and dialogical interventions, building up normative
commitments from the bottom up, how could international criminal law provide a genuinely
common language of jurisprudence for egregious acts exemplified by crimes against humanity?
In a larger context, international law in general, and international criminal law in
particular, is facing new challenges in the post 9/11 era, though only some of these are related to
the emergence of the ‘new terrorism’ discourse in international politics. Reservations about the

4

On the issue of the hegemonic purchase of international law, see Detlev F. Vagts, "Hegemonic international
law" (2001) 95 Am. J. Int'l L. 843; Martti Koskenniemi, "International law and hegemony: a reconfiguration" (2004)
17 Cambridge Review of International Affairs 197, and, Nico Krisch, "International law in times of hegemony:
unequal power and the shaping of the international legal order" (2005) 16 European Journal of International
Law 369.
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role and function of international law in domestic affairs are on the rise. These range from
marked skepticism about the authority and utility of international law vis-à-vis local conditions,
to caution about how international law could be effected within the domestic sphere without
undermining the foundations of the legal systems at the local level. The European Union is a case
in point, showing how even the most elaborate regional efforts for juridical unification can
backfire in unforeseen directions.5 Across Europe, the debate about the relevance of international
law is beginning to be conducted in such pointed language that a constant underlining of the
dangers and limits of constitutional adjustments to ‘foreign law’ has become the tenor of
domestic contestations.6 Law that falls beyond the purview of domestic legislation is in effect
characterized as fundamentally anti-democratic and top-down. This point of view is no doubt
paralleled by a highly negative perception of the legitimacy of international law, as it is reduced
to a mechanism that obligates states to justify their local/national practices if they deviate from a
supposedly universally coded but relatively alien set of standards. National protectionism also
propagates the already mentioned monism/dualism dichotomy in law, portraying international
law either as an external body of law capable of penetrating the national legal order without
democratic consent, or as a corpus of alien jurisprudence that must be rigorously filtered through
the prism of national constitutional law if it is to accrue any benefit for local constituencies.7
In the face of mounting challenges to international law’s legitimacy—at least in select
areas of jurisprudence such as crimes against humanity legislation—priority must be given not to
prescriptions for an institutionally-mandated procedural straightjacket, but rather to elucidating
minimal normative consensus and emphasizing political processes that hinge upon the persuasive
5

Concerns regarding the role of international law are particularly evident in contemporary, post-failed Constitution
Europe. In Germany, for instance, the federal constitutional court has positioned itself as a bulwark between the
national legal system and the two European legal orders the court is a part of—namely, the European Union and the
European Court of Human Rights. In the United Kingdom, long before Brexit, the government sought to derogate
from the relevant provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights in specific cases related to terrorism. See
Karen Alter, Establishing the supremacy of European law: The making of an international rule of law in Europe.
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function of law and legal norms as political judgments. This alternative formulation could
possibly result in the refashioning of international criminal law, not as dictated by an overriding
and authoritative discourse, but as a normative enterprise and an evolving negotiation conditioned
by legitimate and locally endorsed judgments. In this new framework, international and
constitutional norms could be understood as contextually interrelated rather than as conflicting
legal points of reference or frames of jurisprudential meaning.
According to the traditional dualist perspective, the ultimate legitimate source of legal
norms is the democratic process itself. Accordingly, international norms—even those concerning
human rights—are domestically enforceable only to the extent that they are incorporated into
existing legal order through acts of statutory legislation.8 As such, the relationship between
public international law and domestic law is constructed as a tenuous interaction between two
separate realms. This point of view is deeply affected by concern that international norms can
have an immediate and/or unmediated effect on domestic legal structures and choices. When such
interventions are allowed to take place, the argument goes, they will lead to the emergence of an
unaccountable judiciary answering only to its own professional norms of conduct at the expense
of domestic legal and political prerogatives. Hence we witness the equation of international law
with the abdication and delegation of [national] sovereignty. Such an objection, often expressed
in terms of the cultural or institutional incompatibility of international jurisprudence with local
settings, assumes that norms of public international law potentially clash with local democratic
commitments. This is a particularly sore point, which clouds the horizons of international human
rights activism by challenging the local legitimacy of their demands and claims. Equally
worrisome, however, is questioning of the status of the moral principles and political reasoning
present in international criminal law. These bodies of law are perceived as falling outside the
bounded community of the nation-state and thus lacking a proper grounding.9 This deep-rooted
suspicion of international law is commonly justified by means of a contractarian view of
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democratic legitimacy of law, vehemently defended both in the North and the Global South in the
name of state sovereignty. Accordingly, the domain of constitutional law takes on an intrinsic
epistemological priority over the purportedly uneven and unpredictable domain of international
law. This position is based on the assumption that there is a high level of social and political
convergence in the domestic sphere capable of providing a unique moral texture to domestic law.
Unfortunately, in contemporary international law discourse, this lack of ‘universal
justification’ is hardly ever taken seriously and thus is only dealt with summarily, as a legal detail
rather than a substantive issue. At this point, the following pages will argue, the plot thickens. It
is true that the origins of international law are not based on consensus. The whole enterprise owes
its existence to laws of war, treaty obligations, customary practices and unequal and yet binding
contracts, always protecting the sanctity of the Westphalian state system. However, the resultant
historical fragmentation of international law into parallel regimes such as trade, environment,
human rights, international criminal law, et cetera, signify international law’s failure to become a
panopticon-like structure.10 This fragmentation could indeed be regarded as a result of law’s
intimate relationship with power, politics, hegemony, discontent, indeterminacy and change. As
such, international law could be portrayed, in opposition to the presumed purism of the domestic
legal system that reflects a solid political contract among citizens, as a complex platform of
conflicts, negotiations, and legal regime-building strategies. These issues are discussed in detail
in the chapter on transnational law and fragmented regimes of accountability in international
criminal law.
From international law's inception in the Grotian legal tradition onwards, international
legal discourse has been shaped by a constitutive tension between a view of law as having a
contractual genesis, and a view of law as reflecting conflictual moral claims dictated by the
specific demands of contending parties.11 This tension in turn feeds into two competing accounts
not only of legitimation but also adjudication. The former account, which relies upon private law
metaphors such as delegation and trusteeship, emphasizes the necessity of deference to the will of
states as representatives of political communities. Its alternative, on the other hand, prioritizes the
10
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emergence of common normative principles in the conduct of legal reasoning and delivery of
justice.12 The latter account also proposes the possibility of a common global legal enterprise of
adjudication based on the juxtaposition of constitutional and international legal systems in select
areas. In situations where legal standards differ, and where an international body might interpret
an act in a way that runs counter to settled features of domestic constitutional law, international
law is suggestive of adjustments to be made to the domestic constitutional realm. Examples of
this could yield both positive and negative results for domestic constituencies, as is deliberated
upon in critical debates on public international law. Ultimately, however, this scenario
substantiates the dualists’ ultimate fear: the erasure of the domestic legal order and its
adjudicative acquis. As the present work suggests, international criminal law needs to rise to the
challenge of surpassing these two opposing accounts of adjudication and to come up with a
judgment-oriented model for the realization of an alignment between international and domestic
legal spheres.
Needless to say, constitutions do more than merely provide legal guarantees for the
individual by protecting her freedoms against the interventions of public authority, i.e. the state,
or other individuals, communities and corporate bodies. Constitutions also indicate that the state
has a protective function regarding the rights spelled out by the constitution, including
guaranteeing equal access to their use. Meanwhile, the programmatic and open-ended content of
fundamental rights cannot be determined by or derived from the traditions of constitutional or
administrative law sui generis. Furthermore, excessive widening of the province of judicial action
could lead to courts outgrowing their role as catalysts of justice provision, and their becoming
political actors themselves at the expense of actual politics. Consequently, they could become
drawn into the very center of political conflicts and controversies. Tackling interpretive
disagreements, in this context, could no longer be considered simply a matter of debating the
inner meanings of law itself. Once constitutional adjudication is involved in the resolution of
political-epistemic conflicts, the integrative portal of constitutional law is faced with the
impossible task of replacing political dialogue. In legal theory, the dualist perspective rejects the
validity of international law based on a similar logic. The dualists insist that within a
12
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heterogeneous and morally divided society—whether defined in domestic or international
terms—law should mainly assume the function of establishing a stable framework of rules of
interaction, and nothing more. Law, then, is to reveal itself qua law. Consequently, judicial
discretion built into the process of adjudication is limited to clarifying the antecedent meaning of
law and monitoring compliance. This kind of unabashed extrapolation from domestic
constitutional law debates to the workings of international law is a commonly used strategy.
Though the argument merits attention, it hides the essentially hegemonic nature of legal systems
in the domestic realm, as well. This issue is particularly critical for developing a deeper
understanding of state criminality, both within the domestic sphere and from a transnational point
of view.13
Another key dimension of this larger debate on law’s legitimacy pertains to voluntary
compliance with law.14 No doubt visible guarantees of institutional and third-party enforcement
cannot be identified as the only reasons for why such compliance occurs. In democratic
constitutional regimes, the absence of morally reprehensible means for ensuring compliance to
law, such as torture, rape or slavery, implies (at least in principle) that members of the constituent
political community are bound by a common ideal of justice, above and beyond particularistic
factors such as ethnic, religious, historical and cultural identities. Could there not be a similar,
underlying agreement concerning a common ideal of justice in international criminal law? As
already stated, the difficulty about international law is that a contractual ideal of justice cannot be
claimed as the origin of existing legal systems beyond the confines of the modern nationstate.15 In this specific context, evolving standards of international law are regarded as subject to
mechanisms of structurally ‘incomplete’ approval processes exemplified by treaty and customary
law. As such, legal institutional practices such as the adjudication of crimes against humanity are
considered lacking in legitimacy. Their adoption requires a common agreement about their
normative framing. However, since they are triggered at the behest of aggrieved individuals and
as ex post facto developments in de-nationalized or hybrid settings, involved states tend to detest
13
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platforms of adjudication such as those required by crimes against humanity legislation. Contrary
to the assertions of contractarian or dualist models of international law, rights and rulings that are
defined above and beyond the state are intrinsically political rather than procedural. If perceived
as such, international law neither seeks nor depends on full adoption of its codes by constitutional
regimes, otherwise known as the expectation of law’s working itself pure.16 The Hayekian values
of certainty, stability, and efficiency are no doubt as important for the workings of international
law as they are for domestic law; however, conflation of the boundaries of political communities
such as those purportedly represented by contemporary states with ethical prerogatives is a
dangerous fiction for all concerned. Such a conception of a institutionally closed, historically
self-referential and normatively sealed system of domestic law as a coherent and self-reliant legal
edifice stands in direct opposition to the production of legal norms concerning state criminality
exemplified by crimes against humanity legislation.
In conclusion, if international criminal law is re-introduced as an engaged practice of
aligned adjudication and, in tandem, as a persuasion-based strategy of new norm production
rather than the emphasis being placed on criminialization of select states, its potential for recontextualizing international law and introducing a new dynamism to local understandings of
justice may readily unfold. International criminal law is normative by necessity, and it requires
the active usage of political judgment at a systemic level. Wishing otherwise only leads to
disastrous results, as seen in the widespread reactions to ICC indictments across the Global
South. Normative conduct with legal legitimacy cannot be limited to the domestic constitutional
realm. The remaining question is whether such a reflective and involved account of legal
legitimacy presents us with the required ability to rise above particular frames of meaning in such
a way as to enable valid cross-communal judgments concerning mass criminality. Here, justice as
an ideal endorsed by international criminal law would have to operate as a competing template
that shows the limitations of our own local intuitions. Would this perspective allow for certain
acts to be ruled out universally, such as those coded by crimes against humanity legislation? No
matter how the ideal of justice is perceived and ethically patterned—in the case of international
criminal law, reference has to be made to the Eurocentric historical background of the emergent
legal regimes—singularly violent moral commitments cannot be justified as the cornerstone of a
16
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normative structure within which valid political judgments can be reached. In other words, legal
actors who have committed crimes against humanity cannot justify their actions based on the
perceived needs of a given constitutional order, whether European, post-colonial, or otherwise.
Vis-à-vis crimes against humanity legislation, the line of demarcation in terms of normative
legitimacy cannot be addressed within the confines of how political communities govern
themselves. In this regard, this dissertation posits that salvation for international criminal law in
this particular area would come from a ‘thin’ rather than a ‘thick’ universalism. Ultimately, a
substantive theory of judgment is required to combat the excesses of universalism,
institutionalism, legal realism, legal positivism, contextualism and relativism. Understanding the
role of genuine politics in the formation of legal judgment is an essential part of this endeavor.
Indeed, it is this particular aspect of legal judgment that determines the path of both its making
and its application in divergent contexts. The world of international criminal law outside the
confines of the Hague calls for genuine exploration as a conceptual project as well as a moral
imperative.
I. METHODOLOGY
This dissertation uses applied legal theory and comparative international law as its two
prime methodological tools in the building and exposition of its main arguments and findings
about global applications of crimes against humanity legislation. Its chronological focus is the
post-WWI period of adjudication of international crimes, with a particular emphasis on post-2002
developments following the entering into force of the Rome Statute. The overall theoretical
framework guiding the present debate on universal jurisdiction and crimes against humanity is
indebted to the approach to international law developed and articulated by third generation of
legal pluralism and TWAIL [Third World Approaches to International Law] scholarship. The
particular debate on collective responsibility, on the other hand, uses concepts utilized in applied
political philosophy as they pertain to international criminal law. The examples referenced
throughout the text are drawn from international criminal law jurisprudence and case material
related to state criminality exhibited in both the global North and the Global South. However, the
critical lens used to analyze the overall developments in international criminal law and related
accountability regimes prioritizes the experiences of societies in the Global South.
14

International law’s discontents and excesses have always been exhibited at their starkest
along its peripheries, a realm that has otherwise come to be known as the Global South.17 The
relationship between the peripheries and the core of international law has been historically
captured by TWAIL scholarship. However, as TWAIL scholars readily attest, the Global South is
not solely defined by victimhood but by hegemonic and counter-hegemonic relations, shifting
and changing class alliances, and regional hubs of power and accumulation, rather than being the
southern part of a globe neatly divided into two. The complexity and multiple tensions within the
Global South are symptomatic of the general state of affairs in late capitalism. And yet, this is not
simply a case of the periphery mirroring what happens at the core. There are voices, forces and
opportunities that emanate from the Global South that take issue with, challenge and alter the
very enterprise of international law as it is shrouded on a pedestal at the core.
In response to the growth of international law’s involvements in the global management
of resources, movements of goods and people, and sustaining and embellishing accumulation
regimes across the Global South, there emerged a strong call against some of the key tenets of
international law since the 1990s. For instance, alter-globalization activists found their voice in
alternative governance models built upon North-South and red-green alliances, bringing together
organized labor, environmental groups, women's groups, and indigenous groups. Similarly,
different genres of protest movements began to propose alternative frames of reference both for
seeking justice and challenging traditional limits of adjudication in areas devastated by organized
violence, both political and economic. These distinct, albeit overlapping, responses to
international law, coming from legal scholars and in particular human rights lawyers linked with
the Global South, as well as activists and civil society groups, are indicative of a new conceptual
model for how we work with, translate, undo and redo international law.
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A. TWAIL: Both Methodology and Theory18
In this dissertation, I apply the rich and layered conceptual framework inherited from
TWAIL scholarship, combined with the activism and scholarship nexus in the Global South, to a
very specific area of international criminal law, that of universal jurisdiction as it pertains to
crimes against humanity. My point of departure is not the implications of the global application
of crimes against humanity legislation in international public law since the end of the Cold War.
Rather, I strive to elucidate the limitations of this particular legal construct’s applicability in a
rigid and ahistorical frame of reference dictated by centralized institutions such as international
courts. As a conceptual counterpoint to such an absolutist take, I argue that normative strategies
centered on the twin concepts of culpability/collective responsibility and human dignity could
offer a conceptually coherent and politically buoyant alternative. Furthermore, I argue that there
is an urgent need for a new frame of reference concerning erga omnes crimes and jus cogens
norms in order for international criminal law to speak to the realities of societies in the Global
South. This cannot be achieved through a simple reiteration of the conceptual precision of crimes
against humanity legislation, or the threat of universal jurisdiction pointing to trial at any court in
any constituency as seen fit. Indeed, there is an impasse concerning applications of international
criminal law, but in particular concerning crimes against humanity legislation in the Global
South. In this regard, critiquing state-centric notions of sovereign power or underlining the
hegemonic role played by international law in calcifying inherent power relations across the
globe only provides the beginnings of a critical conversation. In the following pages, I argue that
we need to go much further and dare to imagine a different path, leading to adjudication of
crimes against humanity much closer to where these crimes are committed. I also suggest that, on
the normative plane, the dictum of universal jurisdiction must be domesticated through
acceptance of collective responsibility for mass crimes and state criminality.
Critically navigating through the prevailing perspectives on international law, legal
pluralism, transitional justice, and legal ethics, this dissertation suggests that the current global
restructuring of legal regimes of accountability is reproducing subjectivities of marginalized,
dispossessed and deinstitutionalized groups in such a way that the terrain of political struggles are
18
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reduced to symbolic trials and formulaic sentencing. Here I propose an alternative outlook,
obliging the spirit of facing our own demons in the Global South and asking substantive ethical
questions about culpability, legal accountability, and societal responsibility concerning egregious
crimes that states and societies commit against their own people.
A major consequence of the global restructuring of economies, societies and states in the
Global South has been the twin processes of further market integration and privatization of what
were once common or public goods, on the one hand, and unprecedented social exclusion,
precariousness, and dispossession on the other.19 These processes naturally resulted in further
growth of the marginalized, displaced and deinstitutionalized subaltern classes, who often
became the natural targets for mass political violence at times of societal crises linked with
internal or regional conflicts. Standard international law debates on post-conflict legal regimes
and transitional justice measures barely touch base with this reality of structural inequalities that
preceded mass political violence. 20 In this spirit, this dissertation seeks to understand and
transform the way in which legal regimes of accountability affecting the Global South are studied
in international criminal law. The emphasis is on the larger historical context surrounding these
legal regimes and the limitations faced when law is used as the only or supreme tool for the
identification and remedy of injustices.
Ultimately, I remain concerned with institutional formalization of ideals such as universal
jurisdiction for societal and political mass crimes in international criminal law. Similarly, the
emergence of set forms of punishment for crimes falling under the purview of crimes against
humanity legislation, as enshrined by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),
deserves critical questioning. In this vein, this work strives to provide an account of
interpretations of crimes against humanity legislation against the terrain of self-realization, selforganization and genuine political engagement with the past in the Global South. It is written
against apocalyptic and dystopian narratives detailing the usurping and hegemonic monstrosity of
international law as much as against the universalistic preaching of it. This constitutes a vital
challenge to dominant narratives of international criminal law both from within the status quo
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and, to a degree, from the trenches of critical legal studies scholarship. There are inherent limits,
as well, to the standard readings of legal pluralism as the savior for all ills of international law.
Conceptually speaking, the Global South is one of the many “gray spaces” positioned
between

the

“whiteness”

of

legality/certainty,

and

the

“blackness”

of

irregularity/destruction/death. The vast expansion of such gray spaces in contemporary
geographies of conflict reflects the emergence of new types of power relations, which are
facilitated and managed by regimes in the Global South themselves. Traditional uses of
international law have been a lynchpin of this order, providing tools and methodologies to
classify, contain and manage deeply unequal societies. As a possible corrective horizon enabling
analytical and normative interventions, I propose focusing on the notion of societal/collective
responsibility as a counter-weight to the oppressive dilemmas marking the current discourse and
practice of international law as it pertains to crimes against humanity, the most universal of all
crimes defined under its aegis.
Overall, in this work I propose two kinds of upheaval. First and foremost, I insist that the
story about post-Nuremberg embodiments of crimes against humanity should no longer be told as
one where the states and societies in the Global South are striving hard to establish or
operationalize

accountability

regimes,

yet

have

only

a

few

“success stories.” Nor should the accent remain on the universalistic analysis of international
criminal law with its focus on the core legal institutions, since their authoritative take on crimes
against humanity has proven to be inadequate, inappropriate, or incomplete. My findings imply
that as a new generation of TWAIL scholars, we must identify the potential, and the limits, of an
external imposition of international criminal law without serious contextualization in both
historical and normative terms. Crimes against humanity legislation, and their domestication, are
sorely needed by the societies in the Global South—but not in the format in which they have
been offered thus far.
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B. The Neverland of International Law, or, Searching for the Global South21
How is the concept of the “Global South” to be understood in the context of international
(criminal) law? Though this is not the main focus of the present work, it is a very important part
of the metholodogical framework utilized throughout this work. This question is also central for
dealing with gross and egregious crimes committed in the Global South, ones that cannot
currently be addressed within the domestic legal setting in which the crimes were committed.
Applications of the existing dominant conceptual framework of international law to such cases
only produce more of the same: repeat scenarios of the universalization of international human
rights and humanitarian law, despite the opposing histories of these bodies of jurisprudence and
their meaning in the North and in the South. As a conceptual counterpoint to neutralized
universalization, and as an activist strategy towards rights protection and demands for
accountability, the need for greater conceptual precision in the analysis of international criminal
law should be reiterated. Chronologically speaking, the term “Global South” began to be used to
overcome the hierarchical or ideological implications of designations such as the Third World.22
It is also preferred if one refuses to attach epistemological privileges to adjectives of
“developing” or “developed” as both are applied to the Global South. In the context of
international law, the term owes its legitimacy mainly to TWAIL scholarship. This poses the risk,
then, of the Global South becoming a moniker for people who engage in “alternative approaches”
to international law. In other words, just as revolutions eat their own children, the very coinage of
21
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the term Global South introduced the risk of marginalizing the political and intellectual niche it
demarcates. Still, it is not only TWAIL scholars who hold onto it, and persistently so. Marxist
and neo-Marxist critics of contemporary international legal regimes have long pointed out that
the grid of international law is determined by the distribution of political and economic power,
which in turn created the phenomenon of Global South in the first place.23 Accordingly, contrary
to what the term “international” implies, there is not and never was substantive equality across
the contemporary canvas of nation-states. Nor is there a reason to believe that a global regime of
universal justice could be built upon or sustained within the existing system, due to the multiple
layers of historical injustice that have gone perpetuated, unattended or unresolved for centuries.
The Global South thus emerges as a domain at least partially paralyzed by the zealous plans for
its recuperation and neocolonial re-incorporation via the laws, politics, economies, and cultures
of the North.
This kind of nihilism concerning the reach and potency of international law is not
exhausted by the debates on the North-South divide. The issue assumes even darker tones and
more complicated dimensions in terms of South-South relations. Since present work’s focus is on
problems and concerns addressed from within the states and societies in the Global South, this is
of utmost significance here. Unequal relations within the Global South are often left unattended,
only touched upon in terms of the common resistance to the hegemonic nature of North-South
relations. Despite this tendency, and if such ruminations on neo-imperialist/post-colonial law can
be set aside momentarily, another perspective on international law as it relates to the Global
South emerges. This new vista relates to the “internal potential” of adaptations of international
law in the Global South, without removing the necessary emphasis on power relations or
historical contingencies.
Across the Global South, depending on our choice of delimiting or defining criteria, there
exist patterns of injustice and abuse that do not only stem from the historic or current
interventions of the North. Equally important is the admission that there is indeed law in the
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Global South, rather than its being a lawless place, or its legalities simply being a simulacrum of
“Western Law.”24 The key issue in this changed context is to decipher variant forms of legality
above and beyond the classic legal pluralism debate. Taking into consideration tensions endemic
to fragmented and overlapping legal regimes is a good starting point for the task at hand.25
Secondly, the Global South encompasses a rich canopy of political entities including not just
post-colonial nation-states, but also autonomous regional governance structures, federal
frameworks, overseeing public bodies such as regional courts and regulatory institutions, civil
society organizations, social and political movements, and embedded transnational actors such as
INGOs.26 In other words, it is not a mass of ex-colonial semi-states without teeth to bite, or a sea
of non-descript societies totally subservient to the interests of the North.27 Societies in the Global
South are not replicas of a post-colonial or post-imperial master model. Rather, they harbour their
own class structures, variant patterns and regimes of capital accumulation and labor control, and
different strategies of extraction and amassing of wealth. They also exhibit a wide range of
regional alliance-building trends and a canopy of constitutional arrangements that regulate the
relations between state and society. Consequently, it is apt to suggest that the Global South
possesses a multitude of “unique characteristics” as an object of international law and
administration, in particular international criminal law, rather than being a derivative of legal
realities emanating elsewhere, in the proverbial North.
24

Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, The new sovereignty (Harvard University Press, 1998).
Legal pluralism has become common currency in many contemporary debates on law, globalization and postcoloniality since the 1980s. Its most recent proponents claim that a new form of global legal pluralism represents
both the most accurate description of law in a global context and the best normative option. At the descriptive level,
transnational legal pluralism is indeed considered more reliable than state-based accounts. At the normative level,
legal pluralism is similarly trusted to open up spaces for previously unheard voices. On the issue of the limitations of
legal pluralism, however, see Mariano Croce & Marco Goldoni, "A sense of self-suspicion: global legal pluralism
and the claim to legal authority" (2015) 8 Ethics & Global Politics 1; Jiří Přibáň, "Asking the Sovereignty Question
in Global Legal Pluralism: From “Weak” Jurisprudence to “Strong” Socio-Legal Theories of Constitutional Power
Operations" (2015) 28 Ratio Juris 31; Mireille Delmas-Marty, Ordering pluralism: A conceptual framework for
understanding the transnational legal world (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2009).
26
For an all-encompassing debate on non-state actors in international law, see Math Noortmann, August Reinisch &
Cedric Ryngaert, eds., Non-state actors in international law (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015).
27
On the methodology of writing through the prism of the Global South, see the seminal work of Boike Rehbein,
Critical Theory After the Rise of the Global South: Kaleidoscopic Dialectic. Vol. 5 (Routledge, 2015). Also see R.
Connell, Southern Theory: The global dynamics of knowledge in social science (Polity Press, 2007); G. Therborn,
“Entangled Modernities” (2003) 6 European Journal of Social Theory 293; S. Randeria, “Entangled Histories of
Uneven Modernities: Civil Society, Caste Solidarities and Legal Pluralism in Post-Colonial India” in: Yehuda Elkana,
et al. (eds.) Unraveling Ties: From Social Cohesion to New Practices of Connectedness (Campus Verlag: 2002) at
284-311; S. N. Eisenstadt, “Multiple Modernities” (2002) 129 Daedalus 1; Anthony Giddens, “Living in a PostTraditional Society” in Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens & Scott Lash, Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition
and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order (Polity Press, 1994).
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Most of all, the Global South is understood as a politico-economic designation broadly
indicating the contours of the uneven development patterns of historical capitalism.28 The term
term contains all necessary references for histories of colonization, de-colonization, and postcoloniality, as well as structurally conditioned material and political inequalities cozily coupled
up with state-induced injustices. However, these factors by themselves do not explain how
international criminal law works or how it could work. Uneven development does not suffice as a
shortcut to societal accountability and collective responsibility. With these convictions in mind,
in the rest of this chapter debates on universal jurisdiction in international criminal law are
addressed, not from the vantage point of a North imposing law and order onto the Global South,
but from the angle of mitigation and litigation in the context of emergent hybrid regimes of
accountability within the Global South itself. In particular, the possibility of a regime of
“common but differentiated responsibilities” regarding crimes against humanity committed by
states against their own citizenry will be brought into focus.29 The over-used dichotomies of
North/South, developed/developing and First World/Third World offer no new or substantive
clues here. Urgent questions persist, but we must look for answers elsewhere. For instance, how
could we think through, rather than simply think about, unequal distributions of material wealth
and political power at a global scale, vis-à-vis their effects on the Global South? How do we deal
with societal crimes committed within the Global South by regimes themselves? Could specific
28

The critical literature on the subject includes Anthony Anghie, Imperialism, sovereignty and the making of
international law. Vol. 37. (Cambridge University Press, 2007); Mark Goodale and Sally Engle Merry, eds. The
practice of human rights: Tracking law between the global and the local (Cambridge University Press, 2007);
Bhupinder S. Chimni, "Third World approaches to international law: a manifesto” (2006) 8 Int'l Comm. L. Rev. 3;
Boaventura de Sousa Santos & César A. Rodríguez-Garavito, eds,. Law and globalization from below: towards a
cosmopolitan legality (Cambridge University Press, 2005); Obiora Chinedu Okafor, "Newness, imperialism, and
international legal reform in our time: a TWAIL perspective" (2005) 43 Osgoode Hall LJ 171; Balakrishnan
Rajagopal, International law from below: Development, social movements and third world resistance (Cambridge
University Press, 2003); and Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: law, globalization,
and emancipation (Cambridge University Press, 2002).
29
For international criminal law regimes, the importance of the notion of crimes against humanity (CAH) is twofold. These are offensive acts against human dignity committed as part of widespread or systemic attack against
civilian populations. They can be a series of events or a one-time event, planned and committed by state or non-state
organized groups, supported by a distinct policy or ideology. As such, they are not context-bound. Secondly, they
signify a sense of justice that hinges upon dictates of the public conscience. See Eveylon Mack & Corrie Westbrook,
"Does Customary International Law Obligate States to Extradite or Prosecute Individuals Accused of Committing
Crimes against Humanity" (2015) 24 Minn. J. Int'l L. 73; Leila N. Sadat, "Codifying the ‘Laws of Humanity’ and the
‘Dictates of the Public Conscience’: Towards a New Global Treaty on Crimes Against Humanity" in On the
Proposed Crimes Against Humanity Convention, Morten Bergsmo & Song Tianying, eds. (Torkel Opsahl Academic
EPublisher 2014) at 17-46; Cherif M. Bassiouni, "Crimes against humanity: the case for a specialized convention"
(2010) 9 Wash. U. Global stud. l. rev. 575.
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needs of criminal justice, as they pertain to universal jurisdiction, be served within existing
domestic legal frameworks, but via novel forms of collaboration facilitated through hybrid
mechanisms—through which the South can use international criminal law or international human
rights law jurisprudence for its own internal purposes?
Ultimately, neither supporters of the universal jurisdiction paradigm, nor the group of
scholars whom we might call “international law universalists,” can be trusted with the task of
articulating an adequate notion of justice pertaining to most egregious crimes committed by states
against their own people. Both offer solutions that don’t fit, and insist on priorities and methods
that don’t deliver. Once all is said and done in some criminal court, the work of creating a more
just society has only begun.30 Furthermore, the biggest obstacle to developing a more nuanced
and grounded approach to mass crimes is already an erosion of the North/South divide. The
greatest impediment to reaching a substantive understanding of the legitimacy, efficacy, or even
possibility of international law in both the Global North and the Global South is the ascription of
preconceived consequences to democratic constitutionalism, which owes its crowned position to
the persistence of the statist paradigm in international law. Viewed in its lens, anything
“international” looks suspect due to its presumed lack of legitimacy. Accordingly, legal practices
emerging under the UN Charter, or courts such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), or general customary international law, are declared
to be troubled by unique problems of coherence, efficacy and legitimacy, problems which
national domestic law supposedly does not suffer from. Statist constitutional thinking distorts the
assessment of multifocal, transnational, and in general pluralist legal practices. It exaggerates the
value of domestic constitutional practices, to the point of casting a thick cloud of suspicion over
any form of legal normativity beyond state-made law. Last but not the least, statism—particularly
the kind that is coupled with international law universalism—neglects the connection between
domestic legitimacy and efficacy and the wider regional or global contexts in which public law
practices unfold. This is yet another instance of misguided separation. National and transnational
legal and political practices are much more closely connected than conventional legal wisdom of
30

There are myriad examples of universalist international law scholarship, as it dominates the theoretical debates in
this field. Suffice it to say, some make a stronger case than others, and they therefore constitute worthy interlocutors
for the ongoing debate on the applications of universal jurisdiction as seen from the perspective of the Global South.
See for instance the overviews provided by Dennis Patterson, "Cosmopolitanism and Global Legal Regimes" (2015)
67 Rutgers UL Rev. 7; and Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in international law (Oxford University Press, 2015).
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either kind allows us to acknowledge.
To summarize, the statist paradigm of democratic constitutionalism, along with its idealist
distortions leading to the presumption of absolute legitimacy of state law (and the faux realism of
rejecting all law beyond the state-made kind), constitute the framework within which
international law is most commonly imprisoned. The efficacy of domestic constitutionalism is so
exaggerated that, especially in the area of human rights law, it reaches dangerous proportions.
The standard reason given is a quotidian argument about the lack of domestic constitutional
provisions for international human rights law, with repeated references to the enactment of
emergency measures at times of breakdown of civil order and civil war. Meanwhile, law remains
fragile and vulnerable to social and political forces both inside and outside the domestic sphere.
In addition, national domestic law is often conditioned by and dependent upon the wider legal
and political context in which it takes shape. Legal scholars of the TWAIL persuasion know this
all too well. Perhaps one may go so far as to argue that the statist framing of international law, in
the form of a renewed devotion to democratic constitutionalism, is just another Westphalian
fantasy par excellence, albeit replaying itself some 400 years later and in a distinctly postcolonial context.
At this point, a cautionary note is necessary. The limited scope of universal jurisdiction
for select crimes such as crimes against humanity, and its careful application through institutions
such as hybrid courts, as discussed in the upcoming pages of this dissertation do not constitute
proof that international law is inherently legitimate. An ethically cloaked international legalism
suggesting that we all have an innate disposition to appreciate law in select areas of criminality
and violence, otherwise known as the common sense approach to law, is not a requirement for
endorsing hybrid courts, either. Nonetheless, it is apt to insist that the statist paradigm suggests
falsely that state-level law concerning restorative justice for political violence and mass crimes
must or can be framed solely at the domestic level. The presumption that there is a fundamental
difference or an unsurpassable separation between state law and law beyond the state, at least in
the realm of public law, is itself not only false but also anathema to the very history of human
rights struggles. In this vein, horizontal connections among burgeoning international, regional
and hybrid adjudication mechanisms, as well as vertical relations between international courts
and domestic ones, are the axes upon which universal jurisdiction in the Global South must be
24

scrutinized.
Since the foundation of the ICC, there have been substantial changes in the ethos as well
as the methods underlying the operationalization of international criminal law in the Global
South. Whereas the norm that once informed international adjudication was the top-town
imposition of legal precepts, there is now a growing body of hybrid jurisprudence, as well as an
emergent class of national jurisprudence conversant in international criminal law. Indeed, a close
look at the contemporary international judicial landscape would quickly draw our attention to the
role of national courts in applying international law, despite the myriad jurisdictional and
normative conflicts and compliance problems pertaining to universal jurisdiction in select areas
such as crimes against humanity. This seems to be the way South for top-down approaches to
international law, a predicament that I intend to stand against throughout this work.
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Chapter I. Beware the Gift of a White Elephant31: Topographies of Universal Jurisdiction in
International Law, Legal Pluralism and the Curious Case of the International Criminal Court

INTRODUCTION
Legal theory has long accentuated the institutional distinctiveness of law from other areas
of society, portraying law as discrete, internally coherent and thus self-referential and almost
autonomous.32 To distinguish law from other normative elements in society, one does not need to
31

The White Elephant refers to a valuable possession whose cost, and in particular the cost of its upkeep, exceeds its
supposed usefulness; it is regarded as a metaphor signifying an elegant liability. The term derives from the sacred
white elephants kept by traditional Southeast Asian monarchs in Burma, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia. To possess a
white elephant was historically regarded as a sign that the monarch was ruling with justice and the kingdom was
blessed with peace and prosperity. However, since the animals were considered sacred and laws protected them from
labour, receiving the gift of a white elephant from a monarch was both a blessing and a curse: a blessing because of
the animal’s sacred nature, and a curse because the animal could not be put to practical use and was very costly to
look after and keep alive.
32 In his The Concept of Law ([1961] 1994), Herbert L. A. Hart provided a canonical analysis of the relation between
law, coercion, and morality, and addressed the question of whether and when law should be conceptualized as a
coercive order or as a moral command. In Hart’s view, there is no logically necessary connection between law and
coercion or between law and morality. He also takes a stance against imposing a misleading appearance of
uniformity on different kinds of laws and on different kinds of social functions that law may perform. Instead, he
posits the existence of variety in the content, mode of origin, and range of application of law. Accordingly, laws that
impose duties or obligations on individuals are described by Hart as “primary rules” of obligation. In order for a
system of primary rules to function effectively, he then argues that “secondary rules” will be necessary to provide an
authoritative statement of the primary rules. Secondary rules allow legislators to make changes in the primary rules if
the primary rules are found to be defective or inadequate. They also enable courts to resolve disputes over the
interpretation and application of the primary rules. The secondary rules of a legal system thus include rules of
recognition, rules of change, and rules of adjudication. Meanwhile, secondary rules themselves, i.e. the formal
qualities of law, do not guarantee delivery of justice in and of themselves. If the primary rules are not sufficiently
clear or intelligible, then there may be uncertainty about the obligations that have been imposed on individuals.
Neither are primary rules sufficient, in and of themselves, to establish a system of laws that can be formally
recognized, changed, or adjudicated. Primary rules must be combined with secondary rules in order to establish a
legal system. A second distinction Hart introduces is between “external” and “internal” points of view with respect to
how the rules of a legal system may be described or evaluated. The external point of view is that of an observer who
does not necessarily have to accept the rules of a given legal system. The internal point of view, on the other hand, is
that of individuals who are governed by the rules of a given legal system and who accept these rules as standards of
conduct. According to Hart, there are two minimum requirements that must be satisfied in order for a legal system to
exist: private citizens must obey the primary rules of obligation, and public officials must accept the secondary rules
of recognition, change, and adjudication as standards of official conduct. Finally, according to Hart, there is no
necessary logical connection between the content of law and morality, and the existence of legal rights and duties
may be devoid of any moral justification. For this debate, see HLA Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals” (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 593. Hart’s interpretation of the relation between law and morality
significantly differs from that of Ronald Dworkin, who in his Law’s Empire (1986) suggests that every legal action
has a moral dimension. Dworkin rejects the concept of law as acceptance of conventional patterns of recognition, and
describes law as an interpretive process combining jurisprudence and adjudication. In this general context,
international law is seen as problem-laden by Hart, since it may not possess all of the elements of a fully developed
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negate the fact that law is indeed a broad phenomenon. One immediate way in which law’s
multidimensionality, complexity, and lack of unity can be identified is to look at law beyond state
boundaries. In this sense, looking at the contemporary legal landscape in the age of late
capitalism and globalization is both challenging and rewarding for the attempt to capture the
complexities of law. Meanwhile, the historical fact of the coexistence of multiple legal orders
says nothing as to their moral worthiness or capacity for justice. In this sense, recognition of the
complexity and plurality of contemporary legal regimes is only the starting point for present-day
legal theory.
In this opening chapter, I will endeavour to answer the question of why we should care
about the contemporary multiplicity of legal regimes, otherwise known as transnational law, in
the specific context of accountability for state criminality. If state interests and domestic judiciary
interpretations of international law are by and large coincident with preferences of national
political leadership and local legislative concerns, what would be the point in reaching for a
theory of international law that is not fixated on the Westphalian order of things? How are we to
appreciate the consolidation of customary law and regulatory regimes that go above and beyond
the direct mandate of the executive powers of states and domestic justice systems? State-centric
accounts of international law no doubt entertain a rather rigid view of international law and of the
actors who occupy the contemporary legal universe. In contradistinction, alternative accounts
discussed in this chapter provide a depiction of international law as transnational law and, as a
result, present us with a different topographical view of accountability regimes. In this changed
context, international-cum-transnational law is seen as a complex deliberative process.
Furthermore, international law is seen as a battleground for multifarious interests and actors, only
one of which is the state, each trying to determine legal or semi-legal outcomes and judicial

legal system. International law may lack secondary rules of recognition, change, and adjudication. International
legislatures may not always have the power to enforce sanctions against nations who disobey international law.
Finally, international courts may not always have jurisdiction over legal disputes between nations. In
contradistinction, according to Dworkin legal theory does not merely identify the rules of a legal system, but also
interprets and evaluates them. A complete legal theory must consider not only the relation between law and coercion
(i.e. the force of law), but also the relation between law and rightfulness or justifiability (i.e. the grounds of law). On
this issue, also see Herbet L.A. Hart, "The New Challenge to Legal Positivism (1979)" (2016) 36 Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies 459 [the reprint of the original lecture delivered in 1979], and Andrzej Grabowski, “The Missing Link
in the Hart–Dworkin Debate” (2016) 36 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 476.
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processes to their benefit at a global level. 33 This alternate take on international law
acknowledges the inherently plural (though not necessarily pluralist) composition of law, and
engages with the multiple processes involved in the making and utilization of such law. This
determination, in turn, is crucial for fostering a systemic understanding of jurispathic and
jurisgenerative dimensions of international law, and could lead to a fruitful expansion of theories
of jurisprudence concerning state criminality beyond the domain of domestic legal regimes.34
The question that guides this chapter’s discussion of the fragmented, plural and
transnational nature of contemporary international law is whether the nomos (normative universe)
of Robert Cover’s jurisprudential account of law, when applied to a global context, is
substantively different from what we are accustomed to dealing with in national, domestic
contexts.35 This discussion also lends itself to addressing the tension between ideas of monism
and pluralism in legal scholarship. As I already outlined in the opening of this work, legal
monism signifies a pervasive positivist understanding of law as a unified structure of valid rules
and principles contained within a solid institutional framework.36 Legal pluralism, on the other
33

For a promising and hopeful account of the making of international law in the era of transnational politics and
global economy, see Janet Koven Levit, "A bottom-up approach to international lawmaking: the tale of three trade
finance instruments" (2005) 30 Yale J. Int'l L. 125. Also see Ralf Michaels, "The re-state-ment of non-state law: the
state, choice of Law, and the challenge from global legal pluralism" (2005) 51 Wayne L. Rev. 1209; Balakrishnan
Rajagopal, "The role of law in counter-hegemonic globalization and global legal pluralism: lessons from the
Narmada Valley struggle in India" (2005) 18 Leiden Journal of International Law 345; Paul Schiff Berman, "Global
legal pluralism" (2006) 80 Cal. l. Rev. 1155; Ralf Michaels, "The true lex mercatoria: law beyond the state" (2007)
14 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 447; Peer Zumbansen, "The law of society: governance through
contract" (2007) 14 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 191.
34
Robert Cover theorizes “jurisgenesis” or the creation of legal meaning as a process that is not reliant on the state or
any given central authority. Instead, the normative world or nomos within which jurisgenesis occurs is defined as the
amalgamation of multiple social, historical, cultural and political factors, leading to various “interpretive
commitments.” In Cover’s work, the pronouncements of judges and legislatures constitute only a particular nomos
that cannot encompass all that is possible in terms of creation of legal meaning. In this sense, state law in its
traditional definition is not considered the central or superior source of jurisgenesis. Cover’s work on Talmudic
traditions and other renditions of law provides examples of several religious communities inhabiting a distinct nomos
in the context of their religious commitments. These traditions identify their own paradigms for lawful behaviour and
reduce the state-made law and its impositions to one element in their normative environment. In other words, while
each nomos is constituted in part by state or central law, each has a different interpretation of it. Amongst this
plenitude or plurality of laws, Cover argues that the function of the state is jurispathic, or disciplinary and violenceprone, rather than enaged in norm creation. The function of the judge in this context is defined as suppressing the
plurality of law by choosing one interpretation as the official and justiciable one. See Robert M. Cover, "Nomos and
Narrative” (1983) 97 Harv L Rev 4.
35
Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 21.
36
The epistemological foundations of legal monism were most succinctly theorized by the Vienna School of
Jurisprudence and its leading proponents, on the basis of its crucial elements: the Grundnorm, the hierarchy of
norms, and the unity of the law. Subsequently, the theory of legal monism was developed and defended against both
dualism and pluralism in terms of its explanatory power in describing the trigonal relationship between national law,
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hand, emphasizes the multiplicity of legal practices and the hybridity of socio-political platforms
upon which legal edifices are built in the forms of institutions, rule-based structures, and regimes.
At least for the last two decades, legal pluralism has already become common currency in
contemporary debates on law and globalization, its main claim being that a form of global legal
pluralism represents both the most accurate description of law within globalization and the best
normative option. At the descriptive level, global legal pluralism is considered more reliable than
state-based accounts. At the normative level, global legal pluralism is understood as providing a
platform for opening up the legal realm to previously unheard voices.37
In the following pages, I argue that in the area of international law, the transnationalist
view allows current debates on legal pluralism to serve in the construction of a new
understanding of law in a global context, albeit with important limitations. The still operational
conservative emphasis in legal theory on the singularity, uniformity, harmonization, and totality
of legal systems, depending on the context within which law is discussed, could be relaxed both
empirically and normatively through the ethos of legal pluralism combined with a re-inscription
of international law as transnational law.38 In this case, the study of international law would no
longer be circumscribed by inquiries about how we maintain the integrity of law as a system. It
would also not be limited by the need to be socially responsive, adaptive, culturally inclusive and
respectful of existing normative systems.39 Instead, it would allow as much attention to injustice
regional law, and public international law. On the philosophical foundations of monism, see Luke MacInnis, "Two
Concepts of Monism: Axiomatic and Asymptotic" (2015) 77 The Review of Politics 603. For critiques of monism,
see Roderick Macdonald, "Metaphors of multiplicity: civil society, regimes and legal pluralism" (1998) 15 Ariz. J.
Int'l & Comp. L. 69; Mirjam Künkler and Yüksel Sezgin, "The unification of law and the postcolonial state: The
limits of state Monism in India and Indonesia" (2016) 60 American Behavioral Scientist 987; Violeta Moreno-Lax
and Paul Gragl, “Introduction: Beyond Monism, Dualism, PluralismThe Quest for a (Fully-Fledged) Theoretical
Framework: Co-Implication, Embeddedness, and Interdependency between Public International Law and EU
Law" (2016) 35 Yearbook of European Law 455.
37
See Peer Zumbansen, "Transnational legal pluralism" (2010) 1 Transnational Legal Theory 141; and Emmanuel
Melissaris, Ubiquitous law: legal theory and the space for legal pluralism (Routledge, 2016). No doubt, legal
positivism's failure to adequately capture the complexity of contemporary legal orders makes legal pluralism all the
more preferable as a descriptive theory of law. However, legal pluralism does not necessarily offer a normatively
desirable view of law, unless it is supplemented by a theory of critical legal justice. On the limits of legal pluralism,
see Sionaidh Douglas Scott, Law after modernity (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013).
38
See Margaret Davies, "The Ethos of Legal Pluralism" (2005) 27 Sydney Law Review 317. Also see Jonathan
Crowe, "The limits of legal pluralism" (2015) 24 Griffith Law Review 314; and Margaret Davies, Law Unlimited
(Routledge, 2017). This debate continues amongst legal theory scholars and remains loyal to the format that was
originally defined by the Hart-Raz-Dworkin exchanges.
39
This said, scholars such as John Griffiths make the point of distinguishing between “weak” and “strong” pluralism.
Weak legal pluralism indicates that differences are recognized and managed by a dominant legal system. An example
for this in the area of international law would be the ironing out of inconsistencies between laws of the state and laws
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and discontent as to harmonization and consent. Indeed, the presumed conflict and perpetual
conceptual tension between a depiction of a singular, all-controlling international law with
universal applicability and one of co-existing legal orders within a complex web of relations is an
outmoded view. Quasi-legal decision-making bodies (such as hybrid courts or regulatory bodies),
the internal governance systems of large organizations, alternative modes of dispute resolution
and arbitration, regulative systems with a global reach, and myriad other forms and settings that
produce legal or law-like effects clearly indicate the multiplicity of legal regimes at the
transnational level, encompassing the domestic, the international, and a third dimension that
cannot be reduced to either of the first two, the global.40 The critical issue is how to read this
complexity within a historical context that includes state-based domestic jurisprudence without
prioritizing it at the expense of all else.
The persistent focus on the singularity of legal discourse as an internally coherent system
or on the institutional qualities of legal regimes, including the more recent version focusing on
novel forms of constitutionalism, has become a source of frustration for a growing number of

dictated by international bodies and covenants, a practice commonly known as harmonization. This definition,
however, leaves out the importance of judiciary interpretation during and after the adaptation process. Perhaps better
examples would be arbitration tribunals and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms operating within the
parameters of existing national legal systems and in full regard of constitutional principles and premises. It should
also be noted that the recognition of such normative/substantive differences, to the extent that they are contained and
sealed within the realm of dominant law, does not constitute a threat to the doctrine of centralism. In contrast,
“strong” legal pluralism is defined as the irreducibility of differences of legal doctrines and/or applications and
procedures under the rubric of a singular institutional authority such as a state or an international court. Thus, in the
context of strong legal pluralism, two or more legal regimes co-exist in tandem and there is endemic tension between
different legal orders, and a dynamic and often conflictual relationship exists between the different bodies of law
attending to same or similar realms. It is also important to note that this is not simply a matter of jurisdictional reach.
The aforementioned tensions and conflicts may pertain to the substantive elements of the law, as well. In this latter
context, the claims of singularity and centrality are inherently unstable and self-contradictory. See John Griffiths,
“What is Legal Pluralism?” 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 1 (1986). On varieties of legal
pluralism without direct reference to international law, see inter alia, MB Hooker, Legal pluralism: an introduction
to colonial and neo-colonial laws (Clarendon Press, 1975); Sally Engle Merry, "Legal pluralism" (1988) 22 Law &
Society Review 869; Paul Ricoeur, “The Plurality of Sources of Law” (1994) 7 Ratio Juris 272; Martha-Marie
Kleinhans and Roderick MacDonald, “What is a Critical Legal Pluralism?” (1997) 12 Canadian Journal of Law and
Society 25; Brian Tamanaha, “A Non-Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism” (2000) 27 Journal of Law & Society
296; and Christoph Eberhard, “Towards an Intercultural Legal Theory” (2001) 10 Social & Legal Studies 171
(2001). Meanwhile, in the area of theories of jurisprudence, whether Dworkin’s work delivers a legal pluralist ethos
remains debatable, as he is often accused of reducing the pluralism of the community that bestows a meaning onto
law into a singular entity with a definable set of moral values and normative choices. See Ronald Dworkin, Law's
empire (Harvard University Press, 1986).
.
40
See Peer Zumbansen, “Transnational Law” in The Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Edward Elgar 2006), 738754.
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legal scholars and legal practitioners.41 State law by and large continues to be paraded as a
superior enterprise, characterized by its coherence and internal consistency, and by its autonomy
from other, non-state-related normative domains. In this context, the first question I will attempt
to answer here is whether legal pluralism, when applied to international law, could produce the
desired change of optics and allow for a focus on multiplicity, diversity, and conflict.42 The next
question is to what extent a legal pluralistic frame of reference would allow us to understand the
inner dynamics of fragmented and sometimes overlapping accountability regimes in international
law, particularly in relation to the phenomenon of state criminality. This latter inquiry will be
undertaken through a discussion of universal jurisdiction.

I. APPLICATIONS OF LEGAL PLURALISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TOPOGRAPHICAL
OUTLOOK
The tenuous relationship between international law and theories of jurisprudence, as
briefly touched on in the introduction to this chapter, has traditionally created a barrier to the
establishment of a framework within which international law could be understood from the point
of view of legal theory. To say the least, international law was posited as lacking the second order
rules and regulations defined by H.L.A. Hart and thus lacking in substantive tenets of a genuine
legal system.43 In the nexus of international law and international politics, on the other hand, the
relationship appears to be somewhat less troublesome. Often, international relations scholars
would look for three elements in order to determine the existence of a legal system: a legal
concept, a structure or framework capable of supporting its operationalization as law, and the
political consensus to recognize it as law.44 This mode of thinking promises to look beyond the
debate over ‘legal norm creation’ in international law, and to expand analysis of the relationship
41

See Stephen Gill and A. C. Cutler, New Constitutionalism and World Order (Cambridge University Press 2014).
The term “two optics” as a methodological approach was originally coined by Robert Keohane. See Robert
Keohane, “International relations and International law: Two optics” (1997) 38 Harward International Law Journal
487.
43 See Jeffrey Danof, Steven Ratner & David Wippman, International Law: Norms, Actors, Process (Kluwer Law,
2015).
44
See Paul F. Diehl, Charlotte Ku and Daniel Zamora, The Dynamics of International Law: The Interaction of
Normative and Operating Systems 57 INT’L ORG 43 (2003). For introducing me to this literature first hand, I am
indebted to Craig Scott’s and Ruth Buchanan’s graduate seminars on Transnational Law and Peer Zumbansen’s work
on the subject undertaken at Osgoode Hall Law School.
42
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between theories of jurisprudence and international law. Consequently, it dwells on international
law’s effectiveness and target constituencies. From this perspective, international law is not seen
only as a coherent collection of rules, prescriptions, and aspirations governing the conduct of
states and other international actors through legal processes and jurisdictional negotiations; it is
described as a complex structure composed of norms, actors, processes and institutions.
Interventions by international relations scholarship has also cut short the somewhat stale
conversation on treaty implementation and compliance. In its place, their work invites us to turn
our attention to institutional and system-wide normative characteristics of international law, as
well as to the authority and governance structures endemic to its operations.
In order to achieve such an insight from within legal scholarship, and not only with
reference to international relations theory pertaining to international law, a broader frame of
analysis is needed around the nature of law and its internal and external meanings, as the scale is
enlarged to global dimensions. In the following pages, I will provide a brief account of select
debates in the history of legal pluralism scholarship and their applications to international law.
The sequence starts with a broad overview of legal pluralism and the legacy of the New Haven
School. It then proceeds with a specific branch of international law scholarship, TWAIL (Third
World Approaches to International Law) and its effects on our thinking in terms of understanding
international law. This short overview concludes with contemporary interjections made by legal
theorists who strive to bridge the gap between jurisprudential scholarship and studies of
international law from a radical, reflexive or critical legal pluralism perspective, otherwise known
as third-generation legal pluralist scholarship. Although my very modest attempt at creating a
topography of critical approaches to international law could no doubt include the rich and layered
debates exemplified by the work of critical legal studies scholars, feminist legal theorists, critical
race theorists, postcolonial debates on justice, and other very important schools of thought, these
are not explicitly included. This is due to the limitations posed by my choice of focus, legal
pluralism and what it can and cannot offer for rethinking accountability regimes in international
law.
Until recently, legal pluralist scholarship was divided into two main debates. ‘Classical’
legal pluralism refers to anthropological and socio-historical analyses of legal systems of excolonial or post-colonial societies, which had dual or multiple legal systems derived from
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indigenous pre-colonial folk, communal, or customary law on the one hand and imperial law on
the other. In contrast, ‘second wave’ legal pluralism entertained the insight that all societies,
formerly colonized or not, are composed of multiple ‘semi-autonomous’ fields of normative
control and legal discourse. This latter position purported the co-existence of many forms of law,
the majority of which are non-territorial, non-state, local, or international, and horizontal rather
than hierarchical. Both schools of legal pluralism concentrate on legal plurality, and challenge the
presumption that state law is singular or indeed a superior source for legal meaning or conduct.
However, they have paid scant attention to the jurisprudential characteristics of the plurality of
legal discourses, except in the debate initiated by the work of Robert Cover and continued by
Gunther Teubner and David Trubek.45 I will call this the ‘third wave’ of legal pluralism,
whereby legal scholarship developed a rich analytical approach for the study of different modes
of law and the struggle amongst them in terms of co-existence within a dynamic normative
landscape embodying imminent tensions. In this context, the work of contemporary legal scholars
such as Ruth Buchanan, Marti Koskenniemi, Rajagopal Balakrishnan, and Issa Shivji, among
others, attends to the conundrums of international law. This latest debate does not assume that
pluralism in law is merely exhibited in a multiplicity of ‘semi-autonomous’ systems separated by
territory, culture, or history. Rather, an attempt is made to theorize law as a process in which
legal actors, legal subjects and legal norms are interdependent and effected by power and politics
at large. The third wave took the legal pluralist premise that law cannot be defined according to a
fixed set of criteria one step further, and began to ask what ‘other’ criteria are to be used for the
identification of different forms of law and legal regimes, distinct from those espoused by
canonized theories of jurisprudence. As legal pluralism began to be reframed by critical
international law scholarship from within the Global South, the establishment of a theoretical
nexus between a plural view of law and the various manifestations of socio-economic and
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political power became manifest.46
Theoretically speaking, understanding legal plurality is conditional upon the recognition
of irreducibly different accounts and experiences of law at a global scale. In this sense, there is a
need for the legal pluralism debate to move beyond empirical descriptions of different legal
regimes as straightforward socio-legal facts. Precisely in such a spirit, the third wave of legal
pluralism attends to the conceptual complexities inherent in the production and maintenance of
legal regimes in a world-historical context. This genre of thinking about law and legality is
capable of attending to the ways normative systems are construed as discursive practices rather
than mere products of institutions. In addition, the ideals of closure and order are coupled with an
appetite for disorder, chaos, change, and exceptionalities that prove the rules. In this sense, as
Brian Tamanaha redefines it, the central question of legal pluralism can no longer be the different
forms that ‘law’ takes, but what law is in its multifarious definitions 47 Appreciation of
incommensurably different conceptualizations of law can lead to a reflective analysis of the
historical specificity of mainstream Western definitions of law, as seen in TWAIL scholarship.48
Furthermore, by moving beyond descriptive recognition of the multitude of legal or law-like
normative systems, a critically oriented pluralism could point to the inherent diversity of legal
regimes at a global scale—and so allow for the discussion of plural sources, plural modes of
reasoning, and complex and contradictory forms of interaction between different legal regimes.
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Finally, in terms of jurisprudential debates, law is incapable of grounding itself, and its
conceptual foundations rest on other elements that are traditionally regarded as outside law.
These elements also provide the contextual meaning of law in socio-political terms. Acceptance
of the necessary relationship between internal and external elements of law is a foundational
premise of legal pluralism.49 Indeed, critiques of the autonomy and separateness of law began
with questioning the internal coherence of law.50 In this sense, the third wave of legal pluralism is
of direct use for the study of international law in a global context, and more specifically for
attending to what emerged as transnational law in the age of late capitalism and neocolonialism.51
A. The Legacy of the New Haven School
During the roughly four decades in which the concept legal pluralism has been used in
legal scholarship, it has become a subject of many a politically charged debate. Starting with
Brian Tamanaha’s article on the ‘folly of legal pluralism’ (1993), attention was drawn to the
‘legal pluralist movement’ associated with the Commission on Folk Law and Legal Pluralism and
the Journal of Legal Pluralism. Tamahana argued that equalizing normative orders that are
fundamentally different from each other and calling them all ‘law’ was a questionable practice.
Still, reserving the concept of law for only state-made law leads to an essentialist and ahistorical
conception of law, and legal pluralism was guilty as charged for being the first one pointing to
the elephant in the room.52
Indeed, legal pluralism is an essential component of thinking about law above and beyond
the state, both domestically and globally. In this section, I will discuss how, applied to the critical
understanding of law developed by legal pluralism, these two frames, local and global, inform
each other. The subject matter of this work is universal jurisdiction and accountability regimes
49
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pertaining to state criminality. Therefore, my priority will be to understand the workings of law at
the global scale, although in the latter half I will also engage with the debate on legal judgment as
it relates to state criminality in situ. In this vein, transnational law provides a direct entry to the
discussion of the relationship between globalization, historical capitalism and law. The scope of
analysis and conceptual aspirations delivered by the term transnational law are markedly different
from what pertains to traditional depictions of international law. As marked by the canonized
Yale lectures of Philip Jessup, transnational law challenges the frame of thinking that long
characterized international law, and supplements it with a framework that allows grasping the
plurality of interactions among state and non-state actors as well as between states.53 Yet these
observations are far from having received general acceptance. Many still ask whether
transnational law indeed promises a different conceptual framework than the one habitually
utilized by scholars and practitioners of international law. A related question is whether
transcendence of national frontiers is the main criteria for deeming forms of law and practices of
regulation ‘transnational’ and, if so, whether this is enough to require a significant change of
focus in legal scholarship. Does the observable increase in the multitude of norm-producing
institutions and actors constitute a good enough reason for coming up with a different term for
the legal universe that lies beyond the nation-state while also encapsulating it? What is the main
impetus behind the uprooting of ‘dearly-held convictions of jurisdictional boundaries and
competences’?54 Would it not be better to refer to the phenomena under discussion as the ‘law of
globalization’ rather than transnational law?
These questions have a relatively long history in the realm of legal scholarship and, what is
more, they are not unique to the area of international law. As the debates examined in this section
will reveal, the role of law within dispersed and fragmented spaces of norm production has been a
familiar topic since the early days of legal pluralism and critical legal studies.55 What is perhaps
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new is the thorough consideration of the effects related to power and legitimacy of law at a global
scale.56 Yet again, this shift in focus constitutes a significant challenge to the state-centered view
of not only international law, but also constitutional and regulatory law. Furthermore, the
recognition of private actors’ and organized interests’ growing relevance for law and legal
regimes allows for a much more nuanced and dynamic understanding of the relationship between
state and non-state actors, among states, and, between various legal actors and institutions in
general. The growing complexity of de-centered or multi-centric socio-legal and political
discourses around transnational activities requires an equally diverse and flexible frame of
reference. The term ‘transnational,’ conjoined with pluralism, is supposed to be that very
panacea.57 However, a change of terms alone by no means produces all-encompassing solutions
to theoretical or practical problems. Besides, there is an ongoing debate within the field of
transnational law over the characterization of this field, i.e. whether it is fluid, semi-structured
and cooperative, or a mirror image of power inequalities, antagonistic relations, and anarchistic
tendencies projected onto the area of law.58 Transnational law, deemed neither domestic nor
international but both and more, is thus equally important for constitutional and administrative
law in a global context. For some, transnational law is where real change will emerge, dethroning
the monstrosity of global capitalism and neo-liberal empires. For those who hold this viewpoint,
transnational law, by way of providing a platform for new forms of governance, is expected to
overcome the alleged separation of domestic and international realms and provide a global sense
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of transparency for legal conflicts and clashes of interest.59
Against this introductory background on transnational law, and at the juncture of
international law and legal pluralism scholarship that led to the debate on transnationalism, the
New Haven School played a pivotal role. Its scholars, including Myers S. McDougal, Harold D.
Lasswell and Michael Reisman, were among the most influential groups of legal thinkers in the
field of international law since WWII.60 In their spirited response to Cold War realism, they put
their faith in legal processes, rules, and norms, at the expense of the might of naked power in
world politics. Theirs was a choice made in the name of recognizing the transformative normative
power of what they saw as international legal practices. Their departure both from legal
positivism and political realism61 saved them from the pitfalls of a doctrinal quest for ‘what law
is’ in the international arena. Instead, they turned their gaze to issues concerning how non-state
law is created, how it operates, how it affects domestic decisions, and how it influences the
shaping of multiple forms of legal regimes. The legacy of the New Haven School is perhaps best
summarized in two basic questions: What is international law made of, and, who makes it?
Deriving from these two questions, other concerns emerged, such as determining whether
international law is primarily a system of edicts or rather a complex process with indeterminate
ends.
In their charting of the topography of international law, adherents of the New Haven
School fundamentally challenged the foundational assumptions about the nature of law and legal
regimes that had dominated legal scholarship until then. The School’s main impetus for engaging
in this kind of critique was their belief in the possibility of ‘bottom-up international law making’
with respect to the codification of international rules and norms, as opposed to a top-down
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understanding of formal legal systems obsessed with state sovereignty.62 They certainly did not
regard the nation-state as the primary lawmaker. They also refused to privilege treaty law as the
preeminent form of international law. They denied that international law was simply an eliteorchestrated process of hegemonic power-building under the cloak of legality. Instead, they saw
it as an uneven and yet lively battlefield of variant stakeholders and interests. Consequently, it
became possible to regard international law as a legal universe made up of multiple and semioverlapping lawmaking communities. As such, a new account of it could be given. Almost fifty
years after the School’s protests against nationalist and power-centred conceptions of
international law, an influential group of American law professors launched a new attack, but this
time riding the tide of neo-conservatism in United States. Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner, in
particular, emerged as two of the leading spokespeople for the neo-conservative study of
international law, though their followers come from what may be called a ‘rainbow coalition’ of
ideologies within a growing international audience. 63 In the ensuing debates critiquing the
isolationist US stance against international law and the current responses to neo-conservative,
formalist, and doctrinal trends in legal scholarship, one could sense a strong resemblance to the
stance taken by the New Haven School back in 1970s.64 In this sense, there emerged a tradition of
critique adjusting to the demands of the changing times. Along that trajectory, there are at least
three other schools, namely TWAIL, Critical International Law and Radical Pluralism debates,
which take issue with international law as it has been traditionally perceived and taught.65
However, they take the inequalities and historical injustices endemic to the current state of world
capitalism as their point of departure, rather than a mainly internal critique of how international
law works within the West. These latter bodies of scholarship therefore have more kinship with
the articulation of international law as globalization of law or transnational law, and are prone to
overlook the nation-state much more readily. Though the legacy of the New Heaven School is
indeed an important one, to globalize this kind of critique requires a vision that looks above and
beyond the way things appear from the Global North alone.
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B. TWAIL Scholarship and the Radical Pluralism Debate
Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) is a critical approach to international
law that has assumed a distinguished status in the overall questioning of the history and legacies
of international law, an endeavour that started with the first and second waves of legal pluralism
discussed above. However, TWAIL comes with a marked distinction. It is an approach to law
that is unified by a particular set of concerns endemic to the application and imposition of law in
the Global South. It draws its methodology primarily from the history of the encounter between
international law and colonized peoples and post-colonial societies. In this regard, TWAIL shares
a common heritage and an arsenal of analytical tools with post-colonial studies, feminist theory,
critical race theory, critical legal studies, and Marxism, as well as with legal pluralism. TWAIL
scholarship prioritizes in its study the power dynamic between the largely Developed Core and
the mostly Dependent Periphery in the world capitalist economy, following the terms used by
world systems analysis.66 Overall, it highlights the role of international law in legitimizing the
subjugation and oppression of societies in the Global South. Although TWAIL scholars strive to
avoid presenting the “Third World” as a unified, coherent place and instead put emphasis on the
shared experiences of underdevelopment, imposed dependency, and marginalization, they also try
to salvage at least some parts of the overall project of international law to aid struggles for justice
in the Global South. Contemporary TWAIL scholarship has it origins in works of jurists such as
Georges Abi-Saab, F. Garcia-Amador, R. P. Anand, Mohammed Bedhaoui and Taslim O. Elias.
These were later joined by Antony Anghie, Bhupinder Chimni, Karin Mickelson, Obiora
Chinedu Okafor, Wa Makau Mutua, Balkrishnan Rajagopal, and Issa Shivji, who are from postcolonial societies themselves.67 In the remainder of this section, I will first discuss the TWAIL
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project and its significance for the debate on transnational law. I will then concentrate particularly
on Koskenniemi’s work and one of his most vocal critics within the larger context of legal
pluralism, although he is not a TWAIL scholar himself.
As already stated, TWAIL is a legal theoretical discourse that offers an in-depth critique
of the current international law regime from a Global South perspective. The frame of thinking
used by scholars associated with TWAIL represents a distinct form of historical analysis
concerning the development of international law. TWAIL scholarship adheres to the description
of international law as a set of practices that lead to the continual subordination and
marginalization of the experiences of Third World societies, in particular legal activists and
scholars. Makau Mutua describes Bandung, Indonesia as the symbolic birthplace of the TWAIL
discourse, although the school is heavily indebted to the Non-Alignment Movement as well.68
Overall, TWAIL emerged as a response to repressive and disciplinary strategies of decolonization in the Global South. It was developed due to the urgent need for a historical
approach to understand why liberation projects in the post-colonial world could hardly ever were
able to deliver what they promised. TWAIL scholarship also attends to historical experiences in
non-European and post-colonial societies that have given rise to a unique form of political
consciousness about the law.
As such, TWAIL scholarship is dedicated to unpacking the uses of international law as a
medium for the creation and perpetuation of racialized hierarchies, to historicizing the
development and evolution of international law as a repressive universalist discourse, and to
critically assessing its uses for the subordination of peoples and their realities across the Global
South. 69 TWAIL claims to be counter-hegemonic, anti-hierarchal, and also coalition-prone.
Keeping with the spirit of legal pluralism though not necessarily identifying with it, TWAIL
discourse thus assumes a moral equivalence of cultures and peoples. It is in this light that it
considers the current regime of international law as illegitimate, since what exists today is seen as
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being based almost entirely on the intellectual, historical, and cultural experiences of one
particular region of the world—that is, Europe. Finally, TWAIL is positioned as a reconstructive
project that aims at eradicating the conditions of underdevelopment in the Global South. Since
international law has been instrumental in regulating encounters between Europe and the rest of
the world through the rules of both sovereignty and self-determination, TWAIL scholars argue
that international law has been used for the forced assimilation of non-European peoples into a
legal regime that they had no voice within.70 In order to build strong alliances to counter the
position that post-colonial societies have been locked into, TWAIL scholarship has asserted itself
through the formation of transnational movements committed to de-centering the European-North
American domination of international law.
Despite this highly charged political stance, TWAIL scholars still express the need to be
self-critical, aware of the limitations of the school and the voices it may have yet excluded. The
emphasis of this discourse is on the international legal regime’s complicity in the maintenance of
colonial legacies during the post-colonial era. In this context, international law is depicted as
neither neutral nor impartial. Rather, it is marked by its indifference to human suffering and to its
own complicity with historical injustices. Mutua describes the relationship between the
international legal regime and its players through the metaphor of savages-victims-saviours.71
Accordingly, the state is depicted as the operational instrument of savagery in international law.
The victim, on the other hand, is described as a human being whose dignity and worth have been
violated by the savage. The victim is perceived as powerless, and thus in need of external
intervention. Of course, the victim is non-white, highlighting the racial divide endemic
particularly to human rights discourse in international law. The saviour, then, refers to the
Eurocentric nature of the dominant international law paradigm, constructing Europe as
normatively superior.
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One of the most significant critiques of the international legal system offered by TWAIL
scholarship is related to the fact that the pioneering roles played by non-Western activists, judges,
legal scholars and human rights actors are not at all acknowledged in the universal human rights
discourse. In this vein, Issa Shivji argues that a re-conceptualized rights regime is needed to
challenge the hegemonic logic of international law by unpacking its imperialist and statist biases,
while at the same time providing space for registering Third World people’s abilities to resist
hegemony.72 Overall, TWAIL scholars take a decided stance against the promotion of a sense of
naturalness of international law, and treat it as a political project of homogenization in its current
form. They assert that the lack of attention to influences from the Global South within human
rights law leads to a significant erasure of the legitimacy of the discourse, since problems are to
be solved without reference to those involved and affected in the first place. The inconspicuous
erasure of race and racial hierarchies within the human rights discourse and the international legal
system in general is read as a pathology of self-redemption masking the international hierarchy of
race and colour re-entrenched in the global system of capitalist relations. In this light, TWAIL
scholars push for opening up the discourse of international law, and strive to create a balance
between individual and group rights, giving more substance to social and economic rights,
relating rights to duties, and addressing the relationship between the corpus of law and global
economic systems.73
Although state sovereignty and the right to self-determination offer some tools through
which one could assert the dignity that is so central to self-actualization, it is critical for the
system to be reformed not only from the point of view of human rights applications but, more
generally, from within the realm of international law. In this regard, TWAIL scholarship,
although internally fragmented, thus far has iterated a strong argument concerning the importance
of an in-depth understanding of the power dynamics and historical realities at play in
international law. TWAIL discourse attacks widely accepted norms of international law that both
victimize and blame the peoples of the Global South. As it invites more actors onto the stage, it
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detests normative hierarchies in the construction of international law as a regime of hegemonic
practices. For these reasons, although not formally included in the registers of legal pluralism
scholarship, I believe there is a valid case to be made for TWAIL scholarship to be construed as
part and parcel of what I call the third wave of legal pluralism.

C. Radical Pluralism and Beyond
In the remainder of this discussion of legal pluralism, I will concentrate specifically on
Marti Koskenniemi and Ruth Buchanan’s work on international law and globalization. This
choice is by no means meant to suggest that the work of other legal scholars is not important in
marking the contours of radical pluralism. Peer Zumbansen and Gunther Teubner’s works, in
particular, are far too influential to omit from any such discussion.74 But for the purposes of this
chapter, I choose this duo of legal scholars, as the second of them engages in a debate with the
first from within legal pluralist discourse itself, while also utilizing many of the conceptual
reference points of the latest phase of legal pluralism, including Teubner’s work.
From the late 1980s onwards, Koskenniemi engaged in an embedded discussion on
international law, the tenor of which was spelled out in his From Apology to Utopia: The
Structure of International Legal Argument (first published in 1989). In this early work,
Koskenniemi presented a critical view of international law as a discursive practice that attempts
to remove the political from law as well as from international relations. If allowed to function this
way, international law would be nothing more than either an irrelevant moralist utopia or an
apology to global power politics. In his later work, including The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The
Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 (2001), Koskenniemi diversified his agenda on the
discussion of international law. He first developed an intellectual history of international law, and
then offered a critique of that history. This led to a highly pessimistic account of the content and
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workings of international law, wanting it to be more than what it now is. In this sense,
Koskenniemi follows a similar trope to what one finds in Michael Mandel’s, Tony Evans’ or
Steve Ratner’s critiques of different branches of international law.75 Overall, Koskenniemi seems
to have finally given up on the formal, classical legal ideal of international law in search of a
normatively endowed, Kantian ideal. This was perhaps to be expected, as he is an intellectual
historian of the tradition of international law rather than a jurist. In fact, his critique of
international law eventually led him to study even the methodology of the profession.76 This new
turn in his work is most observable in the International Law Commission (ILC) Report titled
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion
of International Law (2007), finalized by Martti Koskenniemi himself. The report organizes and
synthesizes the various debates and discussions that relate to the breaking up of international law
into several distinct regimes. It also presents practical suggestions for mitigating some of the
problems often associated with increasing fragmentation.
At this point, I turn to Ruth Buchanan’s critique of Koskenniemi’s work and her
reintroduction of legal pluralism, not as historical critique or background for policy suggestions
but as a legal theoretical method of dealing with international law while critically addressing its
contradictions. In her work, Buchanan provides both a critique of and a possible alternative to
Koskenniemi’s internal remedies for the failings of international law.77 She argues that as long as
globalization is reframed as an external problem for legal theory, the solutions envisaged will be
determined by the limited parameters of already existing legal discourses. Global legal pluralism,
on the other hand, could invoke or illustrate the multiple, diverse, and contested sources of law
on a transnational plane and could allow us to think about law differently, rather than focusing on
how to respond to globalization within existing frameworks of legality. Buchanan, like TWAIL
scholarship, is squarely opposed to a positivist conception of law. She also refutes the reduction
75

See Steve Ratner, “Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility” (2001) 111 Yale L J 443;
Michael Mandel, How America Gets Away with Murder: Illegal Wars, Collateral Damage and Crimes Against
Humanity (Pluto Press, 2004); Tony Evans, “International Human Rights Law as Power/Knowledge” (2005) 27
Human Rights Quarterly 1046.
76
Marti Koskenniemi, “The Fate of Public International Law” (2007) 70 Mod. LR 1.
77
See Ruth Buchanan, “Reconceptualizing Law and Politics in the Transnational: Constitutional and Legal Pluralist
Approaches” (2008) 4 Comparative Research in Law and Political Economy; and Ruth Buchanan, “Legitimating
Global Trade Governance: Constitutional and Legal Pluralist Approaches” (2006) 57 Northern Ireland Legal
Quarterly 1.

45

of legal plurality to descriptive claims and instead subscribes to it as an ethos and a form of
critical theory. Her approach to legal pluralism takes as its starting point a critique of the
tendency to think of law as a privileged domain of aspiration, responsiveness and precision. She
thus endorses an understanding of legal forms and institutions as both contingent and revisable,
to allow for opportunities for those whose interests are inadequately addressed by current
institutions and legal regimes.
Specifically, Buchanan’s critique of Koskenniemi is two-fold. She states that while law and
politics are interrelated, legal discourses cannot be equated with political outcomes. Moreover,
she argues that while a critical investigation of the politics of law can be quite helpful in
revealing law’s failures and exclusions, this kind of analysis does not shed light on the production
of law, or on the capacities of legal subjects to contest, change, or add legal meanings. Although
she appreciates Koskenniemi’s attempt to imagine law as inherently plural, her emphasis is more
on the plurality of law-creating subjects. In comparison to Koskenniemi’s worries about
diplomats, jurists and international lawyers, Buchanan would like to think of a much wider range
of law-creating subjects. She also refuses recourse to a unifying image of a constitutional
moment, and instead chooses to live with a “radically legal pluralist” topography of multiple and
diverse subjects and regimes, and a transnational legality without a centre or normative hierarchy.
The implication of her reframing of international law is that emergent transnational regulatory
regimes need not be reduced to relations of superior/inferior based on the degrees of their “legal”
or “constitutional” nature. Instead, echoing the work of Cover, Teubner, and Trubek78 among
others, Buchanan presents international law as an amalgamation of competing, interpenetrating,
and mutually constitutive regimes at a transnational scale.79 She hopes that by allowing such
plurality to be perceived, public discussion about the emergence and evolution of transnational
legal norms might include a much wider range of institutional and discursive mechanisms. In
summary, in my view, Buchanan’s unique contribution to the third wave of legal pluralism
debate is her insistence that we give up our obsession with legal forms and start dealing with
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matters of substance, content, and agency, and frame these in terms of processes rather than
formal rules. For her, the lens of legal pluralism leads us to understand the construction and
contestation of normative frameworks by legal subjects. This, in turn, is what is called the
reflexive approach to the relationship between law and politics in the international realm,
whereby competing normative claims are engaged, negotiated and compromised in the name of
law.

II. TRANSNATIONAL NATURE OF ACCOUNTABILITY REGIMES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
MULTICENTRICITY OF LEGAL PRACTICES
In this section, I will narrow down the debate on the applicability of legal pluralism to
international law to the specific field of accountability regimes in international criminal law, the
subject matter of this dissertation. A well-functioning accountability regime in international law
may well be the ultimate dream of legal scholars and jurists. However, the crystallization of a
unitary legal system is an elusive goal, still yet, if ever, to be realized.80 Coherence and efficacy
in the overall international legal order, with its fragmented and diversified legal regimes, could
not be achieved by any given set of primary rules. The multitude of ‘secondary rules’ in
international law—referring to Hart’s list of recognition, change and adjudication—is a constant
force to be reckoned with. Nor could we do away with the proliferation of ‘third party forums’ or
hybrid organs in international law, without the attached cost of eradicating variant forms of
dispute settlement or domestic politics integral to both law-making and adjudication at the
national or regional levels. If we follow the lead of Jonathan Charney, who gave up on the dream
of a unitary regime of international law as early as 1988, clearly pronouncing so during his
Hague Lectures, cross-fertilization and variegation are to be seen as improvements to the overall
quality of international law, rather than a gradual undoing that must be opposed at all cost.81
Observable changes in the global network of legal systems, indicative of a decisive move from an
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exclusive focus on state parties further, undo the majestic assumption of structural unity in
international law. In this case, how could we pronounce an international “accountability regime
that is far-reaching, flexible, adaptable, and yet does not amount to a cacophony of legal
practices? Furthermore, is it desirable to have such a regime, and one that is based on
synchronizations and alliances in the face of histories of discontent and injustice?
No doubt, this set of questions is of import not only for international criminal law, but
have implications for all areas of international public law. However, these concerns are
particularly troubling for international criminal law due to the heavy weight of jus cogens norms
and ergo omnes obligations that dictate a regime of universal jurisdiction in areas such as crimes
against humanity. Furthermore, in the institution of permanent courts such as the International
Criminal Court (ICC), universal jurisdiction delivers the meaning of rules of legal codification
through a model of diffusion from a central legal authority. The general understanding is that the
Rome Statute providing the guidelines for this procedure is built upon a long history of treaty and
customary international law and, as such, does not lack democratic accountability. However, the
way it was designed to be ratified and embedded in the constitutional realm of individual states
has thus far been far too positive law-oriented, and does not take into account the socio-political
investment required for full adoption of the codification of international crimes that fall under the
ICC’s mandate, the prime example being crimes against humanity. In this regard, while an
increasing number of legal practitioners, observers, and scholars make observations about the
hybridization, fragmentation and cross-fertilization of international law—and indeed opt for the
term transnational law in its place—legal discourse in the field of international criminal law has
gone in the other direction and become increasingly more focused on centralization and
standardization, with the universal reach of a single institution and jurisgenerative conduct
identified as its raison d’etre. My argument here will be that institutions like ICC, when looked at
under the lens of transnational law, in fact perform a double action. They engage in both
jurisgenerative and jurispathic conduct, though which one of these practices is more important
for the legacy and saliency of the institution, or indeed for the effectiveness of punishment of
international crimes, remains undetermined. To put it differently, institutions such as the ICC
engage in both primary and secondary rule-making in contemporary accountability regimes,
though often their conduct is discussed almost entirely as one or the other.
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A. Fragmentation in International Law and the Fragile Balance of Primary and Secondary
Rules in Accountability Regimes
Concerns about the increasing diversity of secondary rules and the desired unity of
primary rules of international law reveal themselves fully in the context of debates on the sources
of international law, responsibilities of legal institutions, and normative conflicts. As suggested
earlier in this chapter, the relative autonomy of a wide range of regimes co-existing in the area of
international law is seen by some as a guarantee of its growing effectiveness in terms of its
primary rules, rather than as jeopardizing the unity and coherence of the overall substantive
structure of the international legal order.82 In other words, diversification and differences in
interpretation are seen as an integral part of the general enterprise, and hence secondary rules are
not considered to constitute a threat to primary ones. Furthermore, the apparent coherence of the
doctrines espoused by international courts and tribunals is taken as further proof that it is possible
to talk about a single, unitary accountability regime in international criminal law that can
accommodate the variations between judgments produced within international, domestic and
regional legal regimes.83 In this context, if we are to talk about an accountability regime in any
branch of international law, there has to be an identifiable remedial potential of judicial functions.
There is, of course, a significant difference between substantive and remedial law. The former is
generally understood to stand for statutory or written law that governs the rights and obligations
of those who are subject to it. Therefore, it defines the legal relationship of individuals and the
society, or the relationship between society and the state. Remedial law, on the other hand, is a
version of procedural law, and it comprises the rules by which a court hears and determines what

82

See Herbert L. A Hart, The Concept of Law, supra note 21.
The “fragmentation” of international law has been a topic of discussion for at least the last three decades.
Interestingly, it is the increase in the number of international organizations, multilateral conventions, and bilateral
investment treaties, as well as the growth of international courts and tribunals, that has led to concerns about the
coherence and unity of international law. At issue, I presume, was the destabilization in some manner of a totalizing
international legal order. International law, long confronted with questions regarding its very legality and legitimacy,
then became a subject of worry due to the emergence of competing and overlapping regimes. On this issue, see
Jonathan Charney, "The impact on the international legal system of the growth of international courts and
tribunals" (1998) 31 NYUJ Int'l L. & Pol. 697; Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao, "Multiple international judicial forums: a
reflection of the growing strength of international law or its fragmentation" (2003) 25 Mich. J. Int'l L. 929; William
Burke-White, "International legal pluralism" (2003) 25 Mich. J. Int'l L. 963; and Geert-Jan Knoops, An introduction
to the law of international criminal tribunals: a comparative study (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2014).

83

49

happens in civil or criminal proceedings. In other words, procedural law—including remedial
law—provides the method and means by which substantive law is made and administered. While
substantive law defines rights and duties, procedural law is defined as the body of legal rules that
provides the machinery for enforcing those rights and duties. The principle of delivering and
promoting justice requires both substantive and procedural law. In Hart’s language of
jurisprudence, law has to embody a strong link between primary and secondary rules, which then
necessitates both internal and external accountability in the area of international law. Organs of
international law are not only fragmented, but they operate at multiple levels of jurisdiction and
face a variety of claimants, the state constituting only one amongst many. These multiple fora
entertain different procedural rules and substantive norms, and are thus likely to yield different
results attending to the same case. Their limited locus standi and restrictive jurisdiction does
affect their competency. However, if we go back to the debate on transnational law within legal
pluralism, neither variations in procedures nor oscillations in competency stand as a death
sentence against a nascent legal regime. Instead, it is possible to argue that in the area of
international law, and specifically with regards to accountability regimes, work on primary and
secondary rules is to be undertaken almost simultaneously. This is precisely what organs such as
the ICC have embarked upon. In that sense, determination of the success of a regime of universal
jurisdiction should not be undertaken solely in terms of whether domestic courts adapt the Rome
Statute, or the depth and width of harmonization practices at a global scale. Equally important is
the spirit of the laws endorsed by organs like the ICC. We must turn our attention to the primary
rules of international criminal law falling under such legal bodies’ mandate, and examine whether
the Court initiated a process of transnational regime formation in this regard.

B. The Project of International Law and the Jurisprudential Promise of ICC: Disciplining the
Domestic Realm through International Criminal Law?
Public international law is commonly viewed as oscillating between a Kantian
cosmopolitan ethos and harmonized adjudication regarding conflict of laws and other
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jurisdictional matters at the international level. 84 Regimes of trade law, human rights law,
environmental law, and of course international criminal law are all testimony to the latter
tendency, in varying degrees. The former, cosmopolitan impetus to manage and resolve “global
problems,” on the other hand, often finds its best expression in the form of institution-building
with an international reach and a purportedly global mandate. Traditional legal-political
responses to institutional developments in the area of international legal regime formation—
namely, constitutionalist defense tactics disputing the accountability of transnational institutions,
or invitations extended by the legal pluralism of earlier decades celebrating institution-building as
a possible platform for dialogue—seem inadequate to deal with the task at hand: defining the
project of international law in the age of late capitalism, neo-colonialism, and globalization.
Meanwhile, the knee-jerk reaction of reducing international public law to a phantom mechanism
built to advance functional objectives of neo-liberal harmonization, and serving only the interests
of the powerful, is also a somewhat misleading take on this issue. Surely, aspects of the
managerial vocabularies of international regulatory and legal practices fit the definition of an
overarching plan of neo-liberal global constitutionalism, as do the markedly negative
implications for the Global South of acts committed by select international institutions. However,
not all new formations in the area of public international law can be explained by these broad
strokes.
The establishment of the permanent International Criminal Court is one area that has a
double promise vis-à-vis the post-WWII history of public international law. Strictly speaking, the
ICC does not allow legal pluralist renditions of criminality in its chosen areas of authority.
Despite the worries about it being an integral part of the neo-liberal agenda of forcing postcolonial and post-imperial societies into submission for further capitalist expansion and deeper
forms of accumulation, its nexus lies in the area of what may be called ‘disciplining practices’
emanating from a normative standpoint regarding egregious crimes such as war crimes, genocide,
slavery, and crimes against humanity. 85 Its existence also owes much to widespread NGO
movements both within Europe and from the Global South, as these actors struggled for decades
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and made alliances to counter the US hegemonic position in the area of international criminal law
prior to the foundation of a permanent criminal court.86 This aspect of the ICC’s history gave the
institution an unusual degree of legitimacy for an institutional organ with such outreach
potential—or at least this was the case at the outset. Last but not the least, the regime of
international criminal law envisaged by the ICC cannot be grasped merely through the language
of sovereign acts of states culminating in customary practices or treaty obligations. This signals a
“transnational” quality concerning the ICC’s mandate. The institution is designed to resolve cases
of state criminality within the parameters of a legally identified exercise of international public
authority based on the principle of universal jurisdiction. As such, the subject matter of
international crimes such as crimes against humanity does not refer to disputes arising between
states or states and high-ranking individuals. Rather, it primarily concerns the criminal acts of
states against their own societies.
In terms of its jurisdictional reach, the ICC operates on the principle of
complementarity/subsidiarity. Thus, the first choice for adjudication of crimes falling under its
jurisdiction is identified as domestic courts acting in accordance with domestic law, or
specialized hybrid tribunals subject to supervision by domestic courts. However, the founding
document of the ICC—the Rome Statute—clearly indicates that in cases when such remedies are
deemed not available or not realizable, general international consent authorizes the adjudication
of such crimes by the ICC itself. Whether resolved by resort to domestic or international courts,
international crimes falling under the ICC’s mandate are therefore squarely identified as matters
of international law. The criminal law regime attending to them is to be distinguished from
reciprocal and consensual adjudication as dictated by treaty law. Furthermore, the ICC is a court
of prosecution, and not a civil court. In this context, international criminal law as codified by the
ICC is not based on the regulation of a relationship between juridical equals. Following the
standard criminal law format, it accrues a privileged position to the party representing public
authority, whether this is the ICC or a domestic court, and calls upon those who allegedly
committed crimes against the society. In this case, the latter party is in principle defined as the
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whole of humanity. If so, the ICC, as one of the prime institutional embodiments of what may be
deemed transnational law, acts as a semi-autonomous international adjudicative body that
reviews and passes judgment upon individual conduct in the international public sphere.
The ICC is semi-autonomous because its decisions are insulated from higher court
supervision or judicial review mechanisms, and its ties with the UN are symbolic rather than
legislative. It is international because its authority derives from a treaty, the Rome Statute, as well
as customary understanding of the crimes listed under its jurisdiction. Constituted at the
transnational level, the ICC embraces the role of disciplining the governmental actions of states
and individuals committing crimes against societies and communities, as defined by the
conceptual architecture of international criminal law. In this context, what makes the ICC a
noteworthy specimen of transnational law is not its reach per se. Nor is it the ICC’s inevitable
exposure to and yet determined resistance against forces of legal fragmentation and hybridity in
the global realm. The ICC’s capacity for legal norm and conduct building is worthy of attention.
Owing to the transnational dictate of the ICC’s mandate, tribunals established under the law of
individual states are invested with authority to try crimes defined by the ICC on the basis of the
principle of universal jurisdiction. As such, the ICC produces and perpetuates a legal discourse,
even when it does not try a given case itself. Based on the principle of universal jurisdiction,
although the ICC is uniquely removed from the domestic legal system of any given state, its
codes are to be integrated into the domestic enforcement structures of all states. As a result, the
power of this institution to make and enforce legal claims of criminality stands apart from its
predecessors such as the Nuremberg and Tokyo military trials, or other international courts such
as the International Court of Justice. Mainly for this reason, the regime of international criminal
law as embodied by the ICC should be recognized as constituting an exceptionally important and
powerful manifestation of transnational law. No other system of court-based international
adjudication has as much sway in terms of substantiating forms of criminality and enforcing
methods of adjudication within a global compass. Even if a given state has not signed and ratified
the Rome Statute, the dictate of universal jurisdiction obliges its articles to be considered as
positive international law, and thus to be taken into direct consideration in the domestic realm. In
this context, it would be apt to identify ICC-based codification of international crimes as the fullfledged exercise of a disciplinary regime with transnational qualities. This is symptomatic of a
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certain strand of institutional developments in the area of public international law readily
identified by the third wave of legal pluralist scholarship. In order to understand the workings of
the regime of international criminal law, the manner in which ICC operates needs to be examined
closely. This includes topics such as the court’s determination of the exhaustion of all local
remedies, leading to the establishment of hybrid tribunals based on the principal of universal
jurisdiction, and the adaptation of the Rome Statute by domestic courts, with the implications of
this process for national criminal law. While all of these issues clearly invite further inquiry, the
remainder of this chapter will only focus on the politico-legal reasoning upon which the
ratification of the Rome Statute in the realm of domestic law has been envisaged, and how this
process relates to the “international law as transnational law” debate.

C. International Criminal Court and the Ideal of Complementarity in International Law
A key statement that defines the ICC’s ideal role in public international law was uttered in
2003, just after the Court’s founding, by none other than Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor
of the Court. As he was sworn into office, he declared that “the absence of trials before this
Court, as a consequence of the regular functioning of national institutions, would be a major
success.”87 The legal reference here is to the Rome Statute’s complementarity principle,88 which
permits the Court to exercise its jurisdiction over a serious international crime only if no State is
willing and able to prosecute the crime itself. The determination of the likelihood that defendants
will receive due process in national proceedings is part and parcel of this legal stipulation89 The
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fact that most national criminal justice systems may not provide such guarantees in states where
atrocities have been committed, or where a civil war ensued, no doubt renders this idealistic
picture somewhat incomplete. In some instances, ICC deferrals may in fact expose the alleged
perpetrators of atrocities to national judicial systems that may not be interested in or capable of
providing them with due process. This in turn may increase the likelihood of wrongful
convictions, which in turn would erode the ICC’s legacy, if not credibility. Furthermore, the ICC
was never envisaged as an appellate body to review decisions of domestic courts or indeed as a
human rights monitoring organ. In this regard, making decisions about the legality of procedural
matters in domestic courts in cases related to international crimes does not fall within its
mandate. At best, the Court has the authority to determine the unwillingness or inability of a state
party to prosecute on a case-by-case basis, inquiring whether national proceedings were fair
given the totality of the circumstances in each particular setting. However, if a trial proceeds in a
national court, the ICC has no authority to vacate a national conviction resulting from a trial
deemed not to have been conducted independently or impartially in accordance with the norms of
due process that the court itself embraces.90 In other instances, the ICC’s identification of specific
crimes may never be fully approved by the domestic courts that claim jurisdiction over the
criminal trial of alleged individuals. A case in point is that of Augusto Pinochet, and the
“Bermuda triangle” that formed between the Spanish Judge who claimed universal jurisdiction to
try the retired dictator for crimes against humanity, the British House of Lords that erred, at least
to an extent, on the side of diplomatic immunity, and the domestic courts that were at best
hesitant to try the case.91 Similar examples can be found in cases of the ICC’s direct or indirect
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involvement in Sierra Leone, Cambodia, Lebanon and Iraq. Therefore, the issue of
complementarity could be said to provide more questions than answers in the area of public
international law. However, if we shift our lens from public international law to transnational
law, another picture emerges.

D. The Mandate of International Criminal Court: Jurisprudential versus Political Realities
In reality, the discrepancies observable in the application of universal jurisdiction of the
ICC’s codification of international crimes are indicative of the gap between the jurisprudential
and political dimensions of accountability regimes in international law. The issues and concerns
articulated above are informed by my conviction that in order to make a categorical observation
about international legal institutions with a transnational mandate, we must first attend to the
underpinnings of their legal operations as well as the symbolic and political value of their
jurisdictional characteristics. Determining of the significance of ICC-like institutions with respect
to the grand project of launching a post-Westphalian era in international law is a crucial step in
this direction. Indeed, the ICC has commonly been presented as a tour de force heralding a new
age, wherein state interests are trumped by universal, transnational, and of course humanitarian
ones. Similarly, from a jurisprudential point of view, the Rome Statute is considered to have
made a marked change in the attribution of responsibility and the curtailment of impunity for
crimes of grave nature and wide scope. Historically speaking, the trend that started with the
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials significantly lost steam during the Cold War years.92 Following the
cascade of developments in international criminal law, including the endorsement of the
International Military Tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo in 1946, the charting of the Genocide
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Convention in 1948, the Geneva Convention on armed conflict in 1949, and the attached Code of
Offenses against Peace and Security of Mankind, and subsequent UN covenants related to human
rights law, not much more was done. Until the unfolding of the catastrophic events in the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the constitution of a stable system of substantive international law to
attend to human rights atrocities committed during war or peace was not a priority for UN
bureaucratic and legal circles. This was despite the fact that crimes against humanity were not at
all absent from the international scene, including a wide range of disturbing developments in the
former Soviet Union and Eastern bloc, Latin America, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa.
In summary, the unique area of intersection that the international tribunals of the 1990s
came to embody—signifying a calculated overlap between international human rights law,
humanitarian law, and international criminal law—was perhaps intimated and yet by no means
fully articulated by the immediate post-war trials and the trajectory that followed from them in
international criminal law. Even the International Law Commission resumption of work in 1983,
after a long hiatus of almost 35 years, was tainted by the debate among states concerning how to
define “aggression” committed by states.93 It took another 13 years to reach a state of semiresolution in the form of a Draft Code. The culmination of these efforts finally came in the form
of the constitution of a permanent International Criminal Court in 2002. Yet, for jurisdictionrelated matters, whether this should be regarded as a watermark remains far from obvious. What
could be argued with much greater comfort is that the ICC is part and parcel of a sea change in
norm creation and norm inducement at the transnational level. Its internal logic may be at odds
with the traditional operations of international law, and from that angle, universal jurisdiction
lacks jurisdictional certainty. If, however, universal jurisdiction is taken as a discursive tool
honed to circumscribe domestic variations in the determination of criminality in categories
delineated by the ICC, then the matter will assume novel dimensions, as will be discussed in the
last two chapters of this work.
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CONCLUSION
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide a conceptual map (hence the use of
“topography” in its title) of select examples of existing scholarship on the workings of
international law as it pertains to the dictum of universal jurisdiction. Though the review
presented here is by no means comprehensive, it is symptomatic of most pronounced trends in the
current reconfiguration of the debate on the nature and reach of international law. In this context,
I analyzed the merits and failings of the model of centrifugal diffusion in international law in the
context of accountability regimes particularly in light of the claims made by select schools of
thought related to legal pluralism. Beginning from the foundational premises of the third wave of
radical legal pluralistic scholarship, I commenced an examination of the normative boundaries of
the applicability of international criminal law codified by a transnational body such as the
International Criminal Court (ICC) in local and national settings. This examination will be
continued throughout the rest of this thesis. With particular reference to crimes against humanity,
and attending to the institutional, normative and political aspects of universal jurisdiction, the
following chapters will analyze the context and efficacy of attempts at their adjudication in the
Global South. The aim of this opening chapter was to foreground this debate in legal theory.
The history of politico-legal practices leading to the foundation of a permanent court is
primarily Europe-bound, though its emergence involved a strong component of Global South and
non-state participation. As is, ICC’s mandate defined by the Rome Statute has far-reaching global
implications. Indeed, a crucial part of its operations and the principle of universal jurisdiction
embraced by the court depend on the unassailable equation of morality and law, particularly in
the case of crimes against humanity. Meanwhile, studies of international politics indicate the
absence of a widespread ethics of responsibility or societal engagement to provide international
criminal law with a final say in this area. Hence we witness a clearly identifiable contradiction
between the mandate of a transnational legal institution and the realities of the application and
adaptation of international law produced or endorsed by it. This is a delicate disjuncture, and one
that cannot be handled solely by legal pluralism in its early or later versions.
The original concern behind the debate on the ICC presented in this opening chapter was
to determine whether international tribunals and courts indeed embody a new kind of relationship
between socio-political, substantive/normative, and legal aspects of public international law and
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thus constitute an exemplary case for transnational law. A related query was whether
international criminal law has achieved the status of a transnational legal regime and assumed a
position above and beyond the interests and immediate involvement of the states and societies
affected by it. If so, could it indeed sustain the kind of criticism that was raised by schools of
thought such as TWAIL scholarship? The answers to both lines of questioning proved to be
highly conditional. Here, the issue is no longer the codification of law or even juridification
processes themselves. In public international law, codification customarily refers to the
articulation of binding legal rules, otherwise knows as “positive law.” The “codification
movement” in legal conduct emerged out of the post-Enlightenment context, and took root in
European societies during the late 18th century in the form of civil and criminal codes. It reached
its high point with the enactment of the French Napoleonic Code in 1804.94 No doubt the
relationship between domestic and international criminal codes, and in particular the embedding
of international law within constitutional or domestic criminal law is a complex one. However,
the applicability of transnational law in domestic contexts is only a small part of the problem.
Legal pluralism scholarship reveals that the substantive meaning of law in changed contexts and
scales is a much more significant issue in the workings of transnational law.
In the specific case of international criminal law, this body of law has long been
considered an “autonomous branch” of criminal law, as it only deals with “international crimes.”
Similarly, the institutions within which such crimes are to be adjudicated have been designated
courts and tribunals, set up to try legal and natural persons who have incurred an international
criminal responsibility. This is a distinct category in comparison to criminal responsibility as it
has been defined within the domestic context, or later on, in cases of crimes against humanity and
genocide that impose upon any given constituency the obligation of universal jurisdiction. In the
context of the ICC, international criminal law clearly departs from the classical understanding of
international law as an amalgamation of treaties and conventions regulating relations amongst
states. Yet it never comes close enough to domestic jurisdiction in terms of having the
expansiveness to deal with crimes that are the business of the state or society within which they
94
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were committed, or upon whom costs and damages were inflicted. Neither does it entirely
manage to become transnational, as the court’s emergence was predicated upon state consent and
the continuation of its operations also demand long-term state support. Heren lies the conundrum
for legal scholars and international jurists alike. Although the ICC and similar transnational
organs are not predicates of a unified legal system whereby national laws would be deemed
second-order unless evidently on par with the Court’s mandate, they nonetheless strive for the
establishment of universal rules of adjudication for crimes codified under their aegis.
Consequently, they push for the enforcement of standard practices via public international law.
However, the way they go about implementing this “project” matches the definition of
transnational law, due to the nature of fragmented, overlapping regimes held together through
persuasion, disciplining strategies, harmonization practices and at times brutal force.
The notion of a global order is highly contested amongst scholars of international law.
Global disorder, a multiplicity of regimes, and polycentric systems concepts are much more
readily embraced in describing the status quo in this field of law.95 The unique offer of radical
legal pluralism and reflexive legal theory scholarship is that such disorder is not to be seen as
symptomatic of chaos. On the contrary, it is regarded as the expression of clashes of interest,
conflicts of norms, and different articulations of the desire for socio-political change.96 In this
positioning of diversification as a necessary feature of transnational legal regimes, the tensions
endemic to institutions such as the ICC and their mandates begin to appear pro forma. However,
the real question about the viability of universal jurisdiction in international criminal law remains
unattended to. The issue is not how to make domestic courts and legal systems adapt the ICC’s
definition of criminality, and adjust their codes of legal conduct according to what the Court
dictates as proper adjudication. Whether individual accountability provides meaningful sanction
and could deter governments and societies from committing gross human rights violations is not
the issue here, either. Even in the presence of a comprehensive criminal code substantiated by an
enforcement architecture, limitations exist and will continue to exist. Diverse norms entertained
by different domestic constituencies as to what constitutes a crime against humanity, the power
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dynamics affecting the identification of problem cases, as well as the determination of the venue
and form of trials directly influence both the scope of international criminal law and the set of
mechanisms available for its practice. In other words, the Rome Statute ratification package is
imbued with structural variations that are regarded as permanent features of transnational law in
other instances. The grand project of selective and targeted erosion of state sovereignty in the
name of a higher common good for global society may well be an esteemed legal prescription;its
socio-political validation, however, is an entirely different matter.97 As the practices of public
international law evolved, they did so in the context of conflicts of interest, wars, negotiations,
and partial ramifications under the shadow of global power struggles and historically embedded
forms of domination. Therefore, appraisal of the attainability of the goal of institutionalizing
accountability for crimes against humanity requires that legal scholarship expand beyond the
realm of criminal liability and setting up evidence-based fair trials.
Transnational law, as tackled by recent debates within legal pluralism debates, is one venue
within which we may be able to link accountability regimes to other areas of law in a global
context. This would not only reduce the burden of the ICC’s exceptional status regarding the
application of the principle of universal jurisdiction. It could also bring us closer to the
substantiation of injurious acts exemplified by crimes against humanity legislation in local
contexts through domestic absorption of the normative address of this specific category of crimes
exemplifying state criminality. In conclusion, as I have highlighted, the historical use of notions
of universality and objectivity in international law first and foremost served First World socioeconomic and political interests. One of its end results has been the codification of conditions that
sustain old and new forms of dispossession across the Global South. As evidenced by analysis of
the premises upon which the ICC operates, these interests have now taken on a transnational
character and are being pursued through an elaborate network of meta-regulatory regimes
beneficial to emergent transnational capitalist classes cutting across the North and the South.98
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Transnational legal regimes are most often used to diffuse neoliberal economic reforms on a
global scale, resulting in the embedding of various legal precepts in domestic political and socioeconomic settings. Critical international law scholars appear somewhat ambivalent in their efforts
to craft disciplinary proposals for revealing this dark underbelly of the global legal order, with the
exception of the approaches of TWAIL and post-Marxist legal pluralism. While a reflective type
of global legal pluralism recognizes the legitimacy of lawmaking as executed by non-institutional
actors, the field of legal theory remains perplexed as to how we reconcile the pursuit of legal
accountability in a highly stratified and unjust world.99
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Chapter II. In the Beginning, there was the State? A Critical Review of Compliance to
International Law regarding Universal Jurisdiction

INTRODUCTION
The last hundred years have given us at least three attempts at the creation of an
institutionalized system of international criminal law. The key issue involed in this idea’s
prominence is that of universal jurisdiction. The notion of a universally enforceable criminal law
dates back to the Treaty of Versailles in 1919.100 This was also when the idea of an international
criminal court first emerged;101 the realization, implementation, and application of such a court,
however, were not tried until after World War II. To address the crimes committed under the
National Socialist regime in Germany, an international military tribunal was erected in
Nuremberg, based on the London Charter of the International Military Tribunal, which was
followed by the Tokyo Tribunal.102 Later, after the Cold War, the United Nations decided to
establish ad hoc courts against the backdrop of gross humanitarian law violations in the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Then in 1998 the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(ICC) was adopted, which came into effect on July 1, 2002. The ICC was followed by various
internationalized and hybrid courts, set up inter alia to cope with the conflicts in Kosovo, Sierra
Leone, East Timor, and Cambodia. All of these post-ICC institutions sought the ideal of a
standardized legal frame of reference for international crimes. Alas, this did not alleviate the
problem of the state-centric nature of international criminal law.
In this chapter, I will concentrate on the issue of causes of compliance (or lack thereof) to
international law in the larger context of the debate concerning the emergence of a standardized
frame of reference for universal jurisdiction. This is a continuation of the questioning developed
in the first chapter concerning the nature of the transnational law as it applies to the condition of
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states and societies in the Global South, During the last few decades, the long-standing divide
between those who believed that international rules have an effect on shaping state behavior and
those who saw such rules as epiphenomenal or, worse, as imposed, has given way to an
increasingly complex debate. The proliferation and evolution of international legal agreements,
organizations, and judicial bodies in the aftermath of the Cold War years (1947-1991) provided
the background for the heightened attention paid to the role of international law in determining
interstate and transnational politics. In particular, the phenomenon of legalization and
adjudication of state criminality under the aegis of international criminal law raised several new
questions. What factors affect the choice to resort to international law? When is such a recourse a
choice and when is it imposed? Upon whom is international law imposed and under which
circumstances? Does the use of international law make a difference in how states behave when
faced with their own criminal conduct? What issues emerge from critiques emanating from the
post-colonial world and the Global South at large concerning the use and abuse of international
criminal law? These are just a few of the rather troubling concerns emerging in the post-ICC
landscape of international criminal law.
In this chapter, I will present a survey of some of the recent developments in the study of
compliance to international law in both international relations (IR) and international law (IL)
literature with a specific emphasis on universal jurisdiction. Here, compliance is distinguished
from the related but distinct concepts of implementation and effectiveness.103 Broadly speaking,
the focus of the present discussion is not compliance with treaties, but rather with the broader
category of rules that constitute “customary international law.” Based on a critical review of
some of the major theories advanced by IR and IL scholars from 1980s onwards, my aim is to
identify a number of common questions that guide the debates in both fields concerning the
nature of international criminal law, in particular with reference to the notion of universal
jurisdiction. In studies on international criminal law, comparatively little attention has been paid
to theoretical questions pertaining to universal jurisdiction. This chapter focuses less on the
lawfulness of universal jurisdiction and more on the way the basic concept is treated by these two
bodies of scholarship in the context of how they relate to the state as the basic unit of
103
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international law. This is of utmost importance in terms of developing a robust framework for
furthering the debate on state criminality and identifying the limits of international criminal law
for introducing, operationalizing or enforcing criminal jurisdiction measures based on an
overarching, formulaic regime of accountability.

I. NEMO ME IMPUNA LACESIT? THE ETHOS OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION104
Universal jurisdiction is a specific legal doctrine dictating that domestic courts try and
punish perpetrators of a select set of crimes so heinous that they amount to crimes against the
whole of humanity, regardless of where they occurred or the nationality of the victim or
perpetrator, which otherwise constitute the standard nexus requirements in international law.
Under its purview fall piracy, slavery, crimes against humanity, war crimes, torture, and
genocide.105 Universal jurisdiction thus constitutes a significant departure from the traditional
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approach to international criminal law that requires a direct connection between the prosecuting
state and the particular crime. States could enact national legislation granting domestic courts the
power to assert universal jurisdiction over particular crimes as well as international courts such as
the ICC having the power to litigate. However, the scope and content of universal jurisdiction
laws vary significantly among states. Although domestic implementing legislation may be
necessary for national courts to exercise universal jurisdiction, the contemporary framework of
international conventions and international customary norms provide the legal grounds for the
exercise of universal jurisdiction by states parties even without such a prerequisite.
The doctrine of universal jurisdiction asserts that for a select body of “international
crimes,” the perpetrators in question should not escape trial by invoking doctrines of either
sovereign immunity of states that is used as a standard defense of domestic capabilities, or, the
sacrosanct nature of national frontiers again based on the principle of state sovereignty.
Proponents of universal jurisdiction further argue that it is not always possible to prosecute
crimes by the states in which they were committed. For example, after a devastating conflict or
war, states may lack the necessary legal infrastructure and resources to carry out an investigation
and prosecution. Alternatively, governments may intentionally fail or refuse to prosecute a crime
that occurred within their territory. Crimes and conduct subject to prosecution may have been
sanctioned or supported by the state itself, or the perpetrators of such crimes may be serving as
government officials or could have allies within the ruling regime. Thus, there may be a lack of
political will to pursue investigations, preventing the prosecution of alleged crimes. At least in
theory, in the absence of accountability, other states may seek to initiate prosecutions on the basis
of universal jurisdiction in order to prevent impunity and provide justice for victims of such
crimes. At least some states may feel that they have a common interest, if not obligation, to
punish perpetrators of serious crimes subject to universal jurisdiction.106 States may also be under
pressure to pursue prosecutions due the presence of a perpetrator within their borders, led by the
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desire for their territory not to be a safe haven for criminals. Generalizing this stance to the entire
system of states as an absolute rule, however, is a different matter.
Indeed, I would posit that universal jurisdiction remains a controversial principle and
practice in international law due to the state-centric nature of the very enterprise, as well as the
power dynamics that shape the relations between states, regions and international courts. In this
context, there are three instances that need to be re-examined to provide full background to this
peculiar body of jurisprudence. With the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, President Woodrow
Wilson’s new agenda for Europe led to the development of the League of Nations, and the
emergence of the Permanent Court of International Justice.107 As a result, this court was seen as a
victor’s court. In 1945, the allied powers replaced the (by then defunct) League with the United
Nations, which was followed by the establishment of Nuremberg and Tokyo military trials.108
These too have been generally named as trials that led to victor’s justice, despite the very valid
reasons for which they tried war criminals, albeit one-sidedly. The UN Security Council itself
proved heavily problem-laden in terms of misuse of its powers during the Cold War years.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in November 1989, for instance, the permanent
members of the Security Council cooperated in the unprecedented UN-backed strike against
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. This is commonly cited—both positively and
negatively—as the beginning of a “new world order.”109 The Iraq decision was followed by the
establishment of two ad hoc tribunals for the prosecution of crimes against humanity regarding
the former Yugoslavia (1993) and Rwanda (1994). Considerations of the desirability and
sustainability of emergent institutionalized organs of international law such as the International
Criminal Court (ICC)—which is widely considered as the third call for the adjudication of
universal jurisdiction—developed against this background. The ICC has also been under heavy
attack from states in the Global South, as well as some in the West, who claim that it delivers
justice based on very selective criteria and picks its cases according to political reasons rather
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than purely justice-related ones.110 In this “new world order,” which is the historical context for
the full-fledged embrace of the doctrine of universal jurisdiction, the state is not disappearing.
Instead, it may be apt to argue that it is unbundling into separate, functionally distinct parts. In
addition, regional hubs of economic activity, political alignment, power, and hegemony are
becoming more pronounced. In such a multifaceted environment, courts, regulatory agencies,
executives, and legislatures are networking with their counterparts across the globe, espousing a
transnational system of governance and regulation.111 This has been the reality of neoliberalism
since the 1990s. And yet, curiously, both international law and international relations scholarship
on international criminal law lag somewhat behind and lack answers to many of the most
pressing challenges of the 21st century. Dominant schools of thought in this field continue to
hold the state so dear that all else fades into the background. In my opinion, this is the real
tragedy of the debate on universal jurisdiction, more so than the letter of the law itself or the
uncertainties concerning its application.
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II. TWO SHIPS PASSING AT NIGHT? INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS112
International law and international relations scholarship, as two interrelated and yet
separate disciplinary forms of knowledge, have traditionally approached the phenomenon of
universal jurisdiction from different and sometimes opposing perspectives.113 Consequently, their
understandings of the establishment of the ICC and its juridification of international crimes
exemplify rather contradictory treatments of universal jurisdiction. This is only partly due to a
conception of international law—seen as the study of the kind of law that governs states and
other international actors in their relations with each other—as prescriptive and heavily
normative. In effect, international relations scholars have long self-identified their field as the
analysis of the behaviour of states, and have been descriptive or explanatory but rarely openly
prescriptive. Following the emergence of regime theory, theories of institutionalism and
institutional realism, and in particular with the revival of liberal international relations theories, a
rapprochement began during the 1990s.114 As a result, a select but well-respected group of
political scientists posited that the development of international law should be regarded as an
explanatory factor in the analysis of state behavior. Similarly, an increasing number of influential
legal scholars have become increasingly interested in understanding the workings of international
politics in order to make full sense of the context out of which legal developments emerged, and
later on were sustained or negated. In the IL field, scholars such as Anne-Marie Slaughter and
Robert Keohane identified at least three ways that international lawyers and international law
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scholars could use IR theories: to diagnose international problems and formulate better legal
solutions; to explain the structure and function of particular international legal institutions; and to
examine and re-conceptualize particular institutions of international law as well as international
law as a domain in its own right.115 Despite the rapprochement of the recent years, it is worth
noting that the legacy of past divisions, not only between these two disciplines but also within
each of them, continues to cast a shadow on the study of international law in general, and
universal jurisdiction in particular. For instance, there are several conflicting versions of what IR
or IL scholars consider the international political system that provides the foundations for
international law. First and foremost, there is the classical international relations conception of a
world composed of regulated states, a vision that makes very little distinction between the
process of international legalization and the creation of international institutions. According to
this approach, the process of legalization is seen as the impetus behind institutionalization and
regulated practice of rules.116 In this context, distinct formations such as the ICC are accepted as
simply reflecting enduring sets of rules and norms in international politics. Accordingly,
decision-making processes in international law and their potential to shape the future
expectations, interests, and behaviour of international actors is a natural continuation of
international politics.
115
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On this issue, of whether legalization is simply a reiteration of the political status quo or
whether it offers and reflects something more, international law theorists harbour a rather
different set of opinions. At least in critical IL scholarship, international legal institutions are not
at all seen as equal units. Furthermore, they are attributed a jurisgenerative function. 117
Particularly from the perspective of global legal pluralism, IL scholars emphasize the inevitability
and even desirability of multiple legal and quasi-legal systems purporting to regulate and direct
legal actors in international law.118 No doubt, the resulting plurality creates conflict between
norms embraced by different actors. However, it is presumed that legal systems must be equipped
to address how best to respond to the realities of conflicting demands and normative frameworks.
In this sense, and contrary to mainstream IR literature, in the context of critical IL studies law is
described as a platform for struggle. This line of inquiry also has a constitutional dimension, as it
questions the constitutive character of communities and their relationships with other
communities, be they international, transnational, national, or subnational. In this regard,
international law is not to be solely jurispathic, and bodies of law such as universal jurisdiction
are not juridified to silence all other and competing interpretations of what constitutes an
international crime. The idea is to bring different voices into the debate on what international law
ought to be, thereby creating at least the possibility that past injustices may be addressed if not
remedied. In mainstream IR scholarship, as already discussed, the degree to which a legal
institution’s rules are obligatory, the precision of these rules, and the delegation of legal authority
to third parties to interpret, implement, and monitor these rules determine the strength of a legal
institution.119 According to these criteria, the ICC appears as an exceptionally effective institution
in international law, and the same applies to the process of universal jurisdiction. The ICC
applies and promotes a codified set of laws reified by the principle of jus cogens, and it is an
independent international court with a consent-based statute that is in turn expected to be
enshrined within the domestic legislation of signatory states parties. As such, it constitutes a
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prime case for affirming that international rules and norms have a causative effect on the
behavior of states and societies, rather than merely being an outcome of already established
consent or brokered arrangements.120 This is an interesting point of convergence between the
liberal institutionalist theorists of IR and the normative theorists of IL. Indeed, the work done
under the banner of liberal institutionalism has a close affinity with that of idealist/normative
legal scholarship on international law, though the former may go so far as to wish for a
conception of a morality-based politics and a widespread mode of transgovernmentality in
international relations.121 The idealist perspective holds that human nature is both desiring and
capable of mutual aid and collaboration. Furthermore, states are considered only as one group of
actors in the international community, along with nongovernmental organizations, regional
organizations, transnational corporations, and of course individuals, who are seen as the
constituent units of the international system. Therefore, the idealist/normative stance emphasizes
the importance of international law’s confronting the state as well as other international actors, in
the name of moral norms and principles aspiring to the sustenance of the common good.122 The
spirit of such a take on international law is enthusiastically shared by liberal institutionalist
scholarship in IR.123 The result is an amorphous project of intellectual zeal, characterized by a
maximum degree of expectation from international law with a minimum degree of cynicism.
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The history of the idealist-realist debate in IR theory shows that it was initially framed by
the realist camp, who constructed a unified “idealism” as a straw man to justify their theories of
global politics. The paradigm of idealism turned out to be very close to the staged antagonism
embodied in the sovereignty/anarchy discourse of the interwar years.124 Either way, the winnertakes-all approach that shaped the traditional IR theories readily found a counterpart in IL
scholarship. At the same time, the darker conception of international law characterized by realist
discourse, amounting to an account of a world of self-interested states with calculative goals,
never entirely disappeared. Historically, this vision was endorsed and promoted by the core
academic institutions of IR in the Global North.125 Ultimately, it provided sustenance to the view
that the state is and will remain the inviolable actor in both international politics and international
law. Realist, and later on neo-realist, perspectives also insisted that states act solely in their own
self-interest, and that any international intrusion challenging state sovereignty is unjustifiable.126
This take on state sovereignty has been upheld with reference to Article 2(7) of the UN Charter,
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prohibiting interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state barring specified
circumstances.127 Supporters of this view thus posit that international rules and norms are of
consequence only if they are in the self-interest of the states implicated by them. The resulting
opposition between idealist/normative and realist views of international law affected both
disciplines, but is particularly explicit in IR scholarship. Meanwhile, the difference between
“instrumentalist” versus “normative” lenses for examining international politics and international
law led to a foundational crisis in both fields. As an alternative, Robert Keohane made the
observation that international [legal] institutions are a crucial site for the alignment of interests
with norms. As such, he argued, a composite approach, bridging realism with idealism, is called
for.128 Indeed, this debate between realists and idealist-cum-liberals has reemerged as an axis of
contention multiple times since the Cold War years. In its latest form, the debate is concerned
about the extent to which state action is influenced by structures as opposed to process and
institutions.
It is in this context that liberal institutionalism came to define the golden medium between
realism and idealism (though it stands closer to the latter than the former). Historically, there
have been both normative and positivist versions of liberalism, and thus liberal takes on
international law have produced both descriptive and prescriptive scholarship. The most current
version of liberal scholarship is built on the assumption that the “international community”
comprises a range of actors both within and across state boundaries, and accepts that state
interests are to be regarded as a complex product of the interests of actors within each state, as
well as among states and other actors. Liberal scholarship of late also assumes a variety of regime
types. Yet it openly privileges the liberal state, for the simple reason that it looks at trends in
warfare and extended internal strife. In that sense, this model also has widespread currency
among scholars of democratic development, human rights, and, of course, international law.129
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Still, liberal institutionalism hardly provides all the answers, or even manages to ask all the
critical questions. Yet another venue for the debate regarding the role played by international law
in international politics, and the possibility of universal jurisdiction in select areas such as crimes
against humanity, has been post-conflict versus process-oriented understandings of international
institutions. The former is based on the assumption that it is only in the aftermath of a major
conflict, such as a world war or regional catastrophe, that actors in international politics would
cooperate and use incentive to come up with common solutions. These attempts, however, are not
regarded as having an accumulative effect. In this sense, the post-conflict model of international
law’s emphasis on “crisis periods” is very much in line with realist and neo-realist schools of
thought in international relations scholarship. Inherent in the post-conflict model is the
observation that the display of collective or even consultative will tends to dissipate within a
limited period of time, and states as well as other relevant actors return to their self-interest
guided motivations. What is left is the memory of cooperation calcified in international treaties
and institutions, which can become relics if they do not cater to the changing interests of their
framers. This model, needless to say, fails to pay attention to the fact that stability and lack of
war, in many cases, have enough appeal to be pursued afterward in the name of self-interest. In
contrast, the process-oriented model of developments in international law emphasizes continuity
rather than rupture, and is favourable to the idea of cumulative effects. For instance, according to
this perspective, the emergence of institutions such as the ICC is directly linked to a series of
evolving practices since the founding of the League of Nations.130 Just as the clash between
normative and instrumentalist optics identified by Keohane and others reflects paradigmatic
differences about how to understand international law in general and universal jurisdiction in
particular, so too does the more friendly-looking debate between conflict-related versus processoriented approaches to international institutions, as each produces a radically different kind of
scholarship with practical implications. In the following pages, a select set of specific debates
influenced by these currents of scholarship will be examined. Here, only brief attention will be
paid to the specificities of crimes against humanity legislation and how it relates to international
relations and international law scholarship. The basic premises of how universal jurisdiction is
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defined in international law and international relations scholarship constitutes the first step
towards an all-encompassing analysis of the legal-juridical conception of crimes against
humanity.

III. THE INSIDE/OUTSIDE AND DOMESTIC/INTERNATIONAL DICHOTOMIES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW
Since H.L.A. Hart’s seminal work The Concept of Law (1961), international law has been
commonly described as embryonic, and often treated as quasi- or soft law.131 This is mainly due
to the state-centric conception of law itself. The question of what makes international law “legal,”
and international relations’ inquiries about international order (moral as well as political) and
what sustains or undoes it, are interrelated.132 Whether it is possible to make this relation within
the dominant paradigms in either IR or IL scholarship, however, is highly questionable. Perhaps,
then, the job of the legal theorist who is at also home with international relations theories is to
examine how political communities behave in response to international legal predicamens, while
vehemently refuting the assumption that each community exists in isolation from the rest of the
world. Kenneth Waltz, a well-known representative of traditional international law scholarship,
long insisted that international relations and international law are both akin to a complete system,
composed of an overarching structure and interacting units. In Waltz’ work, structures define the
relations of units based on an ordering principle, referring to the way in which the units of the
system relate to each other. Specifically, Waltz spoke of two kinds of ordering principles: those
characterized by relations of equality and those characterized by relations of superiority and
subordination. At the state level, in the corresponding domain of domestic law, Waltz depicted a
hierarchy within which select actors had legitimate power to command. International relations,
however, is based on the concept of sovereign equality and therefore, at least to him, seemed
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much more open to anarchy than the domestic realm.133
Half a century later, although there is a growing body of work in international relations
scholarship dealing with the issue of international, law including debates on human rights,
humanitarian intervention, environmental issues, and international organizations, international
law as a concept is still defined primarily in a positivist and practice-oriented manner, with the
underlying sense of its propensity for anarchy. In IR theories on international law, either
assumptions of anarchy constitute the ordering principle of interstate relations as Waltz once
theorized, or discourses of hegemony and empire are seen as sustained through the edifice of
international law. Both are posed in opposition to a desirable social order based on justice and
fairness at the global level, which is of course the cosmopolitan call. In other words, according IR
analysis, international law either cannot sustain true legitimacy, or when it does, it cannot provide
a common language to promote justice and equality. For the “anarchy” school, international law
is devoid of an enforcing authority, while for the “hegemony” school, it is structurally incapable
of limiting excessive exercises of power or correcting injustices, defined both in historical and
contemporary terms.134 As already mentioned, this state of affairs in international relations theory
stands in stark opposition to the claims of traditional legal scholarship on international law, as the
latter attribute an independent force to norms, legal rules and, of course, international legal
institutions and organizations.135 If state behaviour is driven primarily by immediate material
interests, then normative factors and rules would have no significant impact on international
politics in the absence of an enforcement agency or a hegemonic power structure.136 On this
issue, liberal institutionalist and realist camps of IR theories converge. While liberal
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institutionalist scholars differ from realists in their emphasis on states’ ability to cooperate, they
nevertheless rely on the same basic assumptions about the self-interested nature of states.137 As
such, it is argued that states follow legal rules only when there is a clear and tangible incentive.
Consequently, at least two of the dominant schools in IR theory treat international law as
an exogenous phenomenon eliciting context-dependent degrees of compliance. In other words,
international law is posited in fundamentally instrumentalist terms vis-à-vis international politics.
Of course there are other schools of international relations, such as constructivist and
poststructuralist scholarship, which have long challenged the basic assumptions of both realist
and liberalist renditions of international law.138 Of these, constructivists tend to emphasize the
relational nature of all things international, and put emphasis on the importance of norms and
their institutionalization in relation to the identities and interests of states.139 Still, they rarely
engage in debates on the nature of international law. This is because international relations and
political science are primarily constituted as disciplines premised on the Hobbesian opposition of
anarchy and order. If this opposition could be rejected, it would become possible to account for
pervasive asymmetries in international politics and law. However, this kind of dichotomous
thinking rarely emerges from the registers of traditional IR scholarship. Consequently, while
norms such as sovereignty or human rights are given extensive exposure in constructivist
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scholarship, there has been little regard to actual mechanisms and procedures linking the idea of
legitimate statehood to norms and institutions belonging to the realm of international law.140
Instead, the focus on norms and common identity construction led constructivist analysts to
develop a neo-Kantian kind of utopianism.141 In this regard, their interventions proved similar to
those entertained by liberal institutionalist or idealist IR scholarship, praising increased
legalization and institutionalization while blocking a view that would reveal the dysfunctional
aspects of norm development and implementation. In contrast, poststructuralists analyze and
criticize underlying structures and concepts such as sovereignty and statehood, and intentionally
blur the distinction between domestic and international politics. In their work, law becomes a
means and never an end in and of itself.142 And yet, while the deconstruction of taken-for-granted
categories is a valuable undertaking, poststructuralist approaches in IR have been either reluctant
or simply unable to develop an alternative framework to understand international law in its
relation to international politics.143 Thus, it is apt to suggest that they did not radically diverge
from the IR convention of neglecting international law. Indeed, despite theoretical and
methodological differences, most IR approaches to international law regard it essentially as a
constraint on state behavior. Law is treated as a construct that defines legitimate forms of
violence. Meanwhile, this perspective totally misconceives the role international law plays in
both the making and sustaining of state identities and state legitimacy. It also perpetuates the
dichotomy of domestic and international domains identified by poststructuralist analysis. Though
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plenty of work is done in IR on the legitimacy of sovereign states and their use of force leading to
systemic political violence, institutionalized forms of exercise of power via international
regulatory regimes are rarely included in this matrix, nor is the international legal system and its
workings. If attention could be shifted, from the classical problems concerning the legitimacy of
the sovereign state and its relations with other states and international actors to the intersection
between domestic and inter/supra-national politics, the question of the relationship between law,
legitimacy and normative consensus building would gain traction.
Returning to the canon of IR theory, an interesting figure is worthy of note, as one of the
most vocal critics of the modern system of law, domestic or otherwise. This is Carl Schmitt. 144
Schmitt criticizes international law’s regulatory character, due to his fear that it undermines the
political nature of international relations. This view suggests that law does not work merely
through sanctioning, but also through the normalization and neutralization of contention in an
existing political order. If so, law is to be seen as a product of social practices and political
relations, rather than an external and calcified imposition based on the threat of force.
Furthermore, what distinguishes law from other discourses is that it provides the basis for social
organization and political order across the whole spectrum of modern societies, liberal or
otherwise.145 Meanwhile, in order to fulfill its functions, law must be perceived as distinct from
the social order it is embedded in and the conflicts it is meant to regulate. It is also posited as
different from traditions and habits.146 The result is the positing of a theory concerning the selfreferential nature of law and its distance from abstract morality.147 This definition of law has been
taken apart, not only by international relations scholars but within the domain of legal scholarship
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itself, as well. Scholarship associated with the critical legal studies movement is exemplary in
this regard.148 Indeed, the links established in the realm of domestic/municipal law between
power, law, and sovereignty are also present in the context of international law. Furthermore,
while law is generally understood to limit as well as legitimize the use of force, the international
legal system relies heavily on another function of law: its ability to define targets and regions for
legitimate political action that performs a regulative function. In other words, the authorization of
acts that lead to the regulation of political actors (both state and non-state) is an equally important
aspect of international law.149 In this sense, public international law bears quite a few similarities
to domestic administrative law. Still, the international legal system seems to critically depend on
the maintenance of domestic sovereignty, as this guarantees the internal consolidation of
power.150 As a result, international law first and foremost regulates the division of the world into
sovereign territorial units, as well as dividing oceans, airspace, and natural resources, and added
to this list are law’s direct and indirect involvements in the management of the world economy.151
In other words, international law has unique functions that cannot be discussed solely in
the language of municipal/domestic law, but cannot be totally separated from it, either. No matter
how contested the validity and power of international legal regimes may be, international law
symbolizes the institutionalization of mores, norms, and practices at a scope larger than the
domain of the state itself. The effectiveness of a legal system in an international context cannot
be measured only or primarily in terms of its enforcement capacity. Rather, the whole arsenal of
means it deploys for deterring violations of its rules, as well as unique techniques in developing
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and legitimizing these rules, must be taken into consideration.152 Contemporary international law
requires the allocation of authority within a complex system of legal prescriptions. As
international law has extended to areas as diverse as the management of global commons,
migration, trade, environmental regulation and human rights, the consequences of breach of
international legal obligations have become increasingly complex to determine. There are special
secondary rules within general international law concerning state responsibility in these areas.
However, states do not constitute self-contained international legal regimes. International legal
regimes are larger than the sum total of states they potentially bind, and possess different
qualities. The next question in this context is to determine whether the function of international
law with regard to statehood is merely “declaratory,” or, whether it is “constitutive.” If it is the
latter, obligation would be the determinant of the legal character of international law. If the
former, force would win the day. As IR scholar Louis Henkin (1979) pointed out many years ago,
even in domestic societies individuals obey law out of fear of extra-legal consequences. In so
many words, punitive mechanisms are not always necessary.153 Legality is to be defined as an
ongoing process that involves institutions and practices as well as rules and enforcement
mechanisms. Indeed, as already mentioned, particular criteria are adopted, such as those proposed
by the contributors of the influential special issue of International Organization (2000) regarding
how to define international legal institutions, which include precision and delegation as crucial
dimensions of legal regimes. 154 Still, such criteria do not automatically give a definitive
normative value to international law, nor do they guarantee that increasing international
legalization would lead to the betterment of the world, whichever way progress may be defined.
This is yet another point of critical exchange between international law and international relations
scholarship. Adherents of critical international legal studies have already pointed out how law
can and does reinforce existing social structures and tendencies towards violence and injustice
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through its capacity for reification, mystification and legitimation.155 At this point, the necessity
of establishing bridges between domestic and international understandings of law becomes all the
more apparent. To be more specific, international law establishes criteria for membership for both
state and non-state actors in international legal systems, as well as identifying the rights and
duties of involved actors.156 As such, it legitimizes and reproduces certain kinds of relationships
while forbidding or chastising others. International law is thus engaged in the creation,
legitimation and regulation of relations in both the domestic and non-domestic spheres.157 What
has so far been emphasized excessively is its inter-state dimensions. This is despite the fact that,
through its institutions and practices, international law has a direct involvement not just in the
regulation of state behavior but also in the very production of the definition and norms of
statehood. International law does not only endorse and stabilize the parameters within which
actors engage with each other. It also establishes the criteria by which to distinguish legitimate
actors, and how they are to be constituted within the system at large.
Here, the language of constraints adds an interesting dimension to the debate on the
relationship between international law and statehood. The liberal institutionalist school of
international relations theory generally equates international law with external constraints—that
is, norms and norm enforcement mechanisms to control behaviour of actors in terms of specific
rights and obligations.158 The choice between compliance and non-compliance, especially in the
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absence of an enforcing authority, is a problem, but only to a limited degree, as this argument
posits that states and other international actors cannot exist in isolation from each other and
therefore they ought to comply. Meanwhile, the identity of an actor is substantively affected by
its involvement in the making and acceptance of international law as well as the specific forms of
its appropriation in the domestic sphere. 159 To this end, in their work on the power of
international organizations, Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore (2014) claimed that
international legal structures are actually essential in the creation of the very actors they
implicate.160 For instance, international bureaucracies specify responsibilities, set and diffuse
norms, and classify and organize information and knowledge. Similarly, international treaties,
conventions, and organizations invent, standardize or redefine legal, social and political
categories. International law, in this context, is not simply an abstract code but is constitutive of
the political, social and economic structures that it seemingly relies on.161 In other words, the
legality of international law does not spring from its centralization or from developing
mechanisms for its authoritative enforcement. Force-based formulation of law fails to account for
how international law works. It is the inter-relational and constitutive characteristics of
international law that provide it widespread legitimacy with hegemonic undercurrents. In
summary, law in general is not an autonomous field of norms and coded practice. In the same
manner, international law specifically cannot be understood without particular moralities and
normative frames of reference dispensed by the actors upon which it exerts influence. Even the
positivists’ requirement to base legal obligation in consent or custom instead of normative
notions of justice does not alleviate this condition of interdependency. According to Martti
Koskenniemi (1990), law must demonstrate its distance from politics in order to be able to set
normative standards applying to all subjects regardless of their political preferences, and, in equal
measure, in order to avoid being degraded into an instrument of apology for the state’s interests.
These two requirements are ultimately self-contradictory, a problem which is reproduced at the
level of international law. Even the celebrated notions of collaboration or compliance in
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international law depend on sufficient prior knowledge of the rules, with clear normative content
and significance. The disciplinary practices of international organizations, institutions, and
regimes play a crucial role in this process of learning, choosing and interpreting. They help
international law present norms as derived from and justified by necessity or consent, often both.
As such, international law obtains its meaning in relation to the practice of interpretation
performed by the very actors subjected to it, who are not limited to the state. Dividing this
process of interaction into external and internal, inside and outside, and then treating each part as
autonomous makes no sense if one is to understand how international law operates.

IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW VERSUS THE STATE? THE TEST CASE OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
Thus far, I have discussed what constitutes international law within an interdisciplinary
framework. Here, I will take this debate one step further and unpack the dominant
conceptualization of international law further in the specific context of universal jurisdiction.
This is in order to identify the pattern that underlies the application of the principle at a global
scale and to assess the state of scholarship and critical thinking regarding its operationalization.
As already stated, international law is traditionally defined as the body of law that regulates the
activities of entities accepted as possessing “international personality.” 162 Historically, such
entities were defined as states, whether nation-states or imperial states. 163 Contemporary
renditions of international law include the affairs of international organizations (both IGOs and
NGOs) and multi- and transnational corporations, as well as individuals engaged in certain kinds
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of acts considered the business of international law.164 International organizations established by
treaties, for instance, are deemed subjects of international law and thus capable of entering into
agreements among themselves and with states. Despite this well-constructed façade of formal
legal principles, scholars outside the legal domain tend to argue that international law has been
and remains a singularly normative regime. In the same spirit, the question of whether
international law is harnessed to the achievement of common values, or instead serves the
function of protecting the status quo that keeps powerful states powerful, if not rendering them
more powerful, also remains open to lively debate, as witnessed in the case of TWAIL
scholarship. Although traditional legal scholarship purports that the necessity of international law
arises from the need to ensure a process that can regulate competing demands and establish a
framework for predictable and agreeable behavior by recognized political entities, non-legal,
Marxist, post-colonial or legal pluralist renditions of international law clearly argue that all states
are not equal and they do not benefit equally from international law. 165 Finally, while
international law sets the criteria for a legal system that has a say over, and beyond, the states and
other legal entities it encompasses, it is also constricted by the very entities—in particular the
state—which it claims to have a mandate upon. This sub-section takes up precisely this last point:
the endemic difficulty in international law vis-à-vis how to address the state in the context of
164
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universal jurisdiction.
The following pages are thus devoted to analysis of the relationship between the state and
(international) law, as it has been canvassed by legal scholarship on the issue of universal
jurisdiction. Although the general call of international law is not limited to issues related to the
state, the state occupies a rather central position in both legal and practical aspects of this domain
of jurisprudence. To start with, as the existence of a state presupposes control of and jurisdiction
over a well-defined (i.e. bordered) territory, international law naturally deals with the acquisition
of territory, state immunity, and the legal responsibilities of states in their conduct with each
other. It is also concerned, by derivation, with the treatment of individuals within state
boundaries, based on the assumption that there must be a comprehensive regime dealing with
group rights, treatment of aliens, rights of refugees and migrants, and human rights, as well as
international crimes. Also included within its mandate are the maintenance of international peace
and security, arms control, settlement of disputes and regulation of the use of force in inter-state
relations. In the event of the outbreak of a war, there are historically referenced principles of
international law concerning how to govern the conduct of hostilities and the treatment of
prisoners. Finally, international law is utilized in attempts to govern issues relating to the global
environment, the global commons such as international waters, global communications, global
labor migrations, and of course, world trade. Consequently, a large canopy of supranational
organizations and international bodies has been created to provide mechanisms through which
disputes between states and other international entities can be resolved through arbitration and
mediation. This wide spectrum of dictates provided by and discharged under the rubric of
international law certainly seems to provide enough justification for the assumption of a selfsufficient and well-established legal system. Still, when a country is recognized as a de jure state
with a sovereign right to exist, it also has the right to refuse to engage or participate in any of the
activities of supranational bodies, or to declare the decisions made by a conglomeration of states
to be non- or selectively binding.
In other words, so far as international law promotes treaty obligations, or refers to
customary law understanding of the historically defined obligations of states, one could speak of
a minimum degree of normative unity. Meanwhile, no matter how powerful international courts,
regulatory bodies, and other non-state organs may have become, the extent to which their rulings
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or judgments can be enforced is limited by and dependent upon the cooperation of concerned
states and other international actors, and thus pertains to the domain of international politics.166
The relationship between national sovereignty and international legality has direct implications
for the debate on international jurisprudence, as well.167 Since they do not possess independent
enforcement mechanisms, other than in cases related to humanitarian intervention and select
cases of humanitarian law, international organizations associated with practices of international
public and criminal law, as well as international courts and tribunals, have to co-ordinate their
activities with national courts. As these two sets of bodies by and large do not have concurrent
jurisdiction, their relationship is primarily based on the principle of complementarity. If the
jurisdiction of these two sets of bodies is regarded as concurrent, however, or if international law
is to supersede nation-state-based law, problems arise. Although the concept of universal
jurisdiction is inherently important to the operations the ICC as an international body with a
global mandate, its power to enforce its decisions and judgments is almost entirely dependent
upon the endorsement of the very actors whose behaviour it seeks to affect. Of course, as
witnessed in the cases of European Union or the African Union, groups of states can create
politico-legal bodies at the regional level with overlapping provisions for juridical authority, thus
challenging the model that prioritizes domestic or nation-state based jurisprudence.168 In such
cases the aim is the regulation and harmonization of judicial relations amongst member states
under the rubric of transnational institutions with declared legislative and, though limited, judicial
powers. For instance, within the domain of European Union, the European Court of Justice
assumes jurisdiction as the ultimate appeal court for member states’ understanding and
implementation of European law.169 Its authority can only be denied if a member state withdraws
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from the European Union itself. However, to assume that international law in general operates
based upon similar principles is naïve at best, and illusionist at worst.170 Although there may be
exceptions, most states enter into legal commitments to other states or other international entities
with reference to historical relations, and often as a result of subtle or overt coercion, rather than
out of adherence to a body of law claimed to be of higher normative status than their own both in
its essence and in its mandate. Thus it is absolutely necessary to state that international law
cannot exist in isolation from the domain of international politics and history. What is curious is
how this could have escaped the vision of international law scholars for almost a century. The
presumptions surrounding the workings of the principle of universal jurisdiction are a clear case
in point in this regard.
CONCLUSION
Do international law and international politics scholarship cohabit the same or at least
cognate conceptual spaces when it comes to the discussion on international law, and in particular,
the state? How does each articulate the reality of an “international system” commonly identified
as the bedrock for universal jurisdiction?171 In this chapter, I made the case that, although it
makes little sense to study these two fields of inquiry independently, an integrated theory of
international law and international relations is yet to come into full existence.172 It is true that
starting with the efforts of Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell, the progenitors of the New
Haven School’s studies in international law, an important niche was carved out to this end.173
Their use of theories of national politics and domestic law to rethink the nature and definition of
international law produced some noteworthy results. Here one should also cite the international
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Legal Process School pioneered by the work of Abram Chayes, Antonia Handler Chayes and
Louis Henkin. These scholars keenly sought to explore the impact of international legal rules on
international political processes. 174 Their task was to determine the extent to which law
influences and shapes how societies behave. Both of these approaches were developed in tandem
with ongoing work in the domain of international relations at the time. Back in the 1970s, the
young discipline of international relations disdained what the dominant group of realist scholars
saw as the moralism of international law. It is in this context that select international legal
scholars attempted to offer a theoretically articulate response concerning the nature of
international law—a response that set the tone of the debate presented in this chapter.
As already discussed, during the 1990s a third approach emerged among legal scholars
who claimed to study law in its full context. Rather than canvassing political dimensions of select
international legal problems, this new body of scholarship attempted to re-think international law
vis-à-vis the entire system of international relations. Members of this school such as Anne-Marie
Slaughter strongly believe that international relations theories have much to offer in terms of
conceptualizing the basic architecture of “the international legal system.” They thus encouraged a
significant degree of congruence between the framing of international law and the models used
by international relations theorists. In this new context, we saw the emergence of a shared
analytical framework between international lawyers and legal scholars, and political scientists
and international relations theorists. Liberalism and realism entertain fundamentally different
assumptions about international politics, such as those related to the identity of primary actors,
the relationship of non-state actors to state institutions, and determinants of inter-state and
transnational relations. Still, the pages above have demonstrated that, overall, the most prominent
aspect of IR theory pertaining to international law, regardless of the particular leanings of the
authors, has been its emphasis on different types of states, based on domestic political structures
and ideological dispositions. Ultimately, the framework of classical international law scholarship
is predominantly based on the premise of sovereign equality rather than differences amongst
states.
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Is it possible to re-imagine international law by looking at it through the critical lens of IR
theory? This is exactly what some of the younger generation of international legal scholars have
been aspiring to do. Gerry Simpson’s work constitutes a remarkable example of such an
endeavor. 175 Whether this kind of scholarship can achieve a re-charting of the field of
international law remains to be seen. What is rather obvious, however, is that the debate on
universal jurisdiction reveals the underbelly of traditional international law scholarship, which is
characterized by its overreliance on the state as a unit of analysis, combined with a
methodological avoidance of a theory of the state. About a century ago, Lassa Oppenheim argued
that (legal) scholarship can and should separate the tasks of presenting an analytic report of legal
practice and engaging in a critique of the deficiencies of existing rules or institutions.176 Indeed,
many of the challenges for IL scholarship have proved also to be enduring ones—the issue of
state sovereignty constituting a paramount example. The current tendency to overload
international law with expectations results at least in part from shunting transnational norms,
private standards and national regulations under the rubric of the state, without paying due
attention to their interconnections as well as separate logics. A systematic study of the relations
between different normative and prescriptive structures in international law also remains absent,
barring debates on transnational law. In this larger context, dealing with the state in a historical
and conceptual manner rather than in a calcified way is essential for understanding the workings
of international law.
This chapter is written to provide a critical examination of key themes in contemporary
legal studies on international law in relation to the work done by international relations scholars,
with a specific focus on universal jurisdiction. Its central question was how the conceptualization
of the state shapes the context as well as the contents of studies of international law across
disciplines. The issue here is not whether legal scholarship on international law lacks awareness
of debates on the state outside of its field. At least in the Anglo-American tradition, theorists of
international law openly attack legal positivism and its heavy reliance on state-made law from
within the discipline. Canonical volumes in this regard include the deconstructivist understanding
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of international law exemplified by the work of D. Kennedy in his International Legal
Structures; Martti Koskenniemi's From Apology to Utopia, which criticizes the liberal political
discourse within which traditional studies of law is situated; and the work of Frederick
Kratochwil on norms.177 These texts have made it clear that the assumption of an Archimedean
point from which one can impartially judge the common good for all states has long been null
and void. Nor can inter-state consent as the foundational process of customary law be taken for
granted.
In this case, could we conclude that despite the lack of a common lexicon between IL and
IR scholarship on the issue of international law, this field of inquiry has moved well beyond the
excessive normative and isolationist dispensation that once characterized it? For students of
international law of all persuasions, it has now become basic knowledge that normative principles
in international law, as elsewhere, receive definitive meanings only in the context of social and
political practices. This does not mean that legal scholarship has totally and unconditionally
given up its “transcendental” aspirations for the realization of an international legal system and
the practice of universal jurisdiction in select areas. Still, there is growing awareness of
conflicting traditions and political trajectories, which leads to questioning of the very principles
upon which the edifice of international law is built. Similarly, it seems that current scholarship
from within the field has finally managed to trivialize the old and tired controversy of natural law
versus legal positivism, and to an extent also the jargon of soft versus hard law. Still, we continue
to struggle with the difficulty of finding an objective legal standard to define justice in the
context of international criminal law. Questions such as how binding normative decisions are
made for the entire community of international actors on the basis of presumed or partial consent
continue to haunt the field. Similarly, the very idea of a self-imposed obligation is in
contradiction with the implication that pacta sunt servanda or jus cogens were originally defined
in relation to one actor’s interaction with others. As a result, the question of whether, when and
how international law is to be considered binding is perpetually deferred, along with the Janus177
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faced, absent but always present referent of the state.178
Consequently, in the study of international law and, in particular, of universal jurisdiction,
we witness a decisive conflation of the subject and the object of analysis, the state. In some
circles, the possibility of the emergence of an external normative order representing an
autonomous system of legality may still be all the.179 As a counter-measure, I have argued here
that the current grammar of legal theory pertaining to international law must address the state
from a critical distance, as already suggested by IR scholarship.180 These two distinct disciplines
have long been striving in parallel, although for different reasons, to show how international legal
institutions emerge, change, work and fail. As demonstrated in this chapter, varied efforts,
particularly since the 1980s, have brought IR and IL scholars together through collaborations in
scholarship, the trading of ideas, and the formation of new journals open to crossing the oncesolid divide. Yet even when studying the same phenomenon, the state for example, these two
fields often seem unaware of, if not indifferent to, the insights available on the other side of the
disciplinary divide.181 As I have proposed here, as far as the state is concerned the academic
analysis of universal jurisdiction constitutes a subset of scholarship on international law, and is
subsumed under the general premises of how international law is understood to be working.
Although comparatively little attention has been paid to the question of universal jurisdiction in
opinions and declarations on international law by IL and IR scholarship, conclusions as to the
“lawfulness” of universal jurisdiction bring us back to critical issue of the state. Conflation of
states’ jurisdiction to prescribe their criminal law and the manner of that law’s enforcement
renders the permissibility of the enforcement of universal jurisdiction rather suspect. State
178
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practices in favour of universal jurisdiction over crimes that fall under general international law
cannot be explained by the state itself. Neither can they be understood through a state-centric
conception of international law. A systemic approach is required, one that takes into account all
the nuances addressed in the previous chapter that underline the transnational characteristics of
international law.
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Chapter III: The Long Road from State Sovereignty to Jus Cogens and Back Again: Travels in
the Global South

INTRODUCTION
This chapter is a situated critique of interpretations of the phenomenon of fragmentation
as it is manifested in international law. The issues addressed here specifically deal with collisions
between international law and state sovereignty, and incompatibilities between the various
international law regimes in terms of their effects in the Global South. This debate has direct
repercussions concerning the merits and applicability of crimes against humanity legislation
under the purview of universal jurisdiction principle. The expansion and diversification of
international law has been possible partly through the rise of specialized regimes that have no
clear relationship to each other, are not subject to coordination, and are not based on anything
other than power-related hierarchical relations. In this sense, assuming harmony and internal
unity to be the foundational characteristic of international criminal law is a prescriptive
suggestion more than a historical reality. Furthermore, conflicts between these regimes present
problems of overlap, uncertainty, and divergence in public international law. Similarly,
specialized bodies of international law come into conflict over what international law means, and
how to define compliance. They also often disagree on the meaning of particular treaties or rules
in international law, the relationship between these, and who should have the authority or
jurisdiction to interpret them with certainty. These disagreements lead to increasingly divergent
decisions concerning international law obligations. Last but not the least, such conflicts have
their origins in the long history of the post-imperial and post-colonial roots of international law
and, as such, traditional rules of resolution have proven to be most unsatisfactory. While some of
the self-contained and regional regimes claim exceptionalism or primacy over other rules of
international law, we also have international legal bodies such as the ICC that claim to be the
harbinger of truth in adjudication. In view of these problems, this chapter seeks to highlight select
kinds of interaction between these multiple regimes of accountability that provide actual political,
legal, and historical content to the long-debated fragmentation of international law. The chapter
concludes with the suggestion that the plurality of regulatory institutions, normative values, and
95

adjudication fora in international law is in fact a very necessary component of the existing system
of accountability.182 Seeking unity and coherence of international law without addressing the
violent histories it represents and through the application of traditional legal techniques to
harmonize adjudication is a futile exercise at its best, and a very antagonistic one at its worst.
As already discussed in the opening chapter of this work, the fragmentation of
international law is a substantial enough issue to have merited even an official recognition. To
this end, back in 2000, the International Law Commission decided to add to its program of work
the topic “Risks ensuing from the fragmentation of international law.”183 The proliferation of
international criminal courts and tribunals is part of this much larger debate on fragmentation. In
this context, theories of fragmentation and constitutionalization have traditionally been presented
as antagonistic accounts of the global legal order. While fragmentation theorists posit a nonhierarchical set of relations between general and specialized areas of international law, adherents
of constitutionalization theory depict a grand transformation from horizontal and consent-based
roots of law towards a hierarchal structure built upon commonly shared fundamental
principles.184 The proliferation of international courts and tribunals has been recognized as a
factor that muddies the perfect picture of constitutionalization, supporting the fragmentation
thesis in international law. Indeed, the development of a series of specialist or regional regimes of
legal accountability is often perceived as posing a risk to the coherence and presumed
homogeneity of international law.185 On the reverse side of the coin, institutional fragmentation is
also seen as a key factor that has strengthened the role of specialized regimes including the WTO,
EU, regional human rights and environmental regulation bodies, and so on. In such a varied
landscape of legal accountability and regulation, the question of what to do with normative
182
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conflicts between co-existing regimes is no longer an abstract one. The Chairman of the ILC
Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law, Martti Koskenniemi, was thus almost
forced to emphasize the maxim of lex specialis in his report in order to address the relation
between these seemingly self-contained regimes and general international law. Meanwhile, lex
specialis suffers from a marked degree of conceptual vagueness. The fragmentation of
international law made new types of conflicts visible, namely those between different and
antagonistic normative orders, and heightened some of the old ones concerning historical
injustices. As such, lex specialis may not be enough to address the current challenges faced by
international law. As argued in the opening chapter of this work, a transnational approach may be
able to soothe at least some of these anxieties. Combined with the double forces of reflexive legal
pluralism on the one hand, and TWAIL scholarship on the other, it may indeed be possible to
chart a different trajectory for understanding the present and future of international law in its
heavily fragmented modus operandi.186
Interestingly, in the area of international criminal law (ICL), much of the recent worry
over fragmentation originated from the collision between the ICJ and the ICTY (International
Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia) over the “overall control-test” in the Tadić case,
where the ICTY departed from settled ICJ law on the attribution of liability and the qualification
of the nature of an armed conflict, employing instead a standard of “effective control.”187 Twenty
years after the establishment of the ICTY, the fragmentation/pluralism debate proliferated to yet
186
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new heights. With a well-developed body of ad hoc tribunal case law, an emerging body of case
law at the ICC, hybrid systems like the Cambodia Tribunal, and increasing number of domestic
prosecutions under the dictate of universal jurisdiction, the co-existence of fragmentation and
pluralism has become a serious matter for legal realists, legal positivists, and monists alike.
While there are still those who express concern over heterogeneity in ICL, many branches of
recent scholarship acknowledge international criminal law’s pluralistic nature and, instead of
striving for unity, call for ways of addressing this plurality.188 All the same, ICL continues to
hover between cosmopolitan ethos and technical specialization while effectively attempting to
displace all other possible routes to attaining justice.189 This is despite the fact that questions of
illegitimacy, discrimination, and asymmetry in its application, as well as the conflicts lying at the
roots of its formation, cannot be wished away.190 As argued by the latest generation of TWAIL
scholars, notwithstanding ICL’s historically troubling past and violent track record, international
criminal justice is still embraced, at least in some parts of the Global South, as a potentially
emancipatory project. And yet, the main impediment to the fulfillment of such a desire remains
ICL’s continuing operational selectivity and geopolitical bias. Is ICL indeed capable of
overcoming deficiencies in national legal systems? When a state is incapable or unwilling to
punish, could there be a reliable and impartial agent such as an international or hybrid court to do
188
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the job? Is ICL capable of offering pragmatic solutions to the partiality and/or ineffectiveness of
national legal systems sans politics?
In this chapter, I answer these questions firmly in the negative.191 In particular, I argue
that ICL in and of itself cannot provide a panacea for the partiality, lack of accountability, and/or
ineffectiveness of national legal systems concerning mass political crimes.192 This leads us to yet
another set of questions. If ICL and the values it promotes are provided by international entities,
what sort of legitimacy could these legal organs claim by virtue of the letter of the law they
purport to adhere to? In my view, this is another embodiment of the consitutionalization
argument par excellence. For the protagonists of ICL as a universalist enterprise, this is called
“robust internationalism.”193As such, the international character of the courts and tribunals tasked
with applying ICL is seen as sufficient to successfully fulfill their mission. This argument is
implicitly recognized by the institutional founders of ICL, and is also reflected in its key
doctrines. Meanwhile, neither of the principal legal responses to the current multiplicity of legal
regimes is adequate. Pluralism divides too much and isolates unnecessarily and perhaps
dangerously, while constitutionalism unites even where there are no grounds for the presumption
of universality in international law. The emergence of multiple regimes of accountability perhaps
resembles the rise of nation-states at the dusk of the European Empires. As nations were
imagined into being, so are legal regimes.194 Reducing international law to a mechanism for
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advancing the functional objectives of a universal mega-state, or to an instrument for powerful
states’ policy implementations at a global scale, is far too simplistic.195 Debates over pluralism
and fragmentation suggest alternative accounts of how international law works. Regional legal
bodies, quasi-legal regimes, sub-national rights struggles, hybrid criminal tribunals, restorative
justice projects, societal reconciliation mechanisms, global social and political movements for
substantive legal reforms are not to be considered as a complement to international law. They are
part and parcel of it.
I. LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: LINGERING QUESTIONS
The regime of international law is illegitimate.
Makau Mutua196
In this section, I will focus on perceptions of the legitimacy of international law in the
Global South. This is an essential discussion for understanding the limits of universal jurisdiction
in terms of its global application. In this specific context, as was the case with the overall critique
of international law, I will turn my attention to TWAIL scholarship. Almost two decades ago,
James Thuo Gathii published a critical overview of the Special Symposium Issue of the Harvard
International Law Journal titled “Alternative and Critical: The Contribution of Research and
Scholarship on Developing Countries to International Legal Theory.”197 There, he stated that
what began as a lecture series during the 1990s at the Harvard School of Law has grown into a
noteworthy enterprise worthy of international law scholars’ attention. This special issue on
“international law and the developing world” was planned as a flagship publication to alert the
world of legal scholarship to a renewal in interest, research, and publication in the area of Third
World contributions to the field. Gathii noted with pride that the articles included in the issue
explored important and novel ways of understanding the most urgent themes in international law
affecting “developing countries” over the last several decades, and the challenges these societies
face in the new millennium. The articles listed here were penned by a broad range of scholars
with varied experiences, perspectives, and national backgrounds, though with a common focus on
195
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the interaction between international law and the Global South.198 They fit into roughly three
distinct theoretical frameworks in terms of their contributions to international legal theory. The
first set of articles provided an explanation of international law as culturally constitutive and
historically contingent. Obiora Okafor’s work in the collection, for instance, underlined the
frailty of the nation-state model in Africa, as a legacy of the impositions of Eurocentric notions of
legitimacy on culturally heterogeneous landscapes, which in turn led sub-state groups to view it
as illegitimate.199 Similarly, Balakrishnan Rajagopal’s piece engaged in an alternative reading of
international legal history, showing how Third World resistance was an important factor, often
totally overlooked or underestimated in the expansion, consolidation, and renewal of
international institutions.200 These pieces signaled the coming trend of critical historical analysis
of international law as seen, perceived, and experienced in the Global South. For the purposes of
this dissertation, this approach constitutes the main pillar of the methodologies used to decipher
perceptions and formulations of international criminal law from within the Global South.
The other two theoretical frameworks celebrated in the aforementioned special issue are
also of great significance. The second called for international law to play a mediating role in
addressing some legal gaps in the global restructuring of capitalism, while the third one was built
on the premise that notions of international law, development policy, or even local customary
practices do not have predetermined outcomes. These are themes and departure points that have
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been developed significantly over the last fifteen years, particularly under the aegis of legal
pluralism and transnational law. Overall, it would be accurate to suggest that TWAIL scholarship
achieved its initial goal, securing growing number of followers as a school of thought. It has been
able to drive home the point that international law’s claims to universality must be replaced with
an acceptance of legal and normative pluralism, and that international law squarely bears the
imprint of the hegemonic architecture of North-South relations starting with European
imperialism, colonialism, and now neo-colonialisms. It is also true that new generations of
African, Middle Eastern and Indian international law scholars have produced increasingly subtle
readings of how international law functions across the North-South divide. Within this first
generation of international law scholars from the Global South, thinkers like Elias Olawale
Taslim and Sinha Prakash had already argued that Africa in particular, and the Global South in
general, had participated in creating the civilizational pluralism from which international law was
created.201 Scholars like U.O. Omozurike, S.B.O. Gutto and Mohammed Bedjaoui, however,
insisted that despite all its potential for plurality, international law continues to reflect the
structural and economic inequalities produced by former colonial rule.202
By the time the third generation of scholars joined this conversation, new debates were
already unfolding within TWAIL itself. The work of Antony Anghie and Siba Grovogui, for
instance, traces the origins of international law and identifies distinctions made by leading jurists
such as Vitoria between Europeans and non-Europeans. Their analysis clearly signal continued
wariness concerning the legacy of contemporary international law doctrines and institutions.
Indeed, overall TWAIL now provides an insistent counterweight to the overwhelming dominance
of American and European legal scholarship, offering alternatives to traditional paradigms of
understanding and producing knowledge about legitimacy in international law. Speaking from a
variety of views on the nature and implications of the hegemonic Euro-American framing of
international law represented by liberal internationalism, institutionalism, constitutionalism, and
of course by neo-conservative realism in international law scholarship, TWAIL scholars have
been asking very difficult questions, not only about the legitimacy of law but also about the
201
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origins of the existing state system.203 The critical issue here is not so much producing accounts
of countervailing or “more authentic” notions of legitimacy, but opening up a space for scholarly
and political projects that are capable of formulating change while acknowledging genealogies of
injustice. In the following pages, working from within the TWAIL perspective, I will refute some
of the key arguments commonly used in defense of the neutrality of international law, though to a
somewhat unusual end: to foreground jus cogens norms in a more palatable context for the
societies in the Global South. These norms form the foundations of universal jurisdiction and, as
such, they are essential in understanding the unfolding trends in the adjudication of crimes
against humanity at a global scale.
In the case of jus cogens norms, my opinion is that even inclusive legal positivism and
new forms of legal pluralism do not succeed in estranging themselves adequately from the
traditional, apoliticized conception of international law.204 It is true that legal positivism, unlike
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other views on the nature of law and its command upon societies, could give us a sensible
explanation of law useful for a theory of historical change; but it does so only if we turn it upside
down. I contend that if canonized debates about the legitimacy of international law were to shed
their state-centric approach along with their Eurocentricity, and if the field could be recontextualized in terms of histories of capitalism and the legacy of North–South relations, a much
richer discourse on international law would emerge. Prior to the emergence of TWAIL as a
formidable school of thought, the conventional view tended to characterize “Third World legal
discourses on international law” as ad hoc and reactive rather than as a distinctive mode of
analysis.205 Given that we have now reached a juncture where, for a growing number of scholars,
thinkers, and legal activists, TWAIL offers both theories of and methodologies for analysing
international law and its institutions, we must reframe the questions of both legitimacy and
universality in international law. In the following pages, I will make a concerted attempt in that
direction.
II. THE QUESTION OF THE STATE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AS SEEN FROM THE GLOBAL
SOUTH: A CHANCE TO START ANEW?
Post-Cold War rejuvenation of enthusiasm about international law has been attributed in
part to the way that “critical legal scholarship,” in particular the TWAIL work, has reshaped the
discipline and provided it with new sensibilities and perspectives, increasing its appeal to larger
audiences.206 Still, the increasingly textured, adversarial, and divisive debate among international
relations scholars about how to embrace the study of international law is a clear indication of how
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Herculean such an attempt is. 207 In the previous chapter, I suggested that one way that
international law and international relations scholarship could converge, in more than tangential
ways, is to re-conceptualize the State. Indeed, I believe that when the state is problematized in
each of these domains, rather than being treated as a political given or a historical fait accompli, a
real chance for dialogue may emerge.
In this section, I will first identify the historical importance of the state in the emergence
of international law from the perspective of the Global South. I will then examine select
examples of the classical mode of thinking in legal scholarship on international law in terms of
the perception of its building blocs and key conceptual tools for understanding how law works in
this specific instance. I will conclude the section with a brief discussion of the treatment of the
state in particular, and power in general, in international law scholarship, and underline the
possibility of a different take on this particular issue for the future studies of international law.
There are a series of fundamental conflicts over both the meaning and workings of
international law as it relates to the history of the nation-state since the Treaty of Westphalia
(1648). Well into the mid-1800s, the classic form of the state was a multi-ethnic empire.208 The
populations of such states belonged to many ethno-religious groups and spoke different
languages. These empires were often dominated by particular ethno-religious groups, and, the
language of these groups were declared to be the language of public administration. The identity
and the composition of such ruling groups changed over time, however. Internal state structures
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also exhibited a considerable degree of variation despite the overarching imperial format.209
Finally, some of the smaller European states were not ethnically or religiously diverse, and yet
possessed considerable territorial sovereignty due to their “successful” imperial and colonial
expansion strategies. In examining these “smaller” states prior to the advent of the nation-state,
one must keep in mind either their religio-political significance, as in the case of the Vatican, or
their overseas connections, as in the case the Netherlands, when judging the political power they
possessed and the bargaining power they could levy in their dealings with other states.210
It was against the background of this general imperial mold that, from the late eighteenth
century onwards, and for reasons far too complex to be adequately covered here, the ideal of the
nation-state took root. The origins of the nation-state are highly contested.211 Canonical figures in
the field such as Benedict Anderson have even suggested that nationalism was actually a product
of what happened in the overseas colonies. It was “over there” that the spark was set off, giving
the idea peoples ruled by imperial powers that “another world was possible.”212 For many other
scholars, however, it is from within Europe that we should read the histories of both the nationstate and nationalism, initiated by the transformations of the absolutist state on the Continent.213
Across Europe, some regions grew into nation-statehood through unification by trade and
political integration, while others were brought in by military force and invasions—for which the
209
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French are singularly blamed. Meanwhile, despite their differences, scholars of nationalism
representing separate schools do agree on one issue: the so-called nation-state emerged at the end
of a particularly brutal trajectory of homogenization and organized violence during the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries. Secondly, it was the political entity that sought to define a firm national
identity in order to justify its existence, internally and externally, and, not vice versa. This is not
to suggest that nationalism was purely myth and invention, or that it did not have historical roots.
This observation does indicate, however, that there was as much politics involved in the
emergence of modern nations as there was culture. Furthermore, it is also generally agreed that
with the growth of not only the concept but also the reality of a nation-state came the idea of
societies-cum-nations to be controlled by a centralized system of government with a complete say
over the livelihood of its citizens. As such, any dealings with entities outside of the “national
jurisdiction” had to be regulated otherwise. Here are the beginnings of international law as known
today.214
The question remains, however: what kind of international law? Until the beginning of the
20th century, relations between nation-states were almost exclusively dictated by treaties, which
are in essence legally unenforceable agreements obliging the concerned states to behave in a
certain way towards each other or another state, based on the threat of use of force.215 At the
other end of the spectrum were customary practices, mainly applicable in the field of warfare,
such as jus in bello and jus ad bellum. As the 20th century progressed, a number of extremely
destructive armed conflicts and unprecedented forms of organized violence, particularly WWI,
WWII and the Holocaust, starkly exposed the underbelly of this semi-voluntary/semi-militaristic
system of international law, at least as far as relations between states were concerned. After
WWI, the model of international law as it pertained to interstate relations was that the League of
Nations, which lasted only until the outbreak of WWII. In the aftermath of the two World Wars,
in an attempt to create a more entrenched and encompassing system of rules and laws to prevent
214
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similar future conflicts, a new vehicle for the application of international law was found in the
form of the United Nations (UN), which came to encompass several international law-making
bodies. So far, this narrative follows a standardized and also, at least in the eyes of critical
international studies scholars, apoliticized history of public international law. 216 Skeptical
readings of this account are also quick to point out that international law is a somewhat young,
and in effect essentially Eurocentric, creation, and to define it does not require going back to
some assumed seventeenth-century fathers. While legal scholarship in this area dictates that the
idea of international law was extant before the nation-state system came to dominate the political
universe of statehood, other angles on the issue make every conceivable effort to separate the
worlds of Grotius, Vattel, and Kant from that of the International Court of Justice and other legal
bodies with an international mandate. For the purposes of the present study, the question that
persists among these categorically different takes on the origins and meaning of international law
is whether or not system-oriented developments in international law have managed, at least in
select areas, to take power away from states and governments, and to cede it to international
bodies with a clear mandate. In other words, regardless of one’s position on its roots (intellectual
as well as historical), has international law evolved to such a point that it now exists separately
from the mere consent of states or other relevant actors?217 Or, as vehemently maintained by the
current government of the United States of America, for instance, is state sovereignty to be
regarded as the only true principle of international law?218 At a different but related plane of
216
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analysis, is it possible to discern a legislative and judicial process endemic to international law
that actually parallels such processes within domestic law? For any of these questions to be
attended to satisfactorily, the sources of international law need to be re-examined. This is exactly
what has been happening in both of the fields of expertise being studied here: legal scholarship
on the one hand, and international relations scholarship on the other.
Legal scholarship clearly posits that there are three recognized sources of international
law: international treaties, customary law, and general principles of law. 219 Specifically,
international treaty law is comprised of obligations that states expressly and voluntarily accept
between themselves through treaties. Customary international law, on the other hand, is assumed
to have derived from the consistent practice of states accompanied by opinio juris, i.e. the
conviction of states that a legal obligations requires a consistent practice. Finally, the judgments
of international tribunals and courts, as well as legal scholarship, have traditionally been regarded
as a source for international law.220 Accordingly, the common narrative account of the emergence
of the current regime of international law suggests that attempts to codify customary international
law assumed decisive momentum after WWII with the formation of the International Law
Commission (ILC).221 The ILC was established by the General Assembly of the United Nations
in 1947, with the specific purpose of codifying and promoting international law, although it is
acknowledged that this project begun with the activities of the League of Nations from 1924
onwards.222
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In general, codification in international law is achieved either through the production of a
binding interpretation of an underlying custom by agreement, or through a treaty. What was
unique about the ILC was that in the case of acts of codification undertaken by this body, states
not party to such treaties were nonetheless expected to accept the work of the ILC in the name of
customary law.223 This was declared possible because the general principles of international law
were seen as concurrent with those commonly recognized by the major legal systems of the
world. Meanwhile, non-legal scholarship on this issue points out that only a very small section of
international law achieves the binding force of peremtory norms (jus cogens) and thus could
include all states with no permissible derogations. Despite this uneven state of affairs in terms of
legal certainty as to what international law stands for in its post-WWII format, both jus cogens
and opinio juris are persistently cited as among the fundamental principles of international law.
This is despite the fact that, unlike ordinary customary law that traditionally requires consent and
allows the alteration of obligations between states through treaties, neither jus cogens nor opinio
juris could be violated or questioned by any state.224 An added complication is that the actual list
of peremptory norms is not exclusively catalogued. In legal terms, they are not listed or defined
by any singular authoritative body. Rather, they often arise out of case law, customary law, and,
in cases such as crimes against humanity, as a direct result of changing social and political
attitudes within the institutional bodies now given power to produce new laws, such as the
International Criminal Court (ICC). Generally included in this list are prohibitions on waging
223
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aggressive war, war crimes, piracy, genocide, slavery, racial discrimination, and torture, in
addition to crimes against humanity. Despite the seemingly clear weight of condemnation related
to such practices, the division of international legal norms into a hierarchy causes serious
problems regarding both consensual ratification and enforcement. Furthermore, there are
disagreements over whether a particular case violates a peremptory norm, and how and by whom
such an occurrence is to be determined. As in other areas of international law, states generally
insist on reserving the right to interpret these norms. Where there are disputes about the exact
meaning and application of international law, ultimately their resolution is deemed the
responsibility of national courts, unless otherwise specified as in the case of the ICC. In other
words, to decide what a particular international law means or how it could be interpreted rests
with the superior domestic courts, unless extenuating circumstance dictate otherwise. Legal
entities such as the ICC or the ICJ are allowed to enter into the debate only if the national courts
fail to give “true meaning” to the jus cogens interpretation of a specific violation.225 Meanwhile,
domestic practices of providing a rendition for jus cogens often lead to a compromise between
three different forms of legal interpretation. 226 The textual approach dictates a restrictive
interpretation based on the “ordinary meaning” of the norm or ruling in question; 227 the
subjective approach considers the idea behind the letter of the law, as well as the context within
which it came into existence or was put into force; and finally, interpretation can also be
conducted in the light of both the object and the purpose of a given norm or ruling. These
variations in interpretation imply differences in the understanding and entrenchment of
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international law within the domestic sphere, as is to be expected.228 In other words, as much as
legal scholarship would like to capitalize the importance of opinio juris and jus cogens,
international relations scholars in all camps are equally determined to reveal the highly political
nature of these principles celebrated in the field of international law.

III. JUS GENTIUM AND THE OUTER LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Historically, international relations scholars have regarded international law with a
marked degree of distance, on the presumption that what exists in the domain of law could only
be a reflection of what goes on in the domain of politics. In other words, although the world of
all things legal distinctly assumed its autonomy, international relations scholars saw this selfperception and self-presentation as nothing more than a comforting illusion for those who
subscribe to it.229 In particular, the lack of a systemic inclusion of the issue of the exercise of
power by states into the study of legal processes and structures has long been taken as a
demonstration that legal scholarship suffers from a lack of depth and width in its understanding
of how power is organized, operationalized, and, of course, maintained.230 I would disagree with
this conclusion and attribute it in part to the lack of dialogue between these two spheres of
scholarship. However, it is important to make a note of this disjunct here as it clouds our
perception of what to do with power and hegemony, and in general history, in the context of
internal debates on international law. This is particularly relevant for the exercise of determining
228
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the limitations of universalized applications of international law, which is an important part of the
focus of this dissertation.
Needless to say, a judicious assessment of both the limits and possibilities inherent in the
conduct of international law requires that a bridge be established between these two domains of
scholarship.231 Whether this would happen through the translation of the terms and workings of
international legality into the language of political science, or through making the conceptual
basis of international relations debates more transparent to scholars and practitioners of
international law surely depends on the initial motivation for attempts at such a bridging act. Two
main issues must be addressed in this context. First and foremost, debates on both the sources and
the meaning of customary international law assume something without ever feeling the need to
explicitly mentioning it; this is the “legal personhood of the state.” It then becomes extremely
difficult for the unsuspecting eye of the non-legal scholar to identify the distinction between
“opinio juris”’ and “consensual state practice” in international law scholarship. Secondly, what
states might be legally obligated to do under the rubric of international law, and what they
actually do and for which specific reasons (apart from legal ones), is as important as opinio juris
in particular, and jus gentium in general.232 In this context, the first critical question concerning
the connection between legal and political science inquiries, and the study of international law is
to determine whether opinio juris gives the acts of a state their legal significance, and thus stands
for more than a widespread consensus symbolizing a shared, though contextually bound,
understanding among states. Only on the condition that opinio juris is larger and deeper than
occasional moments of forced or voluntary consensus on specific issues could states receive their
norms and guidance about what is legally relevant or consistent through jus gentium. The next
question that troubles non-legal takes on international law is related to how the codification of jus
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gentium takes place. In this regard, the “customary processes” depicted by legal theory are often
deemed inadequate to diffuse widespread consensus regarding what jus gentium stands for and
requires of states. Consequently, the articulation between customary international law, its
codification practices, and exercises of power in international politics came to constitute a real
divide between legal and political studies of international law.233 That is what is being attacked
and systemically eroded via the interventions of TWAIL scholarship in particular, and critical
debates emanating from the Global South in general.
Power, needless to say, comes in many forms and disguises. Both consent and coercion
are essential means through which power is exercised. In other words, effective control and
dispensation of force, as well as claims of legitimate authority, are equally needed for the use of
power. As such, the critical international relations scholar dares to question why legal scholarship
on international law privileges or isolates the power of rules as the ultimate tool for constraining,
persuading, and guiding behavior, at the expense of things that are overtly political in their
nature.234 Why, when we study international law, are we to separate power as it is conceived
within the framework of a legal system from power in its other embodiments? Could
developments in international law solely be explained by the unfolding jurisprudence of
international law alone? Could law generate its own source of legitimacy in an all-encompassing
way? How could we understand the background to the foundational principles of international
law, such as reciprocity, jurisdiction, legal personality and legitimate expectations, as well as
their effects in constraining and influencing how states behave, without paying attention to the
very mechanisms that define and sustain these states? Why is it that the idea of obligation
constitutes the distinguishing mark of an international law scholar’s worldview, as opposed to the
idea of conflict? In international relations literature, the same world of interstate relations is
defined by anything but the principle of obligation and the rule of law, regardless of the school of
thought a particular scholar ascribes to. Furthermore, current critical scholarship in IR goes as far
as suggesting that obligations and rules sanctified by international law are often used to qualify
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the abuse of power within the international system by bigger and richer states against others.235
Legal scholars could of course posit that the obligations of international law are designed,
first and foremost, to constrain violence and excessive use or abuse of power, in addition to
framing rights that are at least in principle applicable to all members of the “international
community,” as they are bound by international law.236 Yet, what about obligations, such as those
related to “humanitarian law,” that can generate a correlative right to apply power against select
states despite the right to territorial integrity or immunity from interference, as exemplified by the
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq?237 If the foundational principles of international law are
indeed there to condition states in their attempts to modify customary international legal rules
within the bounds of judicial merit and legitimate expectation, then explicit respect is paid to the
legal personhood of the state at the expense of other international entities. If international law is
open to change emanating from within the system—as long as it is consistent with its founding
premises—this amounts to a protection of the existing status quo of unequal relations and
historical injustices. Among the principles of international law cited above, reciprocity emerges
as primary in international legal relations. It is assumed to ensure—at least in principle—that the
activities and claims of powerful states could be moderated by the knowledge that other states or
conglomerations of states have the right to engage in similar activities or to make similar
claims.238 International relations scholarship on international law, on the other hand, openly
depreciates the principle of reciprocity as a mere front, and not an effective device in regulating
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interstate relations—or indeed any other form of inter- or transnational politics.239 This is despite
the fact that the legal principle of legitimate expectation encompasses powerful norms such as
pacta sunt servanda. 240 In contrast, from the classical legal scholarship point of view, the
principle of legitimate expectation combined with the principle of reciprocity could build into the
system of international law the desired degree of stability, both in the operation of its rules and in
the structure of its institutions. Here the assumption is that there is indeed a stable set of
constraints operating on powerful states in international law, and thus fears that it will only serve
the interests of the mighty is unjustified. Legal scholarship has traditionally insisted that once
norms are created in international law, based on shared understandings of the customary
processes, the relationship between law and politics is no longer a one-way street.
In summary, whichever route one takes to a full-fledged understanding of international
law, the intersection of politics and law appears a key preoccupation. Legal scholarship on
international law cannot avoid debates on the power/law nexus, and the contributions of critical
legal studies scholarship, the New Haven School, debates on transnational law, and TWAIL
scholarship readily attest to this inevitability. 241 On the international relations side of things, the
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long-lived doctrinal triumph of realism has not helped to create conditions for an interdisciplinary
examination of international law. In particular, “realist” international relations scholarship of the
1940s and 1950s showed a very strong dislike for the “idealist” international law of the inter-war,
and later on post-war, period. Scholars as high profile as Hans Morgenthau branded international
law scholarship— refererring explicitly not only to legal positivism but also to liberal idealism-as naïve, dangerous and morally dubious.242 The peculiar relationship between legal positivism
and political realism thus assumes a long history, with each constituting the “classical paradigm”
for their respective disciplines. One may in fact go as far as arguing that they are in effect fully
complementary with each other’s projects, particularly regarding the issue of the state. Both are
state-centric, though legal positivism is so inherently and intrinsically, when compared to
realism’s formulaic focus. Both take the state for granted, the former by not talking about it other
than in a subsidiary manner or as background, and the latter by always starting the debate from
state interests. Equally significant for the purposes of the present analysis is the fact that although
neither school now enjoys the intellectual dominance once characteristic of them, both realism
and positivism have left strong legacies. Any critical activity in international relations literature
on international law, for instance, begins with a well-versed attack on either or both; this includes
but is not limited to work by liberal internationalists and cosmopolitanists, neo-Marxists,
constructivists, institutionalists, and of course critical theorists of a post-modernist persuasion.
Legal positivism, on the other hand, is a common target for both critical legal scholars of myriad
schools and transnationalism debates in international law. The remaining question is whether, by
attempting to surpass both legal positivism and realism in a sweeping motion, these new
developments in either of the fields have managed to tackle the issue that both have in common
while being acutely unaware of its shared status: the state. Furthermore, whether it is the same
state we are talking about in each case is a question mostly avoided outside of particular cases
such as TWAIL scholarship.243
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IV. JUS COGENS OR NOT—DILEMMAS?
The standard account of customary international law is that it arises from the widespread
and consistent practice of states acting out of a sense of legal obligation, though this is in turn
owed to many hegemonic practices and global hierarchies. This account, although commonly
recited, is plagued by evidentiary, normative, and conceptual difficulties, and has been subjected
to increasing criticism.244 A fundamental problem with much theorizing about international law is
that it fails to identify the decision-maker(s) under study. Instead, the discussion proceeds as if
international law exists in the abstract, without any particular political entity to interpret and
apply it.245 In contradistinction, the application of a fundamental norm like jus cogens cannot be
understood without paying attention to the preferences of the relevant legal actors. In the absence
of a controlling treaty, these preferences provide the actual content of jus cogens above and
beyond the letter of the law, perhaps somewhat akin to the judicial development of AngloAmerican common law.246 Immunities in international law expose multifaceted tensions between
the conflicting goals of international stability of the state-system and legal accountability of the
states. The laws arranging immunities do not provide conceptual and doctrinal coherence in terms
of the relationship between state immunity and jurisdictional universalism. Foreign sovereign
immunity and official status-based immunity are jurisdictionally sound, and protective of the
existing state system in that they block the exercise of adjudicative jurisdiction by foreign states’
courts. However, these immunities do not necessarily preempt the prescriptive jurisdiction of
foreign states’ laws to regulate conduct—even conduct inside other states—if a basis of
prescriptive jurisdiction exists in international law such as the kind dictated by jus cogens norms.
This is particularly important in the case of universal jurisdiction for state criminality. The
question is to understand what determines a particular violation’s status as subject to peremptory
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norms and prescriptive jurisdiction in international law. Considering the notion of a hierarchical
international legal order whereby (certain) norms are elevated to a superior level, classical
scholarship posits that international law has largely developed as a horizontal system of norms.
The most prominent exception to this is the concept of jus cogens, which denotes a substantive
hierarchical superiority in international criminal law. Since most of the accepted items clustered
under jus cogens norms belong to the domain of human rights violations and state criminality,
there is a tendency to presume that human rights concerns sit at the top of the pyramid of
international legal norms. Yet it remains highly questionable whether the jus cogens-based
substantive norm hierarchy is anything more than theoretical or aspirational. Due to the rather
narrow interpretation of the scope of jus cogens norms in both domestic and international judicial
practice, in reality they remain within the horizontal scope of international law, unless used by
powerful legal actors.247
I would argue that this dynamic endemic to the relationship between state sovereignty and
universal jurisdiction holds two important consequences for the current state of international law.
The connection between immunities and applications of jus cogens is a very important one in the
sense that the latter introduces practices that are against the mandate of the former in international
law, in particular in the domain of criminal law. A few caveats are necessary here. First, the
relevant law preempting immunities normally accorded to the state is the law in existence when a
court determines whether to entertain suit, and not the law in existence at the time of the domestic
conduct leading to the international adjudication of the issue. As a result, the viability of claims
from the same underlying facts could and does change along with shifts in international law. This
in turn causes complaints concerning legal certainty of adjudication under the aegis of
international criminal law. Second, peremptory norms doctrines by and large lack rule-of-law
coherence, since they are often embroiled with problems of their accepted legality and possible
retroactive applications. This has been particularly troubling in the interpretation of ICC
judgments discussed in previous chapters, and it is an issue receiving further elaboration in the
next chapter of this work on hybrid courts and tribunals. If we were to assess violations of jus
cogens, or peremptory norms of international law, compared with the relatively settled laws of
247
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foreign sovereign and status-based immunities, it would become apparent that international law
of conduct-based accountability and removal of immunities is in a state of flux. Since customary
international law arises from state practices and opinio juris, arguments used to avoid direct
collisions between state sovereignty and jus cogens do not necessarily lend themselves to a
distinct doctrine of international law in this area. Most prominently, arguments suggesting that
jus cogens addresses substantive prohibitions under international law may not even apply when
the acts at issue are to be brought to trial under conduct-based jurisprudence and in ad hoc
settings. Bending towards accountability norms whereby the law about state criminality is
unsettled is not a high priority in international law. The only exception to this seems to emerge
where international legal bodies are engaged in determining culpability and accountability
concerning the acts of the states and high ranking officials representing the state in the Global
South. Only then, it appears, do jus cogens norms become well and alive. If so, jus cogens norms
do not hold such a unique position in the hierarchy of international law. The presumption that,
unlike treaty law, peremptory norms abide no derogation and are binding on all states regardless
of their willingness to be bound by them translates, in actual practice, into something else. As a
result, I would argue that the authority of peremptory norms cannot be adequately explained by
positivist, institutionalist, and voluntarist explanations of their authority. Perhaps the only other
option available is an explanation from natural law or its derivatives, if the authority of
peremptory norms is to avoid the conceptual difficulties engulfing their traditional renditions.248 I
will further explicate this issue in the last chapter of this dissertation, on collective responsibility
and applied political philosophical debates on the notion of justice as it relates to virtue ethics on
the one hand, and natural law theories on the other.
Meanwhile, in the next two chapters of this dissertation, I will first attend to the
applicability of the principle of legal certainty to the category of crimes against humanity and
highlight some of the missing connections between jus cogens norms, erga omnes crimes and
actual international law adjudication of egregious criminal conduct. I will further exemplify my
misgivings on the issue of the application of universal jurisdiction concerning crimes against
humanity legislation through a discussion on limits of ICC jurisprudence and potential avenues
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for alternative practices in the form of hybrid courts and tribunals. However, before advancing
the debate on universal jurisdiction in that particular direction, first I will summarize my findings
concerning the doctrinal limits of universal jurisdiction in terms of its applications in the Global
South.
CONCLUSION
The thrust of this chapter was the critical examination of the matter of the state in
contemporary international law, in relation to the work done by international relations scholars on
the same subject; and to determine how these findings relate to some pertinent issues concerning
statehood and sovereignty in the Global South under the aegis of the global application of jus
cogens norms. This examination was essential for understanding the limits of universal
jurisdiction, which is the main tenet of adjudication of crimes against humanity.
The central motif of this chaper was understanding how conceptualizations of the state—
as emblematic of power relations in general—shape the context as well as content of processes
and practices of international criminal law in the Global South. The original idea for this inquiry
emerged from the observation that a noteworthy conglomeration of recent trends in international
relations seemed to insist that they have solutions to offer for deficits in the study of international
law. However, upon closer examination, it has become apparent that the leading cadres of
international relations scholarship today no longer takes much interest in the state, and rather treat
it either as a relic or as a nuisance. The claim that it is possible to bring these two enterprises,
namely international relations and international law scholarship on the subject of law, together in
the form of a dialogue without sorting out what separated them in the first place has thus proved
absurd. There is no foundation upon which one can appeal for a common understanding of
international law other than the one that engages with power, hegemony and histories of
discontent. As such, one comes across a series of semi-independent conversations amongst
individuals familiar with each other’s intellectual traditions and methodological preoccupations.
In this sense, the most distinctive feature of the current study of international law could be
determined as the decisive conflation of its subject and its object, the state. The possibility of an
external normative order grounding the equality and morality of the state on an autonomous
system of legal sources and processes is currently all the rage. Oddly enough, now that the
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classical bastion of state-centric analyses of politics—i.e. international relations—no longer cares
much for the state, one is faced with the illusion that legal and non-legal scholarship are indeed
engaged in a new kind of dialogue, despite all their previously missed opportunities. The
characteristics of contemporary legal arguments on international law as a result remain elusive.
The evasive rhetoric of the discipline regarding the state in particular, and power relations in
general, provides the ultimate guarantee for its intellectual and professional autonomy. The
traditional circles within which this kind of noble self-isolation would have been methodically
scrutinized, international relations scholarship, is too busy with other questions.
In this context, the suggestion made in this chapter is two-fold. First and foremost, the
debate about the state should at least remain a point of discomfort for international law
scholarship. Second, the grammar of legal theory attending to international law should include
the state as a problem-laden point of reference, rather than a foundational pillar, and
contextualize it both geographically and historically. Perhaps then we could finally start a
genuine conversation about why the state no longer seems to matter as much as international law
once assumed it to. Through interdisciplinary dialogue, we may indeed develop a deeper
understanding of law’s secretive over-dependency on the state. Unlike the immediate post-war
years, the international law scholar’s ultimate wish to dispense with the need for the consent and
compliance of the sovereign state now very much coincides with the reality that his/her
counterparts work with across the disciplinary fence, in the field of international relations.
However, the challenge now comes from elsewhere, the Global South, whereby the state reemerged as a bastion of hope against the invasive forces of neoliberalism and global
constitutionalism. Coming back full circle, on the issue of how to relate to the state in the context
of Global South’s engagements with international law, a major consequence of the new global
restructuring of states, societies and economies has been the double process of further and deeper
integration to the global market on the one hand, and, social exclusion, dispossession, and
emergence of novel forms of widespread insecurity and precarity, on the other. These processes
have led to an exponential growth of marginalized and deinstitutionalized subaltern classes,
especially in the Global South, rendering them all the more vulnerable to becoming subjects of
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state criminality. 249 Critically navigating through prevailing perspectives on international
criminal law pertaining to violent acts and crimes committed by states against their own people-otherwise known as crimes against humanity, the next three chapters of the dissertation will thus
strive to propose an alternative outlook. In the spirit of a “quiet encroachment of the ordinary,” I
will address crimes against humanity first normatively, then as seen through the mechanisms of
international law as they are sought to apply in the Global South, and finally from within the
states and societies wherein they are committed.250
International law, and in particular international criminal law, reproduces many of the
oligarchic tendencies in global governance, while also creating ambiguities and a new
multilateral ethos of indifference. Within these parameters of a dialectics of stability and change,
practices and processes not only inhibit global transformations and reproduce some of the most
oppressive conditions of the existing order, they also lead to new openings. As the following
discussion on crimes against humanity will illuminate, international criminal law is not immune
to these coexisting forces and, as such, it can harbour promises as much as it casts long dark
shadows.

249

On this issue, see Boaventura de Sousa Santos and César A. Rodríguez-Garavito, eds., Law and globalization
from below: towards a cosmopolitan legality (Cambridge University Press, 2005), and Stephen Gill,
ed., Globalization, democratization and multilateralism (Springer, 2016).
250
For a similar use of the phrase of ‘quiet encroachment of the ordinary’ but in a different context, see Asef Bayat,
"From Dangerous Classes' to Quiet Rebels' Politics of the Urban Subaltern in the Global South” (2000) 15
International sociology 533.

123

Chapter IV. Crimes Against Humanity Legislation in International Law and The Conundrum
of Jurisdictional Certainty
INTRODUCTION
This chapter pursues the question of what distinguishes crimes against humanity from
other crimes, as well as why and how they fall under the purview of universal jurisdiction. To
this end, it examines the jurisprudential architecture of crimes against humanity legislation in
order to determine whether jurisdictional certainty alone would suffice for establishing the basis
for adjudication to ensue. In this work, crimes against humanity is the key category of criminal
conduct codified by international law that I chose to use as the basis of my analysis concerning
limits of universal jurisdiction. This is so not because the crimes that fall under its aegis
constitute in any way less than a frontal assault on human dignity and humanity at large. Rather,
the conundrum concerns the impossibility of removing the vestiges of a historically skewed
regime of accountability in international law regardless of the severe and egregious nature of
such crimes. In other words, the problem rests with the way international [criminal] law operates
and not with the applicability of the norm of universal jurisdiction to crimes against humanity. In
this context, let me start this somewhat unsettling discussion with the citation of a very recent
incidence befitting the definition of such crimes, and use this vignette as a starting point to
analyze the current impossibility of legislating an applicable punishment scheme against many
such crimes.
In August 2016, the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) published a report in
which it documents in detail the crimes against humanity and war crimes that led to the complete
depopulation of Darayya city.251 The SNHR is an independent, non-governmental human rights
organization founded in June 2011, and is a certified source for the United Nation of statistics
about human rights violations in Syria. The report notes that all truces and reconciliations
regarding circumstances in Darayya were implemented while negating basic international
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humanitarian and human rights law.252 Negotiations were carried out under oppression and
dictated by siege, indiscriminate bombing, starvation, and the prohibition of civilian residents and
aid from getting into or out of the city. According to the report, the crime of en masse forced
displacement was carried out in a blatant manner in Homs, Darayya, and Banyas. 253 This
particular report is one example amongst many documenting mass political violence committed
by states against their own citizens since 1945. In this sense, it does more than shed an at least
partial light on the drastic changes in the demography of Syria over the past six years as a result
of the killing, indiscriminate and deliberate bombing, and destruction of livelihood of civilian
communities. It also provides an inlet into a more nuanced understanding of the limits of the
applications of crimes against humanity legislation in situ. In Syria, close to seven million people
have been displaced and became refugees, while 6.3 million people have become IDPs.254 Such
demographic changes undoubtedly pose threats to the wellbeing of the peoples of the entire
region, but equally importantly they raise the additional challenge of establishing an
accountability regime in the aftermath of the still-ongoing war. In the specific case of Daraya city,
for instance, the report records the killing of no less than 817 civilians, including 67 children and
98 women, during the time period covered by the report. These numbers and associated
circumstances of the killing of civilian populations constitute an additional concern for the
determination of the extent of crimes against humanity committed during the Syrian War, even as
252
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they are naturalized as wartime casualties. Again according to the report, government forcesowned helicopters dropped no less than 7,846 bombs on the city, including barrel bombs loaded
with a flammable substance that is evidently napalm. The report then documents that the siege
imposed on the city and its fallouts, such as shortages in food and medicine, resulted in civilian
deaths as well. Finally, there are 4,311 forcibly-disappeared persons from Darayya who were
arrested by government forces, while later on the authorities denied their existence.255
The commonly accepted understanding of the modern concept and related jurisprudence
of crimes against humanity is that this section of international law is a product of the horror of the
crimes committed during the two World Wars. It was then revitalized due to the growing
consensus amongst both European and post-colonial states that certain crimes committed within
national borders and by the states against their own citizens should be legitimate subjects of
international law and adjudication.256 However, unlike war crimes and genocide, the law of
crimes against humanity has primarily developed through piecemeal additions to customary
international law.257 Today, the statutes of most international and internationalized tribunals such
as the International Criminal Court’s Rome Statute contain definitions of these crimes, though
there are significant differences in terms of the jurisprudence employed by different international,
regional and hybrid courts.258 To say the least, the evolution of the definition of crimes against
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humanity as an international instrument has not been linear. 259 As far as the practices of
international courts are concerned, later definitions are often more expansive, while at the
regional level domesticated definitions tend to be narrower than their international counterparts.
Furthermore, the contents of the legal norms jus cogens and erga omnes obliging state parties to
punish crimes against humanity remain subject to greater controversy than has been the case in
the prescribing of punishment for genocide and war crimes.260
Overall, one might say that these are internal disputes, jurisprudential matters to be settled
in the courts themselves. In this work, however, I will argue otherwise, and posit that many of
these seemingly jurisprudential disputes actually relate to the criteria used for the determination
of what constitutes crimes against humanity on the ground. Therefore, there is actually an
intrinsic politico-normative challenge on the issue of their universal applicability. In
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where
perpetrated.” [This definition was also used in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.]
The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Article 5:
“…the following crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and
directed against any civilian population: (a) murder; (b) extermination; (c) enslavement; (d) deportation; (e)
imprisonment; (f) torture; (g) rape; (h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; (i) other inhumane
acts.”
The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Article 3:
“…the following crimes when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population
on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d)
Deportation; (e) Imprisonment; (f) Torture; (g) Rape; (h) Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; (i)
Other inhumane acts.”
The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), Article 2:
“…the following crimes as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population: a. Murder; b.
Extermination; c. Enslavement; d. Deportation; e. Imprisonment; f. Torture; g. Rape, sexual slavery, enforced
prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other form of sexual violence; h. Persecution on political, racial, ethnic or
religious grounds; i. Other inhumane acts.”
The Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), Article 5:
“…any acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, on
national, political, ethnical, racial or religious grounds, such as: murder; extermination; enslavement; deportation;
imprisonment; torture; rape; persecutions on political, racial, and religious grounds; other inhumane acts.”
259
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jurisprudential terms, the primary challenge in defining crimes against humanity is to identify the
precise elements that distinguish these offenses from crimes exclusively subject to national laws.
The definition itself not only determines the scope of international jurisdiction, it also gives rise
to a number of important consequences concerning trial structure, conditional and selective
removal of immunities and the commuting of sentences. Unlike the majority of domestic crimes,
these offenses are generally considered outside the purview of statutes of limitations. Equally
importantly, the immunities that often shield state representatives and high-ranking public and
military officers from criminal responsibility are categorically removed in the context of crimes
against humanity, at least when trials are held before international tribunals or domestic courts
employing universal jurisdiction. Although the concept of universal jurisdiction—the principle
that certain crimes are subject to jurisdiction by all states—remains controversial vis-à-vis the
capacities of domestic courts, proponents of universal jurisdiction invariably include crimes
against humanity within its scope. If put into practice, the principle would deliver the following
result: while the crime of murder could only be tried in a court with a jurisdictional link to the
act, a murder committed as a crime against humanity could be tried in any criminal court in the
world. Finally, the prohibition of crimes against humanity is a jus cogens norm of international
law, thus certifying that its derogation is not pardonable or to be permitted under any
circumstance. As a result of its special status, at least in theory, states have an obligation under
international law either to prosecute perpetrators of crimes against humanity or to extradite them
to states intending to pursue prosecutions, hence the erga omnes part of the equation pertaining to
this particular set of crimes. In light of the serious legal consequences of designating an offense a
crime against humanity, as well as the severe moral condemnation the label entails, the
importance of understanding the exact judicial nature of these offenses needs no further
emphasis. However, this chapter is not an exercise in that vein. Although it does provide a brief
historical sketch of the evolution of the norms and jurisprudence prohibiting crimes against
humanity, as well as an assessment of the current state of the definition with respect to each key
element of its constitutive crimes, the core of the argument developed in the following pages
pertains to another and, I would purport, an equally important issue: the politico-normative
framework within which these offenses find meaning and are deemed worthy of trial in the
domestic setting. In this sense, the focus is to be shifted away from institutions such as the ICC to
hybrid courts and the overall possibility of the domestication of this particular category of
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international crimes.
In essence, crimes against humanity are mass crimes committed against the fundamental
human rights of a civilian population. In this context, I make the point that their common
inclusion under humanitarian, rather than human rights, law is misleading and has grave
consequences. They are rightfully distinguished from egregious state crimes such as genocide in
that they need not target a specific group, but may aim at the civilian population in general. Thus,
they include crimes against political and or other groups, and creating conditions of generalized
trauma and loss. In contrast to genocide, it is not necessary for the perpetrator to intend to destroy
a group as such, in whole or in part. Similarly, crimes against humanity should be regarded
different from war crimes insofar as the criminal conduct may be directed not towards the legally
defined enemy's popluation but against the perpetrator's own; hence the difficulty of their
legislation. In the following pages, an appeal is thus made to understand the politico-normative
precepts of crimes against humanity jurisdiction, in an attempt to render them meaningful and
useful within the domestic realm, where these crimes are perpetrated, rather than being seen as an
imposition by an international court or a consortium of states (the latter format commonly known
as “victor’s justice”).
I. JURISPRUDENTIAL ARCHITECTURE OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
In international law, crimes against humanity found their first explicit formulation as a
category of crime in Article 6 (c) of the Nürnberg/Nuremberg Charter which emerged from the
Tribunal.261 The offenses categorized as crimes against humanity were also included in Article 5
(c) of the Tokyo Charter and Article II (1) of Control Council Law No. 10.262 While the
Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters required that crimes against humanity evidence a connection to
aggressive war or war crimes, this supplementary requirement was left out of Control Council
Law No. 10. The Statutes of the Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals and the International
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See The Charter and Judgment of the Nürnberg Tribunal – History and Analysis: Memorandum submitted by the
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Criminal Court have then reaffirmed the customary law character of crimes against humanity,
and the prohibition of crimes against humanity was recognized as having the status of jus cogens
and belonging to the domain of erga omnes.
The legal phrase “crimes against humanity” was first employed earlier, in a 1915
Declaration by the governments of Great Britain, France and Russia which condemned the
Turkish government for the alleged massacres of Armenians as “crimes against humanity and
civilization for which all the members of the Turkish Government will be held responsible
together with its agents implicated in the massacres.”263 Despite this early use of the term,
however, the first full prosecutions of crimes against humanity did not take place until after the
Second World War in 1945, in the form of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at
Nuremberg, Germany. The charter establishing the Nuremberg IMT defined crimes against
humanity as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhuman acts committed
against any civilian population, before or during the war, or prosecutions on political, racial or
religious grounds in the execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where they were
perpetrated. Subsequent to the Nuremberg Charter, the Tokyo Charter of 1946 established the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, incorporating the same definition of crimes
against humanity. Following the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials of 1945-1946, no other
international tribunal with jurisdiction over crimes against humanity was established until the
Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals. However, in 1947, the International Law Commission was
charged by the United Nations General Assembly with the formulation of the principles of
international law recognized and reinforced in the Nuremberg Charter and judgment, and drafted
a “code of offenses against the peace and security of mankind,” which included crimes against
humanity.264 In 1996, this Draft Code from 1947 was brought to the attention of jurists who
reinstated crimes against humanity as inhumane acts including murder, extermination, torture,
enslavement, persecution on political, racial, religious or ethnic grounds, institutionalized
discrimination, arbitrary deportation or forcible transfer of population, arbitrary imprisonment,
263
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rape, enforced prostitution, and other inhuman acts committed in a systematic manner or on a
large scale and instigated or directed by a Government or by any organization or group within the
boundaries of a state.265 This latter definition differs from the one used in Nuremberg in the sense
that, as stated above, the former only targeted criminal acts that were committed “before or
during the war,” thus establishing a prescriptive nexus between crimes against humanity and
armed conflict. Prior to the 1996 definition, in 1993 the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), established by the UN Security Council in order to investigate and
prosecute genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity which had taken place in the
former Yugoslavia, have already opened up the 1947 draft definition. However, it did so only for
the specific case of the former Yugoslavia. Although the ICTY’s connecting of crimes against
humanity to both international and non-international armed conflict led to the expansion of the
list of criminal acts used in Nuremberg to include imprisonment, torture and rape, as per Article 5
of the ICTY Statute, this was done so with reference to a specific case. In 1994, the UN Security
Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) pursuant to the
genocide that had taken place between April and July 1994. This second ad hoc international
criminal tribunal yet again changed the scope of the definition of crimes against humanity. In the
ICTR Statute, the linkage between crimes against humanity and an armed conflict of any kind
was dropped. Rather, a new requirement was added that the inhumane acts must be part of a
“systematic or widespread attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic,
racial or religious grounds,” as per Article 3 of the ICTR Statute.266 This change was stipulated
due to the concern that, given the internal nature of the conflict in Rwanda, crimes against
humanity would likely not have been applicable if the nexus to armed conflict had been
maintained.
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The most up-to-date definition of crimes against humanity came with the establishment of
the permanent International Criminal Court in 2002. In its founding treaty, the Rome Statute,
crimes against humanity are stated somewhat differently than in any of the preceding legal
definitions. For the purpose of this Statute, “crime against humanity” means any of the following
acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
population, with knowledge of the attack: murder; extermination; enslavement; deportation or
forcible transfer of population; imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in
violation of fundamental rules of international law; torture; rape, sexual slavery, enforced
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of
comparable gravity; persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial,
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are
universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act
referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; enforced
disappearance of persons; the crime of apartheid; and other inhumane acts of a similar character
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.267
Essentially, the Rome Statute employs the same definition of crimes against humanity that the
ICTR does. However, it removes the requirement that the attack have been carried out “on
national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds.” In addition, the Rome Statute definition
267
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offers the most expansive list of specific criminal acts to be covered by international criminal
law. Despite the extensive degree of legislation, however, international law scholars have
repeatedly pointed out the need for a specialized convention on crimes against humanity.268 This
is in part due to the fact that its current framing could be problematic in light of the limited
application of select principles of legality to such crimes. For instance, the maxim nullum crimen
sine lege, a fundamental principle of international criminal law, dictates that an individual can
only be convicted for specific acts which, at the time of commission, were known to be of
criminal nature. The aforementioned ad hoc tribunals could not limit their jurisdiction with that
maxim. However, there is at least a partial solution offered to this conundrum in international
jurisprudence. Fundamentally, crimes against humanity are inhumane acts committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack against civilians by their own state or an organized political
authority with jurisdiction over that territory. The connection to a broader or systematic attack is
then what justifies the exercise of international criminal jurisdiction and thus removes the burden
of such crimes not being already codified within the confines of domestic jurisprudence.
Similarly, the erga omnes category dictates the necessity for any legal party to pursue
punishment, even in the event of the impossibility of domestic adjudication of crimes against
humanity. No doubt the erga omnes clause is weaker than the nullum crimen sine lege dictum,
though together they do form a defense of the applicability of crimes against humanity legislation
for both past and present cases. It is also true that some scholars make a distinction between
substantive and procedural law in the context of nullum crimen sine lege.269 According to this
view, a change in substantive law leading to liability must occur before a criminal act is
committed, but a change in procedural law leading to liability may occur after the act is
committed. For example, extending the statute of limitations to allow the prosecution of crimes
that occurred in the past would constitute a change in procedural law.270 This would directly
apply to acts punished by international criminal tribunals that were of ambiguous legality in the
immediate context of the conflict or atrocity situations in which these acts were committed. In
this regard, nullum crimen sine lege as the legality principle as it pertains to international law
268
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jurisprudence requires a procedural reading in the case of crimes against humanity. Finally,
though the exact wording of the definitions of crimes against humanity differ in the cornerstone
documents that provide it a juridical standing, each definition is made up of similar underlying
criminal elements (e.g., murder, extermination, rape, and so forth) as well as common contextual
elements under which the criminal act must have been committed.
As far as the structure of these crimes is concerned, the material element of crimes against
humanity requires the commission of a specific individual act in the course of a widespread or
systematic attack on a civilian population.271 The attack on the civilian population represents the
contextual element of the crime. The mental element requires intent and knowledge regarding the
material elements of the crime, including the contextual element. These crimes affect not only the
individual victim, but as already mentioned, constitue a systematic or widespread attack on the
fundamental human rights of a civilian population as a whole. This particular context of
organized violence calls into question the responsibilities of humanity as a whole against the
atrocities committed by a state against its own people. At least in principle, the norm also protects
individual human rights, including the individual victim's life, health, freedom and dignity.272
The object of these crimes is, without exception, harming the civilian population, though
this explicit focus does not apply to the category of war crimes, the latter category including both
military personelle and civilian populations in the category of victims. Furthermore, crimes
against humanity are directed against a civilian population at large and not merely against select
individuals. A civilian population is any plurality of persons that are connected with each other
by common characteristics, including but not limited to ethnicity, religion, race, nationality, and
political belief, and any one of these characteristics could render them the target of an attack. The
most contentious section of this definition is the criterion that the presence of a limited number of
combatants among an attacked civilian population does not negate its civilian character. At times
of ethnic civil war, for instance, the state cannot justify its actions in attacking civilian
populations through the reasoning that they have a military/guerilla arm. Neither is it necessary
271
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for the entire population of a state or territory to be affected by the attack. The civilian character
of the attacked population and persons applies both in civil war and during peacetime. Therefore,
for the purpose of determining the criminal element, a distinction between civilians and noncivilians is not possible solely by applying the terms of customary international humanitarian
law. In the context of crimes against humanity, application of the notion of harming the civilian
population for criminal adjudication aims to protect the fundamental rights of every human being
against any form of systematic violation. The essential determining factor is the victims’ need for
protection, and the presumption of their defenselessness vis-à-vis the state, the military or other
types of politically organized force. By derivation, anyone who is not part of this organized
political power using force is considered a civilian. Furthermore, it is not the formal status—such
as membership in the military forces—but a person's actual role at the time of commission of
these crimes that determines their culpability under the purview of crimes against humanity. In
other words, members of military forces or other armed groups who have laid down their arms or
have otherwise been rendered hors de combat are not to be subjected to culpability criteria.
Another very important feature concerning the jurisprudential architecture of these crimes
is the idea of “attack.” This element describes a specific course of conduct involving the
commission of acts of violence. Such a course of conduct must include the "multiple
commission" of acts listed in Article 7 (1) of the ICC Statute. However, this does not mean that
the perpetrator needs to act repeatedly by him- or herself.273 Rather, what is in question is the
widespread or systematic character of these acts of violence. Specifically, the criterion
“widespread” describes a quantitative element related to the crimes committed. The widespread
nature of the attack can arise either from the number of victims or from the extension of its
effects over a broad geographic area. The criterion of a systematic attack, on the other hand, is a
qualitative qualifier. It refers to the organized nature of the committed acts of violence, and thus
serves to exclude isolated acts from the notion of crimes against humanity. Earlier case law of the
ad hoc tribunals required that an individual act that is adjudicated based on the definition of
crimes against humanity must follow a predetermined plan or policy. However, the Appeals
Chamber of the Yugoslavia Tribunal then distanced itself from such a requirement and set a
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precedent for limited coverage. 274 Accordingly, although attacks on a civilian population
typically do follow a predetermined plan, this does not make the existence of a plan or policy an
element of crime. This argument relies on the principle that, under customary international law,
crimes against humanity do not call for the proven presence of a policy element. However,
Article 7 (2) (a) of the ICC Statute extended the definition again and stipulated that crimes
against humanity jurisdiction requires that the attack on a civilian population must have been
carried out "pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such
attack."275
Finally, there is the issue of perpetrators. Perpetrators need not be members of the State or
an organization involved in the crime, but can include all persons who act to implement or
support the policy of the State or the organization in question. These individual acts include
killing (Art. 7 [1] [a] of the ICC Statute); extermination (Art. 7 [1] [b]); enslavement (Art. 7 [1]
[c]); deportation or forcible transfer of population (Art. 7 [1] [d]); imprisonment (Art. 7 [1]
[e]); torture (Art. 7 [1] [f]); sexual violence (Art. 7 [1] [g] of); persecution (Art. 7 [1] [h]);
enforced disappearance (Art. 7 [1] [i); apartheid (Art. 7 [1] [j]), and ‘other inhumane acts’ (Art. 7
[1] [k]). For all these acts, it must be proven beyond doubt that the perpetrator acted with intent.
He/she must have acted with knowledge of the attack on the civilian population and must be fully
cognizant that the action constituted a part of the attack.276
In the ICC’s jurisprudence, then, emphasis has been placed on the criteria to be fulfilled
for the possibility of persecution of crimes against humanity as defined by post-Second World
War jurisprudence. This led to a narrower interpretation of the term “civilian.” Prior to the Rome
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Statute, in some cases courts have interpreted the term “civilian” by incorporating hors de
combat. However, both the ICTY and the ICC have moved towards a more restrictive
interpretation of the term, potentially excluding members of the armed forces. This move may be
regarded as regressive, going against the spirit in which the category of crimes against humanity
was created and leading to a protection gap which crimes against humanity legislation was
initially intended to close. In hindsight, the exclusion of members of the armed forces from the
definition of “civilian” may have been a concession extended to increase the number of signatory
states to the Rome Statute.277
In summary, crimes against humanity pertain to both past and present atrocities, and two
new concepts have been introduced into the international landscape as a result: the first one
describes the violence, oppression, or persecution undertaken or allowed under law by the state
itself (international crime component), and the second one encompasses the variety of responses
to these acts of violence, oppression or persecution (transitional justice component). With the
establishment of the ICC, the hope arose that common citizens, whose lives were marked by the
violence of genocide, crimes of war, and crimes against humanity, have finally found a platform
to ask for justice and the punishment of persons responsible for these atrocities. However, the
truth is much more complicated, and justice for crimes against humanity is far more evasive than
what a flat reading of the Rome Statute might suggest.
A reexamination of the Tokyo Trial in comparison with the ICC reveals interesting
characteristics concerning the evolution of international criminal law. The background of the
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Tokyo Trial was somewhat different from that of the Nuremberg Trial, and it had a unique
jurisprudential context due to the declarations made specifically on Japan by the principal Allied
Powers. Among the crimes provided for in Article 5 of the Tokyo Charter, crimes against peace,
for which there was to be individual responsibility, were the most disputed legislation during the
trials. Furthermore, war crimes and crimes against humanity were not clearly distinguished in
either the Indictment or the Judgment of the Trial.278 Later discussions on international criminal
law led to the necessity of posing some new questions on the position of peremptory norms in
international law, which were not addressed during the Tokyo Trials. As a safeguard, the 1969
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties introduced the concept of jus cogens into international
law.279 Still, the related category of erga omnes obligations remains one of the most problemladen areas in international law. The rule that every state has the right to define its international
legal position remains in force. In this regard, the judgment of the English House of Lords in the
Pinochet case is of special interest280, as the problem of criminal responsibility of individuals for
grave violations of international law was trumped by the concerns about the personal immunity
of heads of state, combined with another problem of (quasi-) universal jurisdiction within British
administrative law.281
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In a larger view, the emergence of legal rules governing criminal liability for genocide
represents the response of society in the face of criminal phenomena that cannot be categorized
otherwise. Punishing those responsible for committing such abominations led to a strong
consecration of the criminality of mass killings at the hands of the state in international
humanitarian law. Regulations concerning the methods and means of war, limiting or prohibiting
the use of certain types of weapons and ammunition, and requiring protection of victims of armed
conflict, a body of legislation known as war crimes, are another example. These may be treated as
prerequisites for the criminalization of actions and deeds circumscribed by crimes against
humanity. Unlike these two other prototypical international crimes—war crimes and genocide—
the proscription against crimes against humanity remains to be enshrined in a domestic
constitutional context. While the former two are primarily used for international law purposes
outside the domain of domestic jurisdiction, and historically in international courts, crimes
against humanity relates to internal affairs of the state and, as such, requires additional steps to be
taken at the national level to enable its local adjudication. As already discussed, the legislation
pertaining to crimes against humanity has developed piecemeal, largely through the legal
instruments and jurisprudence of various courts and tribunals established for adjudicating crimes
that fall under this description. This process has yielded enduring normative difficulties as well as
doctrinal ambiguities. Still, the law against crimes against humanity promises to fulfill a function
that no other body of jurisprudence is or has been capable of in the context of human rights law
or humanitarian law.

II. COMPETING POLITICO-NORMATIVE VISIONS
Despite the long struggle to reach a certain level of jurisdictional certainty, there are
foundational normative questions that crimes against humanity legislation is not fully poised to
answer, such as what makes an inhumane act a crime against humanity, or what is the distinct
purpose of establishing such a category of crimes. This is the case despite the fact that, in the
drafting of the Rome Statute, the differentiation of these crimes from war crimes and genocide

courts to deliver a modicum of justice to the victims of Pinochet. See A. Bianchi, “Immunity versus human rights:
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needed to be fortified with substantive legal reasoning. 282 Furthermore, during the Rome
Conference and in its aftermath normative discussions were always circumscribed by the
conflicting political goals of individual states.283 At least in some cases, delegations were willing
to compromise their vision of crimes against humanity if the alternative was to write off the
entire prospect of a permanent international criminal court. As such, the Rome Conference
produced a definition of crimes against humanity without an underlying or overtly expressed
normative consensus. Instead, several normative visions of crimes against humanity competed,
and continue to do so, for recognition in the law, jurisprudence, and scholarship related to these
crimes. In order for the ICC or other national or international judicial bodies to be able to
exercise jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, it is essential that they be able to identify
accurately and consistently situations in which these crimes have been committed. This is not
exclusively a jurisdictional matter. As well, for judicial bodies to attribute individual criminal
responsibility for such crimes without violating the principle of legality, they must have clear
guidance of principles with reference to indictment, defense, and sentencing. This again is not
simply a jurisdictional matter. Finally, in order for states to justify universal jurisdiction in
addressing the commission of crimes against humanity, the scope of these crimes must be clearly
defined. This is perhaps the only aspect of crimes against humanity with an exclusively
legislative focus. Even there, however, politico-normative concerns determine the threshold for
resorting to the exercise of universal jurisdiction, i.e., trying nationals of another country above
282
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and beyond the requirements of nationality-territoriality nexus.
Despite the heavily normative nature of the establishment, adoption, and application of
definitions pertaining to crimes against humanity, declaring them as worthy of international law
jurisdiction simply on the basis that they threaten the peace and security of the world was the
central justification for the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment as reflected in the war nexus.284 In
other words, it was the context of war that justified the adjudication of such crimes. Atrocities
committed within a state with no connection to war were regarded as concerning that state alone.
Indeed, some participants in the Rome Conference endorsed this perspective as late as 1998.
With the Rome Statute’s coming into effect, however, a broader view of the peace and security
rationale was adopted, which encompasses threats posed by internal armed conflict as well. This
latter perspective also provided the legal basis for the establishment of the ad hoc international
criminal tribunals for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda under Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter.285 Ultimately, the elimination of the requirement of any context of armed conflict from
the definition trumped the peace and security rationale for these crimes. However, what is to
replace the war nexus is yet to be determined. Crimes committed in peacetime by a sovereign
state pose unique challenges for international law. The trials about the horrendous crimes of the
Khmer Rouge provide an apt example. In justifying the continued detention of one of the
defendants charged with crimes against humanity, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia (‘ECCC’) echoed the old peace and security rationale. 286 The Rome Statute’s
rationale, on the other hand, rests more on the gravity of the crimes than on any concrete threat to
international peace and security. One of the most frequently invoked justifications for crimes
against humanity is then that they “shock the conscience of humanity.”287
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This view of crimes against humanity is duplicated in the human rights law framework, as a
result of which crimes against humanity are depicted as particularly severe violations of
fundamental human rights. According to this perspective, the purpose of the overarching category
of crimes against humanity is to capture this seriousness through the requirements of a targeted
“population” and a “widespread or systematic attack.” Proponents of the gravity rationale reject
the notion that crimes against humanity should require a government or organizational policy or a
discriminatory intent. Unfortunately, the difficulty with this latter normative vision is that it
necessitates a scale for judging the gravity of the crime in question. This task is not a legitimate
component of international law, much less of the legislation pertaining to crime against
humanity. Nevertheless, the gravity of the crimes probably remains as the most pervasive
normative justification for crimes against humanity legislation thus far.288
In addition to the peace and security argument and the justification from the gravity of the
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offenses, there is a third normative perspective that envisions crimes against humanity as offenses
committed exclusively by state actors and, as such, the ethos of crimes against humanity emerges
as punishment for the misuse of state power to attack rather than to protect.289 If so, it is the
misuse and abuse of state power that renders these crimes non-justiciable in the domestic sphere,
and the likelihood they will go unpunished mandates the availability of international jurisdiction.
Proponents of this view promote the inclusion of a state policy element in the definition of crimes
against humanity. In other words, only inhumane acts dictated by a state policy to commit such
violence would merit designation as a crime against humanity. This vision relies heavily on a
historically descriptive point of view. At the same time, it also reflects an overreliance on a rigid
understanding of state sovereignty, especially concerning crimes perpetrated by regional alliances
and non-state actors intervening in a civil war situation or during a military occupation. While it
is true that domestic legal systems are generally unwilling or unable to prosecute either their own
state or non-state actors, it is far from clear that international courts could easily step in to remedy
the lacunae in adjudication of such crimes. In this regard, though the critique of state sovereignty
is the strongest normative standpoint for the justification for crimes against humanity legislation,
it falls short of identifying the political and institutional route required to try these cases in nondomestic courts. This weakness is at least partially remedied by emphasis on the group harm
elements of the crimes against humanity legislation.290 This requires that the targeted group share
particular characteristics beyond the geographic proximity of its members, such as nationality,
race, religion, or ethnicity. 291 This brings the normative basis of crimes against humanity
legislation close to the prohibition against genocide, although without the requirement of intent to
destroy the group in whole or in part. The focus on group-based harm undoubtedly captures one
of the primary features of crimes against humanity. Still, it lacks the large-scale and systemic
attack component, and thus is weakened in its coverage.
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In summary, only a composite analysis of existing approaches would provide a complete
rationale and normative foundation for crimes against humanity legislation. Thus far, none of
them is capable of redefining the applicable nexus, due to their emphasis on select elements or
aspects of these crimes. No single vision of crimes against humanity has predominated in
scholarship, law, or jurisprudence. Instead, from the Nuremberg judgment onwards, various
approaches continue to compete for the provision of a solid basis for the adjudication of these
crimes. The ILC has also experimented with different rationales. The 1954 Draft Code adopted a
combination of state action and discrimination, while the 1991 Draft Code relied on seriousness,
introducing the criteria of “systematic” or “mass scale.” Finally, the 1996 Draft Code combined
the seriousness and state action requirements. All of the post-Nuremberg statutes pertaining to
crimes against humanity have carried forward inconsistencies in their justifications. The ICTY
resurrected the nexus with armed conflict; the ICTR required both seriousness and
discrimination; the ICC injected a requirement of state—or at least group—action; the Special
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) relied almost exclusively on seriousness; and the ECCC reinjected the element of discrimination.292 The resultant lack of normative uniformity in the
legislation has led to important doctrinal questions remaining perpetually unresolved. The current
state of affairs also clearly indicates the importance of the politico-normative context of the
adoption and usage of crimes against humanity legislation.

III. ADJUDICATION, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW: LIMITS OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
Since 1945, there have been myriad kinds of prosecutions for crimes against humanity. In
addition, charges for particular crimes against humanity are often brought in conjunction with
charges for particular war crimes in a given prosecution.293 The changing nexus within which
these prosecutions took place has already been discussed. In this section, this debate will be
extended to address another issue, that of collective responsibility. As already stated, under
Article 7(2)(a) of the ICC Statute, crimes against humanity require that a widespread or
systematic attack on a civilian population be committed “pursuant to or in furtherance of a State
292
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or organizational policy to commit such attack.” Here, both the term state policy and the
interpretation of the term “organization” remain controversial. Normative and jurisprudential
debates on the exact meanings of these terms lead to varying conclusions. Now, if these terms
were understood as reflecting the ordinary meaning of the concept and including any association
of persons with an established structure of political authority, perhaps the dubiousness of their
coverage would erode. What is it, then, that makes such a wide and yet simple interpretation,
associating responsibility with the state or state-like organizations and people acting on their
behalf, so cumbersome a task?
The missing link between the adjudication of crimes against humanity and a principled
acknowledgement of their defining relationship with the acts of the state or state-like political
authority harks back to the painful debate that emerged in the aftermath of the 1961 Eichmann
trial in Jerusalem.294 The Eichmann trial is part of a series of Holocaust-related trials widely
known and studied among Holocaust scholars, but which rarely enter into other debates on
international criminal law. Specifically, Holocaust scholars have come to employ the tripartite
concept of information, knowledge, and awareness for the determination of accountability based
on the study of these of trials. Their work maintains that an awareness gap exist between
information flow, its processing and interpretation into general knowledge, and the crystallization
of the recognition of the consequences of criminal actions.295 In many ways, these trials directly
contributed to building a consciousness about individual responsibility for state crimes. In this
regard, in addition to the Nuremberg Trial, the trials of Jewish functionaries during the Holocaust
(otherwise known as the Kapo trials), the Malkiel Gruenwald trial (otherwise known as the
Kastner trial), and the Eichmann trial are cornerstones of legally inclined Holocaust research.296
Insofar as the Holocaust was so aberrant and unprecedented an event, these trials also set a
formidable precedent for tracing the complex paths that acts constituting crimes against humanity
follow before they amount to mass destruction.
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Unlike the way that ICTY or ICTR are examined, however, these trials are generally
accepted as offering significant clues concerning the politico-normative underpinnings of crimes
against humanity adjudication. The Nuremberg trials (1945-1947), which took place during the
period immediately prior to the establishment of the state of Israel, were marked by the intensive
diplomatic and military struggle against the British for Jewish independence in Mandate Palestine
and the sanctification of national freedom. The "Kapo trials" and the Kastner trial (1948-1959)
occurred during the transition from a pre-state community (Yishuv) to sovereign statehood, and
took place under the circumstances of Israel’s War of Independence, mass immigration, and the
building of the new state’s legal, economic, and security infrastructure. At this time, Israeli jurors
also crafted the Law no. 64, "Nazi and Nazi Collaborators Punishment Law" (1950), designed to
bring Nazis and their proxies to justice through the quasi-legal practice of universal
jurisdiction.297 The Eichmann Trial (1960-1967) came after these two initial sets of trials; it
received public attention at a time of economic and political growth of the Israeli state and was
used to make that state’s voice heard in international law. Holocaust scholars are not at all
reticent in stating that each of these trials proceeded according to the national spirit and political
environment of the times. Each trial was also associated with a specific agenda: the Nuremberg
trials reflected the Allies’ victory over Nazi Germany, while the Kapo trials were an expression
of the postwar mass immigration that put its stamp on Israeli society. The political dimension of
awareness of the Holocaust as an international crime stood at the core of the Kastner trial. The
Eichmann trial, on the other hand, focused on the operative meaning of state sovereignty, the
privatization of the Holocaust, and the place of crimes against humanity in the wider context of
World War II. In the post-Nuremberg era, we rarely associate political agendas with courts,
tribunals and trials working towards the adjudication of crimes against humanity, but in the 1960s
Holocaust scholars readily did so.
The remainder of this section will focus on the interpretation of crimes against humanity
during and in the aftermath of the Eichmann trial, and compare the context within which this
debate took place with the current obsession on the universality of the Rome Statute. According
to Hannah Arendt, men are not capable of forgiving what they cannot punish, nor are they
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capable of adequately punishing what is unforgivable. Indeed, the most distinguishing feature of
crimes against humanity, in the form that they were articulated during the Eichmann trials, is
their imprescriptibility.298 The Arendtian claim concerning the impossibility of punishment in
certain cases such as crimes against humanity is a clear indicator of the limits of positive law.
This is what Arendt calls the “radical evil,” the inadequacy of existing sentences and punishment
schemes in addressing the damage caused, both because of the unprecedented nature of the
crimes committed and due to their extreme cruelty constituting an obstacle to the very idea of
adequate punishment. According to Arendt, during the Eichmann trial, the monstrous scale of the
Nazi crimes made any punishment provided for them inadequate and absurd. 299 More
specifically, in Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship, Arendt stated that the horror of the
Nazi crimes themselves, in their naked monstrosity, transcended all moral categories and
exploded existing standards of jurisdiction.300 Hence she reached the conclusion that such crimes
were neither adequately punishable nor suitable for forgiveness. In the same text, she further
claimed that, contrary to the statements made by the Israeli courts, reasons such as the need for
society to be protected against these kinds of crimes, the rehabilitation of criminals, the
dissuasive force of the example, or measures of retributive justice would not bring a complete
closure. Thus, our ordinary sense of justice does not suffice in the case of crimes against
humanity. In her later work, however, in particular in The Human Condition, Arendt admitted a
possible combination of forgiveness and punishment concerning crimes against humanity.301
Still, she clearly stated that punishment is an alternative to forced forgiveness by the dictates of
history and not its opposite.302 Punishment and forgiveness have one crucial aim in common: an
attempt to put an end to something that without interference could lack closure and repeat itself
endlessly. Forgiveness is not alien to politico-normative judgment. In other words, forgiveness
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could not be routinized, and it remains an exceptional act. Meanwhile, we make the opposite
claim for crimes against humanity legislation: it is meant to be the supreme example of the
regularization of international law and its universal codification.
To think more deeply about this seeming antinomy, it is necessary to consider the context
in which both the “globalization of forgiveness” and universal jurisdiction pertaining to crimes
against humanity emerged.303 Especially in the Global South, but also in the heart of what were
once the colonial empires, scenarios of repentance, confession and forgiveness have multiplied
since the end of the Second World War. The Catholic Church’s request for forgiveness for the
Second World War crimes, that of the Prime Minister of Japan to the Korean and Chinese, that of
the Belgian government for not having acted on the genocide in Rwanda, the Chilean armed
forces’ confession of their crimes, and the Canadian prime minister’s apology to the Native
Peoples of Canada are just a few examples that were widely advertised in this avalanche of a
desire for forgiveness for crimes that cannot be punished. This proliferation of scenes of regret
and requests for forgiveness coincides with the renewed urgency of memorials, of selfaccusation, and of repentance. It appears to be a symptom of a larger yearning for redemption. As
such, forgiveness and its solicitation are directly conditioned by the weight of guilt felt on the
shoulders of the public. What is worrisome about this trend is not so much that we choose to
remember and to give account for, but the simulacrum of healing that comes with repentance.
This calculative aspect of public apology is indeed troubling, considering the egregious nature of
the crimes committed that constitute the subject matter of historical apologies. Consequently, the
general character of requests for forgiveness could be paramount to collective guilt rather than
collective responsibility. Perhaps this is the point at which one re-embraces the strong reasoning
for celebrating the legislation of crimes against humanity in international law. This particular
branch of criminal jurisprudence emerges as the only chance for freeing societies from the
repentance-redemption equation or its opposite, the total denial of heinous and most egregious
crimes. A publicly appointed body could not forgive on behalf of either the direct victims of
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egregious crimes or the public at large who suffered in relation to or as a result of such crimes.
The State, its institutions and courts cannot force wronged peoples to forgive simply because an
apology has been extended to them. Through the adjudication of crimes against humanity, on the
other hand, the culpable person(s) is punished for unforgivable acts, and yet without being
redeemed. That is a much stronger form of claiming responsibility for mass violence, rooted in
politics, history and normative grounds, than what forgiveness alone could provide.304

CONCLUSION
Despite the universal jurisdiction clause attached to them, much like forgiveness crimes
against humanity have politico-normative foundations that determine the shape and content of
their adjudication. And much like foregiveness for mass societal and political crimes, crimes
against humanity legislation should not be normalized and become routine in international law.
By the very nature of the crimes it attends, this body of legislation must remain exceptional and
extraordinary, putting impossibility to the test, as if it interrupted the ordinary course of human
temporality. Only then it would assume the power to intercept the flow of events that sanctify
egregious crimes. This chapter opened with the question of what distinguishes crimes against
humanity from other crimes. The answer to this question cannot be determined solely on the basis
of the jurisprudential architecture of crimes against humanity legislation. Their distinct status has
a deep connection with Hannah Arendt’s narration of the “banality of evil” with reference to the
Eichmann trials. More than half a century ago, as Arendt witnessed the proceedings of the trial of
Adolf Eichmann as one of the major figures in the organization and conduct of the Holocaust, she
coined two separate terms: “radical evil” and the “banality of evil.” The latter term has since
become something of a legal and normative conundrum. Arendt certainly did not mean evil had
become ordinary, or that Eichmann and his Nazi cohorts had committed ordinary crimes. Rather,
she was convinced that the crimes committed were so exceptional, they demanded a new
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approach to legal judgment itself.305 Concomitantly, she offered several challenges to traditional
conceptions of legal judgment. The first one was related to legal intention. The key question here
is whether the courts had to prove that Eichmann intended to commit genocide in order for him to
be convicted of the crime. Eichmann may well have lacked the required legal intention, insofar as
he failed to even think about his acts as constitutive of a crime. Though Eichmann acted in full
conscious capacity and without being affected by insanity, he lacked a mode of rationality that
would yield intentionality. This observation led Arendt to claim that although national socialism
was capable of making individuals implement policies that led to egregious crimes, it also
equipped them with a cathartic state of assuming no responsibility for their actions and attributing
no intentionality to their involvement in the making and sustenance of a criminal regime. In order
to claim intentionality, one has to convey the capacity or knowledge needed to think reflectively
about the consequences of one’s willful actions. The banality Arendt names thus corresponds to
the inability to think and understand the weight of one’s own actions as a legal/political being.
Arendt was not trying here to establish an exceptional case for Israel or the Jewish
people. Rather, she was trying to establish the backbone of a theory of crimes against humanity,
one that would acknowledge the destruction of not just Jews, but also Catholics, Gypsies, gay
people, communists, the disabled and the ill under the Nazi regime.306 In her thinking, the
destruction and displacement of these populations on a categorical basis was an attack not only
on those specific groups, but on humanity itself. As a result, Arendt objected to a specific nationstate such as Israel conducting the trial of Eichmann exclusively in the name of its own
population. She was cursed and almost crucified for her interpretation of the crimes of the Nazis.
And yet her interventions also made it possible to talk about crimes against humanity above and
beyond the Jewish case and the Holocaust. As the history of crimes against humanity legislation
proves, after the particular historical juncture of the Eichmann trial it indeed became necessary to
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devise new structures of international law that identify and propose punishment for crimes
against humanity in a generic sense. There is a critical aspect of Arendt’s observations of the
Eichmann trial, however, that fell aside in international jurisprudence. This aspect concerns the
“banality” of such crimes, indicating that they were committed in the midst of daily life and
routines, without opposition to their conduct, and without being named as a crime at the time that
they were committed. In a sense, Arendt’s calling a crime against humanity banal allows us to
conceptualize the socially accepted, routinized nature of these crimes which are committed
mostly through policy enactments and, as such, without moral revulsion, political indignation or
resistance. Thus, her interpretation of crimes against humanity calls for a new mode of political
and legal reflection. Combined with the notion of radical evil, this opposition between the radical
nature of the crimes committed and the ordinariness that their committal assumes invites us to
rethink the almost mechanical reiteration of crimes against humanity legislation in the post-Rome
Statute era of international law.
Arendt was long blamed for trivializing the Holocaust and the Nazi crimes, as she was
seen as attributing them to the Nazis’ and their collaborators’ simple failure to think before they
act. For her, however, the degradation of thinking worked hand in hand with the systematic
destruction of populations. What drew the ire of Jews at the time against Arendt’s interpretation
of the Eichmann trials was also the fact that she showed the audacity to quarrel with the
reasoning put forward at the trial, and confronted the Israeli courts in terms of their legal
reasoning and conduct, though not their final verdict. She thought the trial needed to focus more
on the acts that Eichmann committed, acts that left an imprint on the whole of humanity, not only
the millions of European Jews who perished as a result. This is partly due to the fact that, similar
to the legal philosopher Yosal Rogat before her, Arendt did not think that anti-semitism in
Germany could be tried in a courthouse.307 She thus objected to the ways that Israel used the
Eichmann trial to establish and legitimate its own legal authority and national aspirations as a
Jewish state. She was severely displeased by the fact that Eichmann was made to stand for all of
anti-semitism and for every Nazi. In her view, this was far too simplistic an interpretation of who
Eichmann was and what he stood for. For Arendt, the Eichmann trial also necessitated a deep
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critique of the idea of collective guilt, as well as a broader reflection on the historically specific
challenges to collective and moral responsibility under dictatorships and authoritarian rule.
Eichmann was guilty because he failed to take distance from the requirements that Nazi law and
policy imposed upon him in a legal order that was impeccably legitimate on paper. Thinking
about Eichmann in terms of his obedience, his lack of critical judgment despite his high status
and rank, and his failure to think about the results of his actions, is the lasting of Arendt’s
struggles with the Israeli courts at the time; and it is a very precious legacy indeed.
There remains, then, a question that, from the legal point of view, has provoked several
discussions and still lacks a definitive answer. It pertains to the politico-normative foundations of
the adjudication of egregious crimes such as crimes against humanity. The first time we heard of
acts that could be defined as crimes against humanity was 100 years ago, in 1915, when France,
Great Britain and Russia used this concept in a diplomatic note. They were considering issuing a
warning concerning the massacre of the Armenians at the hands of the Ottomans. The first legally
sanctioned instance of the adjudication of this category of crimes appeared at the Nuremberg
trials, set up to judge major Nazi criminals. At Nuremberg, it became a practical necessity to
create a special category of crimes that did not fit into the conduct commonly classified as war
crimes. This need to create a new framework was partly due to the fact that Germany’s
persecution of its own citizens could not be classified as a war crime. It is true that a country’s
expulsion, deportation, and mass murder of its own citizens was not unheard of in the history of
war. However, the degree to which these acts were orchestrated and publicly condoned by the
German state constituted a unique case. What was once considered unique, however, became a
normalized category on its own, expected to deliver a sense of closure for societal morass and
collective responsibility. Thus, the current normative framework that characterizes crimes against
humanity as a frontal attack on plurality and human diversity in effect became a pro forma
acknowledgement of the conducts that constitute crimes against humanity as part of the
maintenance of the Westphalian system of sovereign statehood. Addressing this issue requires
a closer study of the way that international law has played out in court and litigation-based
accountability measures systems, with a particular emphasis on the Global South, which is
the task undertaken in the next chapter.
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Chapter V. Through the Looking Glass: Hybrid Courts and International Criminal Law in the
Global South

INTRODUCTION
This chapter offers a critical analysis of a particular set of courts in international criminal
law, which have emerged since 1990s. This constitutes a continuation of the debate over the
limits of universal jurisdiction in the Global South that was covered in the first three chapters of
the present work. These are the third generation of international criminal bodies and they are
commonly known as hybrid courts. 308 The term has been used to address at least three
jurisdictions, all of which were created between 1999 and 2001. They include the Crimes Panels
of the District Court of Dili, The “Regulation 64” Panels in the Courts of Kosovo and the Court
for Sierra Leone.309 To this list, one should also add the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia,310 and the Extraordinary African Union Chamber in the Court of Senegal.311 Most of
the earlier hybrid courts have closed their operations and thus it is possible to ascertain the
outcomes of these trials. Indeed, there is significant merit in examining the promise or potential
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benefits of hybrid tribunals and courts for the future of international criminal law in the Global
South as an alternative to the centrifugal model, which than leads to severe limitations in terms of
the application of the universal jurisdiction model concerning crimes against humanity
legislation. This chapter thus attempts to identify the distinct features of hybrid courts while
acknowledging the variation amongst those that have thus far been created. It is true that
literature in the field has moved away from analyzing or attempting to examine the promise of
hybrid courts. Current commentaries on existing hybrid tribunals or courts are more inclined to
examine specific issues or areas in the jurisprudence or statutes of hybrid courts. The approach
presented in this chapter differs in that it focuses on the general promise of the mechanisms
offered by hybrid courts as an important tool to be used for criminal adjudication in the Global
South. To this end, the discussion presented in the following pages is divided according to three
separate themes. These are: TWAIL [Third World Approaches to International Law] scholarship
and discussions surrounding the Global/ North/South dichotomy and its effect on accountability;
exploration of hybrid courts as viable mechanisms of criminal justice in cases of state criminality;
and the ICC and the principles of universal jurisdiction and complementarity.
Like preexisting international judicial bodies, such as the International Court of Justice or
the European Court of Human Rights, hybrid courts are composed of independent judges,
working on the basis of predetermined rules of procedure, and rendering binding decisions. They
are subject to the same principles governing the work of other international judiciaries, including
but not limited to due process, impartiality and independence. Within this wider class of
international courts, however, hybrid courts belong to a specific order. They are specialized
criminal organs with a limited mandate, and prescribed to fulfill their function with reference to a
predetermined time period. Meanwhile, although their goal is to sanction serious violations of
international law, and in particular international humanitarian law and human rights law, they are
part of transitional justice regimes rather than being an ongoing feature of the legal system in any
of the given constituencies. Similarly, although they impose criminal penalties, their primary
obligation is to the state and society within which they are situated, rather than addressing the
international community. Akin to the ICTY and the ICTR, but unlike the ICC, they are ad hoc
institutions, created as the result of singular political and historical circumstances. Still, similar to
other international criminal institutions, in order to carry out their mission hybrid courts need to
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rely on international jurisprudence and judicial assistance from states and international
organizations, although their peculiar legal status gives an utmost priority to the bridging act of
creating hybrid jurisprudence which resonates with the national legal system. In some cases, they
are part of the judiciary of a given country, while in others they have been grafted onto the local
judicial system through the intermediary action of international bodies. One constant feature they
exhibit, however, is that their jurisdictional portfolio is mixed, incorporating international and
national features.312 This chapter argues that on the critical issues of criminal accountability and
responsibility, hybrid courts exhibit a unique promise for states and societies in the Global South.
The literature on international criminal law has already welcomed hybrid courts as a new
type of international crimes courts, asserting that they have the benefits, while avoiding the
drawbacks, of both purely international and purely domestic trials. A closer examination of
current examples of hybrid courts, however, in Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Cambodia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina, reveals something else as well. Attributing a promise to hybrid courts
as a fixed category has raised false expectations, as each court has fundamental differences and
distinct features. I will argue that this variation is endemic to any genuine transitional justice
project, and should be welcomed rather than shunned. Hybrid domestic-international tribunals
and courts offer an important new angle to institutional approaches to international law and to
transitional justice, whose formulatation is often given by donor institutions in the Global North.
The processes by which societies provide accountability and reconciliation for mass atrocity in
their own terms is often overlooked. Hybrid courts are courts in which both the institution and the
applicable law consist of a blend of international and the domestic jurisprudence. In many cases,
foreign judges sit alongside their domestic counterparts to try cases prosecuted and defended by
teams of local lawyers working with those from other countries. At the same time, the judges
apply domestic law that has been reformed to include international standards. Furthermore, these
courts have developed in an ad hoc way, the result of on-the-ground innovation rather than grand
institutional design, which carries the seed of a genuine political involvement from within.
Typically, they have emerged in post-conflict situations to address cases involving mass atrocity,
usually where no politically viable full-fledged international tribunal exists, as in East Timor or
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Sierra Leone, or where an international tribunal exists but cannot cope with the sheer number of
cases, as in Kosovo or Cambodia. Yet despite these features, they have often been marginalized
as yet another failed project of the Global South. The truth is more complicated, and worthy of
real attention.

I. MAPPING RESPONSIBILITY FOR MASS ATROCITIES
Theories of transgovernmental and transnational networks, when applied to cross-border
regulation regimes in areas such as international finance, antitrust regulation, environmental
protection, or securities law, have steady purchase amongst international law scholars. One area
to which this type of theorization has not yet been fully applied, however, is international
criminal law.313 Until recently, international criminal law had not been conceptualized within the
framework of the transnational networks that have caught our attention in other legal fields.314
With few exceptions, the predominant conception has been that international criminal law is
enforced primarily through a universalized idiom and with a top-down approach. However, as
critical debates in the area of human rights scholarship amply demonstrate, this picture is far from
accurate. Human rights lawyers, activists, and advocates as well as investigators, prosecutors, and
judges dealing with specific categories of crimes have long been acting in degrees of
collaboration or consultation, with their peers across borders and with their counterparts at other
national or international courts and regulatory bodies.315 In the following pages, some of these
developments are evaluated in reference to hybrid courts dealing with cases of mass atrocities.
Providing a conceptual framework within which transnational networks are not seen as an
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anomaly, in the context of a nexus between international human rights law and international
criminal law, is essential in this regard. International human rights law, which in essence
embodies a constant mediation between claims about the core values of justice and dignity, on
the one hand, and hard-fought contingent politico-historical battles, on the other, is in particular
need of a richer exchange between the North and South. As amply illustrated by TWAIL [Third
World Approaches to International Law] scholarship, political geography has much to contribute
to the critical study of international law, above and beyond connecting rights discourse with
particular contemporary justice agendas.316 As TWAIL scholars declare, for instance, human
rights struggles, even when they are regarded as part of independence struggles, reveal a global
gap of consistent practices of violence, which necessitated current human rights practices in the
first place.317 The ways that responsibility for systemic and structural violence has been claimed,
denied, ascribed, enacted, or avoided have cartographical anchorage. The North takes the credit
for creating discourse and jurisprudence, while the South carries the burden of the heaviest
violations and at the same time is singled out as the worst violator. We need a new and more
evocative lens for understanding the place of human rights law and its variants, within a global
framework of emancipatory politics.318 As Vijay Prashad puts it ever so succinctly, “The Third
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World was not a place. It was a project.”319 TWAIL scholarship both specifies and expands upon
the sense in which Third World or Global South was never a place per se. In the same spirit, in
the following pages the Global South, as well as the North-South divide, are treated as part of a
grand political project of some elusive universal legal order, which is subject to constant
reinvention. Here, the emphasis will be put on alternative lineages of the Global South, outside
the realm of state-based narrations of post-colonial politics, as explicated in the methodology
section of the Introduction to this work. Indeed, it is essential to foreground aspects of the NorthSouth divide that hinge upon the premise of intertwined regimes of accumulation, regulation,
culpability, and responsibility. Only then can we truly challenge the top-down approach—the
siren call of international human rights law and international criminal law in the Global South—
and offer something more palatable in its place, based on a transnational politics of rights
struggles, accountability for mass crimes, and substantive human emancipation.
A. More Than Each unto His Own -- Hybrid Courts in the Global South
This chapter singularly focuses on the distinctive characteristics of regional, sub-regional
and hybrid courts operating outside of Europe. Their operations clearly suggest that in terms of
universal jurisdiction and the application of international law, the Global South is not an
unwilling participant at best and an insignificant addendum at worst. Tailgating TWAIL
scholarship, I strongly argue otherwise, and the examples chosen here amply illuminate the
reasons for insisting upon alternative vantage point.
To begin with, there is a growing number of new international courts, tribunals, and quasijudicial review bodies that exercise compulsory jurisdiction over states parties which are located
not only located in the North but also in the Global South. Secondly, established hybrid and
international tribunals, despite all their failings, trials and tribulations, have been steadily
expanding their authority over a wide range of legal actors, including but not limited to states.
Many of these courts owe their strength to their limited-subject-matter mandates and conscribed
geographic and chronological reache. Thus, the argument that the North subjects the Global
South to neo-colonialism via international criminal law is nullified to a large degree. The
majority of these courts and tribunals, in fact, attend to regional affairs and internal conflicts that
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entail massive human rights violations. In other words, they constitute a new terrain for the
establishment of fragmented and yet reasonably operational accountability regimes in the Global
South. There is, it’s true, grounds for fear of a growing trend towards the judicialization of
politics at a global scale in this regard. We certainly cannot take it on faith that creating new
international courts or hybrid tribunals will necessarily provide solutions to deep-seated societal
and political problems. Rather, the role of law in various struggles for social and political justice
in the Global South, some of which take are waged against post-colonial states themselves by
their own citizens, should be the focus here. The case of hybrid courts signal the emergence of
alternative forms of international law, ones which call for new legal theories capable of capturing
the potential of, and the tensions endemic to, counter-hegemonic forms of globalization.
Although the legitimacy of domestic courts is no doubt more established than that of their
international or hybrid counterparts, the risks of depending solely on domestic adjudication at
historical junctions in relation to transition from civil war, ethnic cleansing, genocide, occupation,
etc. are far greater than resorting to divergent interpretations of international criminal law in these
settings. Furthermore, third-generation courts are often regional in scope and thus cover both
states and subterranean or non-state actors within their jurisdiction. This is yet another advantage
they have over domestic courts. They have the ability to contextualize a given conflict, a most
urgent need in the cases of mass political violence in Africa, the Balkans, or South East Asia.
Equally importantly, while traditional international courts have had shallow—i.e. optional—
jurisdictional powers, hybrid courts tend to have a much deeper jurisdictional basis that leads to
compulsory jurisdiction, since they act over a limited number of issues in conjunction with a set
number of parties.
Thus far, perhaps, international courts and hybrid tribunals have made only limited
contributions to the resolution of high-politics disputes. At the same time, concerning broader
trends in international adjudication, it is safe to suggest that based on the increasing number of
rulings produced by regional tribunals and hybrid courts in Africa, Latin America, and Eurasia,
there is an emerging litigation pattern that may be significantly different from those of
international or European courts.320 These rulings span a broad range of subjects, including
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customs, taxes, and tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade, as well as criminal proceedings. In
these alternative settings of international jurisdiction, national as well as international judges,
administrative officials, and private parties participate in litigation. The symbiotic relationship
between international and national law exemplified by these courts and tribunals also has a
broader significance. Even when (national) law proves moot, a distinctive group of sub-state
actors including human rights movements, NGOs, political movements, and judges, can serve as
conduits to bypass the indifference or even the resistance of governmental institutions to
delivering justice where (though rarely when) it is due. Alas, such is the nature of criminal law.
II. THE CLARION CALL OF DOMESTICATED UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW
One of the more recent and noteworthy episodes in international criminal law pertaining
to a rising demand for hybrid, as opposed to centralized, courts is the Darfur crisis. In July 2008,
the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague sought the indictment
of the Sudanese president, Omar al-Bashir, on charges of genocide and war crimes. 321
Subsequently, foreign diplomats, regional leaders, and many Sudanese activists, including
members of the political opposition in the country, expressed divided opinions in their evaluation
of this indictment. It is true that some supported the idea of prosecuting President Bashir and his
leading cadres for the human catastrophe they are alleged to have inflicted on Sudan’s western
province of Darfur.322 At the same time, a growing number of NGOs, political groups, and legal
scholars in the Global South were not comfortable with the indictment of a serving president by
an international court situated in Europe due to two factors: its neo-colonialist optics, and the
indictment’s possible negative effects on the Sudanese society. For instance, human rights circles
Business Laws in Africa, and the East African Community Court of Justice are some of the leading examples of nonEuropean regional courts with a strong human rights-related track record of rulings.
321
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repeatedly stated that a vindictive Bashir could resort to a number of violent strategies in
response to the ICC’s indictment, which could indeed make the situation in Sudan worse than
before.323 They argued that President Bashir’s repertoire of actions could include ending the
already fragile peace process in Darfur, expelling UN troops from the region, and retarding the
implementation of a peace agreement between his government and the former rebels in south
Sudan.324 Differences in interpretation persisted when in April 2010 President al-Bashir won
Sudan's first multi-party elections in 24 years, despite the fact that observers criticised the
election as falling short of international standards. Many opposition parties withdrew from the
race, alleging widespread vote rigging and intimidation.
In the light of the developments and concerns exemplified by the case of Sudan, it is
timely to ask whether a better mechanism of international criminal law could be envisaged to
hold individuals responsible for the type of atrocities perpetrated in Darfur, and elsewhere in the
Global South, without jeopardizing the safety of local populations or creating an aura of
neocolonial moral and legal superiority. This inquiry is linked with the larger question that runs
through this entire dissertation: how meaningful and beneficial is it for crimes against humanity
to be subject to universal jurisdiction if the local constituency, including the victims’ groups,
rejects or disagrees with the charges, methods of trial, or both? More specifically, what are the
implications of trials held in an international court, removed from the original locale where the
crimes were committed, rather than being deemed as an internal affair of the societies in
question? In Sudan, for instance, in response to significant worries about escalation of violence in
the aftermath of the ICC indictment against President al-Bashir, Sadıq al-Mahdi, the country’s
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most prominent opposition politician, urged for a “third way” solution.325 Like many in human
rights circles, he believed that an ICC indictment of President Bashir would lead to further chaos
in Sudan.326 He did not agree that hauling the Sudanese president to the Hague would achieve
much in terms of the crimes in Darfur. Instead, he suggested setting up an independent “hybrid”
court for Darfur, which would have both Sudanese and international judges, and would sit in
Sudan as opposed to Europe, the land of ex-colonial powers. The idea of mixing national and
international jurisprudence and legal procedures, and of holding difficult trials for societal and
international crimes on home turf, has already been accepted in Sierra Leone and Cambodia,
among others.327 It is true that these two examples have thus far yielded only mixed success. Still,
the overall prospect of hybrid courts possesses both legal and political attractiveness. In the case
of Sudan, for instance, a hybrid or “internationalized” court could dispense justice close to the
scene of the crime, and at the heart of the society directly affected by the atrocities committed.
Additionally, if such a special court were deemed to be a genuine, impartial attempt to obtain
justice, the ICC could defer its indictment of President Bashir under Article 16 of the Rome
Statute.328 Finally, a hybrid court with a strong domestic element would have the strength to
counter the furious denounciations of the ICC charges and indictments as a Western imperialist
plot against the Bashir government and its supporters.
Based on the understanding of these potential gains for transitional justice as a societal
project with a strong historical dimension, rather than a package of mechanized solutions, the
remainder of this chapter will examine past examples of hybrid courts, as relevant cases for
emerging models of transnational justice and for the dissemination of international criminal law
325
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jurisdiction in a genuine fashion. The fragmented nature of the international legal regime of
accountability—despite the post-ICC solidification of the doctrine of universal jurisdiction for
international crimes—is not something to be shunned but a development to be embraced. The
benefits of the limited application of universal jurisdiction, as endorsed by the hybrid courts that
have emerged under the guidance of or in consultation with the ICC during the last decade, are
yet to be explored. Legal literature has already welcomed hybrid courts as a new type of
international crimes courts, asserting that they could avoid the drawbacks of purely international
and purely domestic trials.329 Upon closer examination of the recent examples of hybrid courts in
Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, it becomes clear,
however, that the current set of hybrid courts differ from one another in critical respects. To
attribute promise to the category of hybrid courts as a whole may be to raise false expectations. A
more realistic approach to major new developments in international criminal law, such as the idea
of universal jurisdiction with reference to select categories of crimes, may be to evaluate hybrid
courts as part of a large continuum of fragmented practices, which include truth and
reconciliation commissions, local adaptations of the Rome Statute, and expansive application of
human rights mechanisms to improve general standards of societal responsibility in the event of
mass crimes. There is no doubt that hybrid mechanisms blending international and domestic
elements have the capacity to deliver improved justice measures—especially when they are
undertaken via local judicial reforms, thus initiating a process of serious commitment to legal
accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity in post-atrocity states.
Furthermore, at the institutional level, the claim of universal jurisdiction put forward by
the ICC has severe limitations. To begin with, many crimes currently ailing post-conflict
societies cannot be tried by the ICC, since conflicts which occurred before the Rome Statute went
into effect, or ongoing conflicts in non-signatory nations, lie beyond the jurisdiction of the Court.
Secondly, even when the ICC has jurisdiction over a set of crimes, its mandate is primarily
329
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limited to calling for the involvement of a handful of senior figures. In other words, societal
responsibility is not within the reach or the mandate of the Court with reference to the overall
process of transitional justice. Last but not the least, the ICC has thus far entertained a binary
approach to societal crimes, either providing wholly international justice or leaving the conflict to
local post-atrocity courts, an approach that often goes against ensuring genuine accountability. In
the light of these concerns, a closer look into the promise of a fragmented embrace of universal
jurisdiction in the form of hybrid courts, and what they entail for both the current project of
international criminal law, must be synchronized with a tally of local endeavours for transitional
justice and societal accountability for mass atrocities. Going back to the case of Sudan, on 13
October 2016 the African Union Commission (AUC) launched a campaign to “restore the dignity
of women and to ensure accountability in South Sudan.”330 This campaign was intended to lobby
for accountability and an end to the atrocities that have disproportionately affected women in
South Sudan. It was organized in solidarity with the women of South Sudan, and spearheaded by
the AU Special Envoy on Women, Peace, and Security in Addis Ababa.331 The outcomes of the
campaign were to be presented to high-ranking South Sudanese officials. While accountability
has been touted as a key element for peace and reconciliation in South Sudan, it remains to be
seen whether the envisaged hybrid court for South Sudan would be able to try sitting leaders and
senior government officials who had involvements with the atrocities in the country.332 Human
rights reports on the South Sudanese conflict consistently point out that the country’s leaders bear
responsibility for the war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated in the country, and
have in fact benefited from these offenses.333 Thus any real effort to ensure accountability in
330
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South Sudan needs to engage the role of the South Sudanese leaders. Efforts continue at the legal
affairs department of the AUC to mobilize funds and finalize the memorandum of understanding
(MoU) for the establishment of the hybrid court. This is in line with the Agreement on the
Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, signed by former vice-president Riek
Machar and President Salva Kiir.334 According to the peace agreement and the MoU, the mandate
and the jurisdiction of the proposed hybrid court should have been finalized within six months of
the formation of the government of national unity, which took place in April 2016. The hybrid
court was to be operational within 12 months of that date, April 2017. However, the ongoing
violence, and the replacement of Machar with Taban Deng Gai as vice president of the
government of national unity, are stalling this process, and attention is instead focused on ending
the most recent crisis. As it is, the authorities refuse to execute arrest warrants issued by the
International Criminal Court (ICC). The security and humanitarian situation in Darfur, Blue Nile,
and South Kordofan states remains dire, with widespread violations of international humanitarian
and human rights law. Furthermore, evidence points to the use of chemical weapons by
government forces in Darfur. The rights to freedom of expression, association and peaceful
assembly are repeatedly and arbitrarily restricted and critics and suspected opponents of the
government have been regularly subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention and other violations.
These “internal hindrances” aside, a crucial question remains: will the AU Assembly of heads of
state and government—its highest decision-making body—draw up legislation for a hybrid court
that enables it to try leaders and senior government officials? For instance, Chapter 5 of the peace
agreement stipulates that the hybrid court “shall not be impeded or constrained by any statutes of
limitations or the granting of pardons, immunities or amnesties. No one shall be exempt from
criminal responsibility on account of their official capacity as a government official, an elected
official or claiming the defense of superior orders.”335 Meanwhile, the AU remains in favor of
immunity for sitting heads of state and senior government officials. This development came after

Human
Rights
Council
Report
on
Sudan
at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/CoHSouthSudan/Pages/Index.aspx
[15.03.2017]
and
Amnesty
International Report on Sudan at https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/sudan/report-sudan/ [15.03.2017].
334
For
the
full
text
of
the
Agreement
signed
on
17
August
2015,
see
https://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/final_proposed_compromise_agreement_for_south_sudan_conflict.p
df [15.03.2017].
335
Also see the legal opinion expressed in the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights document on the
issue at http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/tunisia/247346?download=true [15.03.2017]

165

the ICC’s issuance of an arrest warrant for President Omar Al Bashir of Sudan in 2009. The AU’s
new immunity stance led to the inclusion of an immunity clause in Article 46A of the 2014
Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and
Human Rights.336
In effect, prior to the Sudan issue, the AU has fought desperately, in the case of Kenya
and Sudan, for the lifting of ICC charges against leaders in office. The AU also recently called
for an inquiry into a collective withdrawal from the ICC based on the differences over immunity
concerns in Africa.337 To date, Burundi, South Africa and The Gambia have already announced
their withdrawal from the ICC.338 The dilemma is that, according to the peace deal, the same
leaders who would have to be tried by the hybrid court are meant to occupy leadership positions
in the transitional government of national unity. The South Sudanese deal keeps South Sudanese
leaders in the positions they occupied before the war started. The dynamics among the member
states of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), who are mediating in the
South Sudan conflict, indicates that the question of leadership accountability is a contested issue.
Hence, there is not enough regional support for the issue to deter South Sudanese leaders from
orchestrating further violent atrocities. The hybrid court for South Sudan could thus end up
336
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prosecuting lesser officials and soldiers of both Kiir and Machar factions. Due to these concerns,
some observers attending the issue of accountability in South Sudan have recommended that an
alternative international body should provide the necessary checks and balances.339 Others have
recommended that the South Sudanese leaders should be bound through the peace agreement to
ratify the Rome Statute, thereby enabling the ICC to intervene if they attempt to undermine the
efforts of the hybrid court—though no doubt given the present climate this is one of the most
unrealistic solutions proposed. Although the peace agreement is vague about the role of the
transitional government in the workings of the hybrid court, Chapter 5(1.1) of the agreement
states that the transitional government “shall initiate legislation for the establishment of the
transitional justice institutions,” and Chapter 5(1.5) expects the hybrid court to cooperate with the
AU and the international community in its operationalization.340 This gives the transitional
government some leverage to influence the establishment and mandate of the hybrid court from
the outset. In the end, the liability of South Sudanese leaders for the heinous atrocities and human
rights abuses in the country rests on the balance of societal pressure and political negotiations,
and not just on the form or legislative intent of the proposed hybrid court per se. Neither could
these dynamics be reversed or undone by the sheer presence of ICC indictments. In the case of
mass political violence, (criminal) law and politics go hand in hand to introduce change, rather
than the former leading the latter in providing solutions and rectificatory and restitutive justice.

A. The ICC and Domestic Applications of the Rome Statute
Overall, this chapter purports that the establishment of the ICC by no means lessened the
need for regional, lesser, or hybrid courts. Instead, it argues for an increased appreciation of the
fragmented nature of international criminal law as an accountability regime. Even in treaty terms,
pursuant to Article 11 of the Rome Statute, the ICC has jurisdiction only with respect to crimes
committed after the Treaty came into force in 2002. Consequently, there is a marked judicial
vacuum concerning crimes identified by the Rome Statute as subject to universal jurisdiction in
339
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the period prior to ICC’s establishment, as well as regarding countries that are not signatories.341
With reference to these limitations, hybrid forms of endorsing international legal accountability
have become the focal point of a growing number of discussions on the ICC.342 Those who
support hybrid courts’ functioning in tandem with the Rome Statute argue that national/municipal
courts and the ICC constitute “two layers of judicial institutions” that can cooperate in bringing
perpetrators of international crimes to justice.343 This state of heightened expectation from multilevel judicial dialogue is partly due to the fact that the question of the limited potential of the ICC
to affect the international criminal justice system, and more specifically to sustain an
international legal regime of accountability as the leading institution, remains unanswered. In
reality, the ICC is a carefully constrained legal institution in its structure and reach, despite the
fact that it relies on universal jurisdiction for the crimes falling under its purview.344 Not only is
the jurisdiction of the court limited, as exemplified by discussions of the above-cited Article 11.
The Rome Statute also requires that either the state where the crimes have occurred, or the state
of which the accused is a national, must be a party to the Statute. Crimes committed on the
territory of a non-consenting or non-party State by the nationals of a non-consenting or non-party
State may not be prosecuted before the ICC, unless the case is referred to the Court by the
Security Council of the United Nations. This is a current problem clouding the prospects of, for
instance, those who wish to bring the case of Israeli war crimes in Gaza to the Court’s
341
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attention.345 The limitations that come with a territorial or nationality-based nexus to the crime in
question could be overcome only to a certain extent through the exercise of universal jurisdiction
by states that are a party to the Rome Statute. For universal jurisdiction to take effect, these stateparties must be willing to try the case in their own courts in accordance with international
criminal law as embedded in their national legal systems. Again in the Israeli case, so far only
Belgian courts have expressed a willingness to consider a trial at a future date. Added to these
constraints are the complexities of the complementarity principle, as well as limitations regarding
subject-matter jurisdiction and the parliamentary overview of critical judicial matters, as
exemplified by the final decision concerning the Pinochet extradition case in the United
Kingdom.
Given all this, what does universal jurisdiction [re]defined by the Rome Statute of the
ICC add to the already existing regime of accountability in international criminal law?346 The
core idea of universal jurisdiction is that some crimes are so heinous that they lead to a duty, in
every society and in every system of substantive law, to prosecute the perpetrators when the
opportunity arises. The very category of “crimes against humanity” captures this notion at its
best: it refers to criminal acts that constitute an offense to every human being, and a
corresponding obligation to take action against the perpetrator(s) regardless of the specific
circumstances of the crime or limitations to jurisdiction.347 Although the concept of crimes
against humanity had specific roots as one of the key justifications for the Nuremberg trials of
Second World War criminals from 1945 to 1949, it came into much more common use after the
collapse of dictatorships in Latin America during the 1980s.348

345

For a full coverage of the crimes under consideration, see Richard Falk’s report published in Le Monde
diplomatique (March 2009) titled Israel’s war crimes: Calls for investigation into Gaza attacks. For the full text, see
http://www.tni.org/detail_page.phtml?act_id=19322&username=guest@tni.org&password=9999&publish=Y&print_
format=Y [15.03.2017].
346
Here, I define accountability regimes in international law on par with Steven Ratner and Jason Abram’s definition
in their work Accountability For Human Rights Atrocities In International Law: Beyond The Nuremberg Legacy
(Oxford University Press, 2001). Accordingly, accountability regimes in current international law are those that
respond to the necessity of holding individuals and legal subjects accountable for gross human rights violations.
347
For an authoritative account of crimes against humanity not just from a legal but also from a historical
perspective, see Larry May, Crimes Against Humanity: A Normative Account (Cambridge University Press, 2005).
348
On the issue of the use of the legal category of crimes against humanity in the context of transitional justice, see
“What is Transitional Justice?” A Voice for Victims, New York: International Center for Transitional Justice Annual
Report 2004/2005 1; and Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Javier Mariezcurrena, eds,. Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First
Century: Beyond Truth versus Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2006).

169

Here attention should be turned to transitional justice measures and their relationship to
accountability regimes in international criminal law. The overall aim of transitional justice
projects is to end impunity deriving from official or personal exceptions accorded to state
representatives and high-ranking officers, and to guarantee personal accountability for gross
human rights abuses and societal crimes. In this vein, for instance, the impetus behind the
reactivation of the legal category of crimes against humanity against Latin American
dictatorships was the hope that universal jurisdiction in relation to these crimes would help to
bring torturers and murderers to justice when national jurisdictions were failing to try them.
Another pertinent reason for the call for universal jurisdiction in the case of crimes against
humanity is that many deposed oppressors have sought amnesty outside of their own country and
claimed asylum on neutral grounds. By removing the territorial nexus of the crime, it was hoped
that universal jurisdiction litigation would allow for the capture of fugitive statesmen, army
officers, and former dictators. In summary, universal jurisdiction for international crimes would,
at least in principle, obligate governments to prosecute the perpetrators of a certain set of crimes
wherever they were found. While the government of the country where the atrocities occurred
might be severely compromised to prosecute these persons, the idea is that another government
without a history of complicity in these crimes could reach out and punish the concerned
criminals based on the principle of universal jurisdiction. As early as 1999, the very date that
marks the formulation of the ICC jurisprudence on crimes against humanity, Amnesty
International reported that twenty-four national jurisdictions had adopted universal jurisdiction
for serious international crimes such as genocide, among them Spain and Belgium.349 Since then,
however, there have been very few prosecutions. Perhaps as to be expected, the most notable case
was in Britain and Spain against the Chilean ex-dictator Augusto Pinochet, prior to the
establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002. The success of this particular
rendition of universal jurisdiction, however, remains far from obvious.350
The Pinochet case is of interest for understanding both the internal and institutional
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limitations of universal jurisdiction as endorsed by the ICC. As far as the ICC is concerned, the
claim in its statute that the Court's jurisdiction is “complementary” to that of the nations that
endorse it emphasizes its underlying purpose: to drive societies to prosecute criminals in the
places where the crimes were committed, or in countries which are signatories to the Rome
Statue, but not at the Hague itself. In this sense, the Court supplements rather than dictates
universal jurisdiction. It is constituted as a transnational tribunal to try only a select set of
international crimes when all else fails. If it is to provide outreach services or to act as a
centrifugal force, this should take place at the level of jurisprudential framing provided by the
Rome Statute, rather than in the actual proceedings of the court. A legitimate question that needs
to be answered in the context of the Pinochet case, for instance, is the following: if Chile,
currently a democratic state peopled by many of the victims of Pinochet's regime, did not want to
prosecute the ex-dictator in 1998, on what basis could a magistrate in Spain interfere in Chile’s
internal affairs or past crimes committed by its state officers? Furthermore, when a Spanish court
claims to exercise universal jurisdiction over Pinochet’s crimes, how could Britain refuse to
honour Spain's request for extradition, despite the fact that Britain herself is a signatory to the
Rome Statute and a dedicated state-party to the ICC? In this regard, the internal and historical
facts of the Pinochet case allow us to examine a different and mostly overseas dimension of the
universal jurisdiction debate. Chile granted amnesty to Pinochet as a way to break his grip on
local politics and to return to democratic governance.351 Still, this should not have shielded the
retired General from justice for his gross human rights violations, and specifically the crimes
against humanity associated with his regime. The only reasonable explanation for this local lapse
of justice is that Chilean prosecutors and investigating magistrates, while enjoying institutional
independence, were bound to operate within the strictures of Chilean law and politics. These
legal authorities had to answer to appeals courts and to other officials, and they had to honour
statutory obligations, one of which is stated as the immunity of General Pinochet in perpetuity. A
legal authority outside Chile may not claim to have a direct interest in the affairs of the nation
where the crime occurred. And yet, under the principle of universal jurisdiction, they would have
the freedom to indict and to prosecute. This paradox repeats itself in African and other cases as
well.
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A more recent example that further illustrates the pros and cons of universal jurisdiction
exercised by foreign courts taking on cases pertaining to international crimes, rather than the
issue being referred to the ICC, is the case of Belgium and the investigation it launched against
Israel’s military offensives in Gaza and Lebanon during the last few decades.352 Human rights
groups hailed the Belgian Supreme Court’s decision as another stepping stone for international
justice, following the path heralded by the arrest of the former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet
in Great Britain on a Spanish warrant. The high-profile Sharon case complemented the 1993
Belgian universal jurisdiction law, which permits lawsuits to be filed in Belgian courts for war
crimes, crimes against humanity, torture, and genocide regardless of the time and place of the
crimes committed and regardless of any national or geographical link to Belgium by the plaintiffs
or the accused.353 This is despite the fact that the Belgian law had to go through a series of
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amendments.354 The specific case against Sharon was brought by a group of Lebanese citizens,
who charged him with war crimes in connection to his indirect role in the 1982 massacre of at
least 800 Palestinians by Phalangist troops in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps outside Beirut,
while the camps were under Israeli control. Sharon was found “indirectly responsible” for the
massacre by an Israeli judicial commission in 1983, and was barred for a time from holding high
office in Israel. In 2002, a Belgian appeals court ruled that Sharon could not be tried in Belgium
because he was not physically present in the country; the Belgian Supreme Court reversed that
ruling in 2003. This latter decision acknowledged diplomatic immunity only for serving heads of
state or ministers. Based on this nuanced reading of immunity, Belgian prosecutors could open
proceedings against other Israelis allegedly involved in the massacre, including former Israeli
army chief of staff Rafael Eitan and current Defense Ministry Director General Amos Yaron,
who was the Israeli army commander in Beirut at the time. Consequently, in addition to the
possibility of arrest on Belgian soil, Israeli officials became worried about possible extradition
demands from other European states. Israel has extradition treaties with most European countries,
and all members of the European Union have conventions requiring that an extradition request by
a member state is be considered by others.
The plot thickened in January 2017, A Belgian court ordered the arrest of former Israeli
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tzipi Livni, when she disembarked the plane on her upcoming
scheduled trip to Belgium. Livni is accused of committing war crimes and crimes against
humanity during her time as Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2006-2009. She oversaw the Israeli
military operation "Cast Lead" in the Gaza Strip, from which the crimes allegedly stem. In effect,
Livni was one of several Israeli officials named in the lawsuit filed by a group of victims in 2010
in response to the military activities in Gaza. Livni, who is a member of the Israeli parliament,
was set to meet with Jewish leaders in Brussels, but canceled the trip before the report of the
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arrest order came out. Back in 2010, Livni had been set to speak at the Jewish National Fund
Vision 2010 conference in London, but again cancelled her travel plans after a British court
issued an arrest warrant for her. In 2011, however, the UK announced that Livni would enjoy
diplomatic immunity. The practice of giving immunity to foreign officials who are accused of
serious crimes under international law, in order for the host country to avoid having to arrest
them, readily receives criticism. Proponents of the warrants argue that countries giving immunity
to these officials are not living up to their responsibility under international law, and are thus
complicit in creating impunity for international crimes.355 Belgium and the UK are not the only
countries to have enshrined elements of universal jurisdiction in their laws during the process of
ratifying the Rome Statute. With Spain and Canada coming on board, the endorsement of the
Rome Statute moved to the far end of the spectrum in terms of domestic law’s engagement with
international criminal law according to the principle of universal jurisdiction.356 Other notable
countries opting for institutionalizing universal jurisdiction as defined by the Rome Statute
include Australia, Germany, New Zealand, and South Africa, all of which have amended their
laws to provide for the opening of investigations without any of the traditional nexus
requirements.357
Situated at the other end of this spectrum, where rejection of “international jurisprudential
intervention” constitutes the distinguishing feature of thedomestic judicial order, are the United
States and Israel. Still, even these states have legal mechanisms that allow foreign acts to be
prosecuted in their courts. For instance, the Alien Torts Act allows foreigners to sue in United
States Federal Court if acts were committed against them in violation of the law of nations or an
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American treaty. This act was used by a group of Bosnians against Serb leader Radovan Karadzic
for crimes committed in the Balkans. Similarly, in Israel, the Knesset passed an amendment to
the Penal Code in 1995 that is almost identical to Belgium’s 1993 law.358 Israel also passed
legislation making it responsible for the protection of every Jew around the world, whether or not
such protection is requested. According to this law, anyone committing a crime against a Jew
anywhere in the world breaks Israeli law and is liable to punishment by the Jewish state. In this
sense, it would be apt to suggest that Israel herself has long been a pioneer among nations in
forcefully applying universal jurisdiction, though only in select areas.359
Based on the two examples of the Pinochet case and the Belgian law for universal
jurisdiction, it is apt to suggest that the key question concerning the limits of universal
jurisdiction is whether the problems that are appearing in its current applications in national and
international courts are likely to weaken its usefulness or legitimacy. In this context, some argue
that hybrid courts established closer to the scene of the crime and in direct contact with the
societies involved could be more effective in delivering universal justice for international
crimes.360 Where the scope of a state’s application of universal jurisdiction is wide, as seen in
Belgium for instance, the problems may indeed increase in some areas. As a case in point, in
2000 Belgium sought to extradite the Congolese Minister of Foreign Affairs for speeches that
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allegedly incited to race-hatred in the Congo.361 Given Belgium's troubled history of colonial
engagement in the Congo, such a complaint opened the country to a charge of neo-colonialism. In
response, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) stepped in and declared that an incumbent
minister of foreign affairs was immune from Belgian criminal proceedings. The principal
problem in this case was less with the process of filing and administering complaints than with its
political character. In contemporary international criminal law, the majority of the states that
ratified and embedded the Rome Statute into their constitution and/or criminal law are excolonial powers. Complicating matters further, the majority of the cases that fall under universal
jurisdiction take place in the Global South, and therefore in ex-colonies. This brings forth the
critical issue of trust, and opens domestic courts such as the Belgian courts to charges of neocolonial domination of the Global South through the means of international criminal law, and via
the premise of universal jurisdiction.
There is another concern, too, when domestic courts take on international criminal cases
above and beyond the traditional nexus requirements. They tend to act as a magnet for
complaints, regardless of their merit, leading to arguments that both the claims and the resultant
complaints against the claims are rooted in regional or global political vendettas. On the other
hand, international power politics tend to narrow jurisdiction and to cut off complaints, as in the
case of claims made against Israel. This latter situation then leads to the argument that when
domestic courts exercise universal jurisdiction concerning cases that affect other societies,
meritorious complaints could be stifled due to extraneous issues not germane to the case itself.
Domestic criminal jurisdiction, where it embraces universal jurisdiction, aspires to be free of
politics and discrimination. However, it is also true that, since the Second World War, interest in
universal jurisdiction has grown partly because of the biases in and failures of domestic
jurisdiction. International criminal jurisdiction, for all its shortcomings, has been compensating
for the failures of the domestic courts. If this is so, how could we rely on domestic courts to
deliver justice based on the principles of universal jurisdiction? Is the solution simply a matter of
someone else’s domestic courts doing the difficult work? If high-ranking Israeli soldiers and
leaders could not be tried in Israel, is their trial in Belgium the ultimate solution to the suspicion
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and accusation of war crimes, for instance?
The answer to the question of the pros and cons of universal jurisdiction exercised by
organs other than international or transnational courts is two-fold. By virtue of being
complementary to the domestic system, the workings of international criminal justice organs such
as the ICC could create a dialogue, however limited, that in turn would increase the possibility of
establishing of a legal regime of accountability for international crimes. In the Pinochet case, the
British authorities managed to avoid his extradition based on the defendant's alleged illness.
However, the British courts also recognized that his crimes were heinous enough to support
extradition to Spain where he would have had to stand trial. That development alone could be
considered a key element that has driven Chilean courts to undertake their own case against
Pinochet, despite the many internal obstacles leading them to avoid this for decades. This has
been pinpointed by legal scholars such as Stephen Ratner as the “democratizing effect” of
international law, despite the fact that international law itself may not qualify as a democratic
edifice in its origins. 362 The second point to be made is that unless and until we accept
international accountability regimes such as international human rights law or international
criminal law as fragmented regimes composed of variant elements, rather than centre-heavy and
fixed structures, we will continue to have far too many (and often unrealistic) expectations from
organs such as the ICC. This could in turn create effects to the detriment of the very regime we
purport to uphold, as these courts and their proceedings often reflect power dynamics in global
politics that in turn render their reach uneven, and sometimes problem-laden. This is in addition
to the fact that, unlike the ICJ for instance, ICC is defined as a court of last and not first resort.
In the remainder of this section, the critical role of the complementarity principle as a
defining feature of the post-ICC regime of accountability for international crimes will be
examined. Select cases of hybrid courts will also be brought into the picture, to determine the
degree of their contribution to international criminal law in terms of the expansion of universal
jurisdiction, especially in the context of transitional justice. The goal of this exercise is to
determine the relationship between international, domestic, and hybrid courts, and to revisit the
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idea of the fragmented nature of international criminal law as an accountability regime in terms
of its future promise.

B. The ICC and the Importance of the Complementarity Principle for the International Legal
Regime of Accountability
The basic stated objective of the establishment of a permanent international criminal court
was to replace a culture of impunity for the commission of very serious crimes with an
international legal regime of accountability.363 To this end, the provisions of the Rome Statute
expressly address a specific set of crimes—i.e. genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and the crime of aggression—as indictable crimes. Prior to the founding of the ICC, there were
numerous other tribunals with an international mandate. However, bodies such as the ad hoc
Tribunals for Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were necessarily limited in scope, due to their
context-specific and time-sensitive characteristics. To a certain degree, the idea of a permanent
court was also a response to the UN Security Council's monopoly on international tribunals,
which many states in the Global South deemed as being far too selective in “distributing”
international justice. 364 Still, there is an ongoing argument about the deterrent effect of
international tribunals or courts in general, whether permanent or ad hoc in their constitution.
There is also the much larger question of what universal justice means for different societies, and
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whether some are treated “more equal” than others within its reach, especially under the purview
of Europe-based international courts such as the ICC. 365 The common response to the
establishment of the ICC emanating from scholars and practitioners of international law is that
the effectiveness of such international tribunals and courts must be judged within a long-term
perspective.366 Accordingly, the impact of these relatively new bodies cannot fairly be compared
to that of longstanding institutions such as the Security Council or the ICJ. Specifically, the ICC
is seen as part of a framework of measures brought into effect in order to establish and sustain a
new international regime of accountability, including increased domestic prosecution of such
crimes, the greater and wider use of common jurisdiction, and greater international and
transnational cooperation and coordination in the addressing of international crimes.
The cornerstone of this anticipated legal regime is the principle of complementarity, as
reflected in Articles 18 and 19 (containing procedures) and Articles 17 and 20 (containing the
substantive criteria) of the Rome Statute.367 This principle was agreed upon as a result of long
negotiations. It was put in place to ensure that “State Parties” will always have primacy if they
choose to investigate and prosecute crimes within domestic jurisdiction or in accordance with the
jurisdiction of the Court. Accordingly, it is only where States are unwilling or unable to act
within the meaning of the Statute, or where they are simply inactive, that the ICC will take on a
365
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case. Moreover, if a State has started proceedings, the ICC will only be able to take on the case if
it is shown that domestic authorities acted with an intention to shield the person(s) concerned
from justice, or in a manner that was inconsistent with the intent to bring the person(s) concerned
to justice. Without such a finding, lack of observance of international standards of due process or
differences in sentencing practices does not constitute a valid reason for ICC to step in. At the
same time, there are complementarity provisions to guide national authorities towards
incorporating the Rome Statute definitions of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes
into their domestic law. As such, the primacy of State Parties for investigation and trial purposes
does not go against the principle of universal jurisdiction and the demand for the faithful
adoption of its current legal articulations by the Rome Statute. On the contrary, the
complementarity principle reflects the belief that universal jurisdiction is best achieved through a
multi-level and complex model of jurisprudential expansion that links international and domestic
spheres. Meanwhile, it is important to note that this still remains a centrifugal model; the ICC
acts as the epicenter, and produces the blueprint to be appropriated wherever a certain set of
international crimes are concerned. Both State and non-State Parties are expected to adopt the
principles and format of codification developed by the Court, in order to make a legitimate claim
that their legal regime is on par with the international-cum-transnational one in this specific area
of criminal law.
In this context, the “proper implementation” of the Rome Statute within the national law
of States Parties is of key importance for the establishment and sustenance of a legal regime of
accountability. This is in addition to the required cooperation between the ICC and affected
States Parties in the investigation and preparation of cases, as outlined by the elaborate machinery
set out in Part 9 of the Statute.368 Indeed, there is a set of specific stipulations put in place to
ensure the desired coordination for investigation and adjudication purposes. First, States Parties
are under an unequivocal obligation to cooperate fully with the Court (Article 86) and to modify
national law as necessary to allow the forms of cooperation required by the Statute (Article
88).369 States Parties are also obliged to arrest and surrender suspects to the Court (Article 89),
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and to provide other forms of cooperation as requested, such as the questioning of witnesses, the
conduct of searches and seizure of evidence, the protection of witnesses, and the tracing,
freezing, and seizure of assets related to the crimes under investigation (Article 93). The grounds
allowed for refusing cooperation are extremely limited. States Parties cannot refuse to extradite
their own nationals, and immunities available under national law cannot be used to refuse to hand
over one’s own nationals to the Court. Notwithstanding these precautionary mechanisms, suffice
it to say that national security concerns can always provide a limited basis for refusal to
cooperate, provided all the consultation measures set out in Article 72 of the Statute are
undertaken. It is in this larger context of complementarity that ICC and the Rome Statute function
as guideposts for the exercise of universal jurisdiction. No doubt the domestic jurisprudence of a
State Party to the ICC provides the critical mass of laws and principles specifically designed to
govern and protect its people and its borders. However, the majority of recent cases brought to
the attention of the ICC proved that while these domestic laws can prosecute individuals for
crimes such as murder, rape, armed robbery, and larceny, they often do not equip the national
judicial system with the competence to try perpetrators of serious violations of International
Human Rights Law or International Humanitarian Law.370 Hence the need to enact laws that can
address egregious crimes committed both in conflict and during peace-time. The standard route
for this is the domestication of the Rome Statute by the States Parties.371 The assumption behind
this prescription is that the domestication process would provide the legal framework for the
implementation of ICC jurisprudence, inching towards a wider network of universal jurisdiction
in the case of select international crimes, and hence a sustainable legal regime of accountability.
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As a final note, the Rome Statute makes provisions for victims’ participations at all stages
of proceedings. As a result, at least in principle, the ICC assures the victims’ access to and
participation in the adjudication process. In international law, this is regarded as a unique
development in the structure and operations of international tribunals. The ICC also takes into
account issues of reparations for victims beyond the traditional punishment and deterrence
objectives of domestic courts. Specifically, Article 79 of the Rome Statute provides for the
establishment of a trust fund for victims and their families.372 This does not only address the issue
of reparation, it also guarantees legal representation to allow victims to participate at all stages of
the proceedings. The court can determine the extent of damages, and can order perpetrators to
compensate victims as such. Furthermore, adhering to international standards, the ICC does not
use the death penalty as punishment. Article 77 of the ICC’s Statute provides that the court can
only institute penalties such as life imprisonment, imprisonment for a designated number of
years, and fines, but cannot institute the death penalty.373 Domesticating the Rome Statute could
therefore constitute a significant step to expunge capital punishment from domestic jurisdictions.
These points may appear as tangential to the issue of universal jurisdiction. However, in
effect, they could also be seen as part and parcel of the transfusion of a legal culture of
accountability and the globalized endorsement of a new approach to international crimes,
especially those committed by state authorities and people in position of power, a process that has
included victims as legal actors since Nuremberg trials. In summary, the ICC’s complementarity
principle is essential to the workings of a new legal regime of accountability for select
international crimes. This principle operates at three levels. First, it dictates the set of crimes that
fall under the purview of universal jurisdiction. If local, domestic legal authorities and courts do
not act on these crimes, and if these crimes are brought to the attention of the Court, it then
becomes a court of last resort and, in select cases at least, proceeds to try those accountable for
the identified crimes. Alternatively, if there is not a case brought directly to ICC’s attention, or, if
there are local attempts to achieve accountability that are hindered by domestic circumstances,
372
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the ICC then provides a reservoir of legal expertise, as well as guidelines for juridification for
these trials and transitional justice projects-in-the-making. Hybrid courts fall under this last
category. This induction is based on a nuanced rendition of the complementary principle both by
the Court itself and also by domestic legal and political actors. In this chapter, examples of
hybrid courts and their workings have been presented in order to illustrate their potential, but also
to underline the fact that they are not the ultimate solution to the problems with a centrifugal
model of universal jurisdiction. Indeed, their operations are much more complex than have thus
far been foreseen by proponents of universal jurisdiction in the area of international criminal law.

III. HYBRID COURTS: FRACTURED OR OVERLAPPING LEGAL REGIMES OF ACCOUNTABILITY?
To reiterate, due to disappointments and difficulties with both local trials and
international tribunals in the area of international criminal law, hybrid courts and tribunals are
increasingly seen as a compromise that could benefit from the strengths of international
jurisprudence while minimizing the weaknesses and “side effects” of central institutions such as
the ICC, particularly concerning the charge of neo-colonialism.374 A hybrid tribunal is indeed a
distinct instrument of international criminal law. It is a court in which international judges and
local judges sit side-by-side, drawing their decisions from a blend of both local and international
jurisprudence. From the point of view of an international/transnational regime of accountability,
hybrid courts are expected to benefit from the outreach of universal jurisdiction and the
codification of international criminal law achieved by various conventions and the Rome Statute,
while honoring domestic legal traditions. During the post-ICC era, the first hybrid court was
established in Kosovo in 2000. As discussed, this was followed by hybrid courts in East Timor,
Sierra Leone, and Bosnia. Cambodia is in the final stages of a hybrid court to address crimes
committed by the Khmer Rouge,375 and Lebanon is yet another country to have expressed desire
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to create a hybrid tribunal.376 As mentioned in the earlier sections of this work, there were also
internal and external political demands for the Sudan’s President Bashir to be tried by a hybrid
court rather than by the ICC. Then there is the successful resolutoion of the trial of the former
dictator of Chad, Hissène Habré, in the Senegalese hybrid court. Concerning this last example,
the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and
Human Rights, known as the Malabo Protocol,377 truly reconceptualized the idea of transitional
justice mechanisms and purported that transitional justice mechanisms can encompass regional
and transnational efforts to respond to mass political violence. In this sense, the Protocol actively
seeks to correct for perceived biases in international criminal justice. As such, it offers the
Continent, and Global South at large, a substantive alternative vision of local and regional
criminal justice and criminal accountability for state criminality targeting a state’s own civilian
population.378 In keeping with these developments, in the final section of this Chapter, the
workings and institutional characteristics of some hybrid courts established since the
establishment of the ICC and the coming into effect of the Rome Statute will be further
scrutinized.
My starting premise on hybrid courts has been that domestic criminal justice systems
have options for flexible responses not currently available to the ICC, and that these options
extend beyond criminal proceedings to encompass civil proceedings. The right to sue
governments and out-of-court settlements supervised by judges that allow for the participation of
those harmed also promise a wider range of potentially satisfying compensatory activities for
government-induced harms. These and other strategies of litigation inch towards restorative
justice measures, and do not limit accountability for societal harm to criminal proceedings. That
is perhaps where hybrid courts have so far been underutilized, due to their dependency on the list
of crimes and trial procedures defined by the Rome Statute. Restorative justice, in contrast to
over selected crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge regime between 1975 and 1979. However, only one person has
been indicted due to interference from the government and resource issues, as well as responsible persons passing the
age of 70. For further details on the ECCC, see https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/thematic-areas/international-lawcourts-tribunals/international-hybrid-criminal-courts-tribunals/ [15.03.2017].
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retributive justice as embodied in international criminal law, does not focus solely on the
punishment of the offender, but rather seeks to address the needs of both victim and the offender,
with the goal of restoring the broader wellbeing of the individuals and communities involved.379
An equally important point is that contemporary prosecutions at international criminal courts and
tribunals have demonstrated that, where individuals are convicted of core international crimes,
the resources available for reparations and are grossly insufficient to meet even the basic
restitutionary needs of both the victims and the society at large. Most of the wealth that might
exist as a result of crimes such as crimes against humanity or war crimes is likely to be in the
hands of individuals via corporations or other artificial persons who have gained property and
income through these mass human rights violations. None of the international criminal courts and
tribunals (together known as the ICCTs) has adjudicative jurisdiction over artificial persons of
any sort. This means that any progress on restitution and restorative justice must come through
national tribunals. This applies to both core international crimes and the broader category of
human rights treaty crimes, which remain outside the authority of ICCTs.380 Translating the
experiences of restorative justice into international criminal law dealing with mass atrocities is
not simple. While restorative justice is traditionally used in response to lower-impact crimes such
as property damage or fraud, it has also been successfully used in response to higher-order
offenses such as sexual assault or murder, for example, where the victim or their family and the
offender agree to participate, and where traditional retributive forms of punishment, such as
imprisonment, could not resolve the issue of long-standing damages. As a case in point, the
potential utility of restorative justice measures in the context of hybrid court trials and for past
mass atrocities was a lively public debate and in and around the Juba Peace Talks in Uganda.381
379
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The July 2007 agreement between the Ugandan Government and the LRA on Accountability and
Reconciliation stated that traditional justice mechanisms as practiced in the communities affected
by the conflict shall be promoted, with necessary modifications, and that restorative justice
measures would be treated as a central part of the framework for accountability and
reconciliation. 382 Although the Final Peace Agreement was not signed, various forms of
traditional restorative justice in northern Uganda have been used extensively with lower-level
LRA members who have returned to their communities.383
No doubt there are inherent problems with traditional forms of justice, and overreliance
on them could also lead to an evasion of the retributive justice embodied in indictments by the
ICCTs. Still, some of the practical questions faced by both the state and the society during the
Uganda peace talks reveal the essential element of limitations posed by criminal trials alone. For
instance, how should abducted children who committed atrocities be treated, when they are both
victims and perpetrators? Can traditional justice work both for formerly abducted children who
became LRA fighters under duress, and for LRA commanders and those who enlisted voluntarily
as adults? Traditional forms of restorative justice that are locally rooted and adapted for the
purpose of reconciliation, truth-telling, and advancing peace for a just social and political future
forces dates back to 1986. In 2006, the Juba Peace Talks were held between the GoU and the LRA, mediated by Riek
Machar, the Vice President of South Sudan. However, LRA leader Joseph Kony refused to sign the final peace
agreement, and the LRA has been at large since. Military campaigns by all parties to the 20-year-conflict led to fierce
attacks on civilian populations across Northern Uganda, which included raping, mutilating and abducting civilians,
raiding villages, and looting and burning houses. The conflict has had disastrous economic, physical, social and
psychological effects on the entire civilian population. It is essential to note that both during and after the conflict,
women played important roles as combatants, in support roles in the military as well as the domestic sphere and in
initiating community-led approaches to ending the violence. Nonetheless, transitional justice discussions in Uganda
almost exclusively focus on male parties to the conflict only. For a policy brief describing gender-based violence, its
occurrence and effects on local communities during and after the conflict in Northern Uganda, see Sylvia Pinia and
Frederike Bubenzer, Gender Justice and Reconciliation in Uganda (Institute for Justice and Reconciliation 2011).
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order do not have to take place in opposition to or in isolation from ICCT involvement.384
However, the question remains as to whether simply prosecuting and convicting Kony and a few
of his senior commanders would indeed satisfy the needs of justice in the Ugandan context.385
Rather, a multi-layered, locally nuanced set of approaches to finding justice and peace is more
likely to deliver the needed results, a possibility that could be made into reality through the
mechanisms of a hybrid court. Overall, the verdict from the Global South is that the ICC in
particular pursued a narrow criminal justice mandate under the Rome Statute to investigate and
prosecute those primarily responsible for committing mass atrocities.386
As stated, according to the ICC’s defining principle of complementarity, the Court will
take on an atrocities case only if the domestic courts are “unable or unwilling” to do so. The
Court may also agree to hand over the prosecution of a case in midstream, if its judges are
convinced that the proposed special domestic (or hybrid) court would be as strict and fair in its
application of justice—including its sanctions—as the ICC itself. This is an option that could be
put into practice for cases pertaining to countries such as Sudan and Uganda. It may indeed
become a necessary route to take, as in recent years the ICC has faced a growing degree of
suspicion since its first trial was suspended and the defendant, the Congolese warlord Thomas
Lubanga, was subsequently ordered to be released.387 In the meantime, a decade of war began in
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) with Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s 1996–1997 campaign to
overthrow the repressive rule of Mobutu Sese Seko in the country then known as Zaire.
Here is how this peculiar story seems to have unfolded: in resource-rich Ituri province in
the country’s northeast, Thomas Lubanga led the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC) and its
militia, the Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo. In 2004, the DRC herself invited the
384
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ICC to investigate and prosecute war crimes that had occurred in the DRC since July 1, 2002.388
Meanwhile, DRC authorities arrested Lubanga in March 2005 and charged him with genocide
and crimes against humanity, based on provisions of the DRC’s military criminal code. These
charges concerned the UPC’s alleged participation in the killing of civilians in the villages they
attacked. In March 2005, DRC authorities issued a second warrant charging Lubanga with illegal
detention and murder. After these two warrants, the ICC issued a complementary arrest warrant
accusing Thomas Lubanga Dyilo of war crimes for conscripting children as soldiers in 2006.
However, the Court had to cancel the beginning of his trial in June 2008 because of what is stated
as “complex procedural issues.” The two other Congolese warlords, Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui and
Germain Katanga, are awaiting trial in The Hague, while a fourth, Bosco Ntaganda, has been
indicted but is still at large.389 None of these long-drawn-out proceedings has helped matters
concerning how to deal with the ICC in particular, and ICCTs in general, as they become
involved with mass crimes in the post-colonial world. The growing tendency and desire is to see
locally rooted and regionally legitimate institutions come on board instead.390
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CONCLUSION: HYBRID COURTS AS NEW ACTORS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN THE
GLOBAL SOUTH?
Major cases that have taken place before hybrid tribunals all merit close examination in
terms of their legal and political context, as well as their procedural details and jurisdictional
outcomes. To this end, in the remaining pages a select number of these cases will be examined. In
the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), for instance, there are two
particularly critical cases: Case 001 (Kaing Guek Eav a.k.a. “Duch”), and Case 002 (with
defendants Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary, and Ieng Thirith). The individuals mentioned
were each charged with war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, and crimes under
Cambodian Law.391 Meanwhile, Case 003 and Case 004 have been opposed by the Cambodian
government, as a result of which several members of the court’s international staff resigned from
the tribunal. At the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the trials for the Civil Defense Forces
(CDF; including Sam Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana, and Allieu Kondewa), the Revolutionary
United Front (RUF; including the surviving leaders Issay Sesay, Morris Kallon, and Augustine
Gbao), and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC; Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy
Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu), along with the indictment, arrest, and prosecution of Charles
Taylor, are of particular concern for the future of international criminal law from the perspective
of its future in the Global South.392 There are also the cases of Julio Fernandez and Joao
Fernandez, The Los Palos Case, and the indictment of General Wiranto before the Special Panel
for Serious Crimes, Dili. At the Bosnia War Crimes Chamber, the Foča Rape Camp Trials as well
as the Kravica Case, focusing on violence related to the Srebrenica massacres in 1995, are of
significant concern. Similarly, in Kosovo, the trial of Milos Jokic as well as the Racak massacre
and the 2001 bombing of the Nis Express (Florim Ejupi) are to be followed closely, in terms of
both their results and their reception in the larger context of bringing closure to the war and
atrocities that marred former Yugoslav Republics in South-Eastern Europe.
All of these hybrid courts of the Global South operate based on the same principles that
guide international criminal law and human rights law nexus in other, larger, regional and
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international courts. First and foremost, whether they appear as witnesses, victim participants, or
civil parties in mass crimes proceedings, victims contribute vital evidence and insight bearing on
the guilt or innocence of the accused. Their testimony is accepted as a categorically valid
contribution to the truth-telling function of the process, and under some circumstances used as a
base for coming to terms with societal trauma. However, as has been widely discussed, victim
testimonies can also lead to re-traumatization.393 Furthermore, from a jurisdictional point of view,
they could compromise the fairness or efficiency of the judicial process if emotional distress is
regarded as a factor that undermines the testimony’s relevance, credibility, or focus. Inherent
tensions are inevitable due to the nature of courtroom experience for victims, who are subjected
to pointed questioning and cross-examination on the details of very traumatic events as part of
standard procedures that are essential for a fair criminal trial. What is unique about the hybrid
courts is the way they deal with such tensions, and the flexibility and innovativeness they exhibit
compared to the much more rigid structures embraced by the larger courts. A key example in this
regard is the UN-backed hybrid court established to address crimes of the Pol Pot era. The ECCC
has tried to facilitate victim testimony both through formal procedures and through informal trial
management strategies, including two important innovations in international criminal justice.
Specifically, the ECCC spearheaded the special “victim impact hearings” and “statements of
suffering,” both of which allow civil parties to describe harms they endured under Khmer Rouge
rule before a judgment is reached. These types of interventions help ease the tension between
survivors’ interests and the rights of the accused, which is for the benefit of the society at
large.394
When it comes to mass atrocities and egregious crimes, the techno-legal transitional
justice paradigm and the heyday of transitional justice institutions funded by the global North but
operating across the Global South is beginning to pass. Therapeutic legalism did not deliver.395
This creates a wonderful window of opportunity for the societies in the Global South. Similar to
standard international judicial bodies, such as the International Criminal Court or the European
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Court of Human Rights, the hybrid and “internationalized” criminal organs are composed of
independent judges, working on the basis of predetermined rules of procedure, and rendering
binding decisions. They are subject to the same principles governing the work of all international
judiciaries, including due process, impartiality, and independence.396 Within this wider class of
international judicial bodies, however, hybrid courts belong to a specific order. Similar to the
ICC, ICTY, and ICTR, their goal has been to sanction serious violations of international law in
the area of international humanitarian law and human rights law, to secure individual
accountability, and to act as a deterrence mechanism against future violations. To serve these
functions, these internationalized criminal courts impose criminal penalties. This is perhaps the
most critical feature setting this group of judicial bodies apart from other international judicial
bodies. Moreover, like the ICTY and ICTR, but unlike the ICC, they are by their nature ad hoc
institutions. They have been created to address particular situations, for a limited period of time,
and they respond to singular political and historical circumstances. Finally, like all other
international criminal organs, in order to carry out their mission the hybrid courts rely on
cooperation from international legal organs such as the ICC and judicial assistance by individual
states, as well as the endorsement of international organizations such as the UN. In summary,
hybrid courts, as a specific form of internationalized criminal institutions, constitute a group of
their own, and yet they operate within the larger field of other international judicial and political
institutions and entities. They possess common characteristics that set them apart from other
cognate entities. In some cases they are part of the judiciary of a given country, while in others,
they may have been grafted onto the local judicial system by outside actors and posses a semiindependent status. In all the cases covered in this chapter, however, their make-up is markedly
mixed, incorporating international and national features, and their mandate is circumscribed and
issue-specific. They all are composed of international and local staff (judges, prosecutors, support
staff), and apply a compound of international and national substantial and procedural law. The
remaining question is whether these hybrid courts constitute the future of international criminal
law in terms of the dissemination of jurisprudence produced and endorsed by central institutions
such as the ICC. More specifically, one must carefully examine their significance in terms of an
396
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international regime of accountability regarding the crimes that now fall under the purview of the
Rome Statute.
Throughout this chapter, I posited that international criminal law on war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and genocide—perhaps better clustered together as societal crimes—
constitutes a fragmented accountability regime. The common mistake regarding this regime is to
limit the roster of actors that constitute it to state parties and international institutions such as
international courts. The ICC is an independent, permanent court that tries persons accused of the
most serious crimes of international concern under its aegis. The ICC was established based on a
treaty, which was originally joined by 108 countries.397 However, the ICC is a court of last resort.
It will not act if a case is investigated or prosecuted by a national judicial system unless the
national proceedings are not genuine, for example if formal proceedings were undertaken solely
to shield a person from criminal responsibility. In addition, the ICC can only try those accused of
the gravest crimes. One of the great innovations of the Statute of the International Criminal Court
and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence is the series of rights granted to victims. For the first
time in the history of international criminal justice, barring the Eichmann trials that took place in
a domestic court, victims have the possibility under the Statute to present their views and
observations before the Court. Participation before the Court may occur at various stages of
proceedings, and it may take different forms. Although it is up to the judges to give directions as
to the timing and manner of participation, the victim-based provisions within the Rome Statute
provide victims with the opportunity to have their voices heard and to obtain, where appropriate,
different forms of reparation. At least in theory, it is this balance between retributive and
restorative justice that enables the ICC to carry out a mandate of not only bringing criminals to
justice, but also helping the victims to obtain justice and have a sense of closure. However, as we
have seen from the existing trials, in reality hybrid courts are much better equipped than the ICC
to ensure such results.
In setting up the ICC, its founders stated two main aims: to end impunity for the worst
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mass crimes, and to deter would-be perpetrators.398 Since its inception, three States Parties to the
Rome Statute—Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and the Central African
Republic—have referred situations occurring on their territories to the Court. In addition, the
Security Council has referred the situation in Darfur, Sudan—a non‐State Party. The Court’s
Prosecutor has opened and conducted investigations in all of the above-mentioned situations.399
Given that the Court’s first four cases are all in Africa, no doubt the accusation of neo-colonial
bias is raising its head. This is despite the fact that, in Congo, Uganda and the Central African
Republic, it was the governments themselves that requested the court to investigate. There are
also charges that accuse the Court of being used by corrupt leaders and dictators in the Global
South, who use the Court as a stage to wage battles against the opposition in their countries. In
this context, hybrid courts do seem to offer a much-needed new platform for accountability in
international criminal law. Another recent case that caused immense controversy is that of
Charles Taylor. In May 2010, the trial of Charles Taylor at the Special Court for Sierra Leone
(SCSL) took a dramatic twist as prosecutors requested the judges to issue a subpoena to
supermodel Naomi Campbell, requiring her appearance before the Chambers. 400 The SCSL
Prosecutors made an application that they be allowed to reopen their case, which was closed in
February 2009, or to bring evidence in rebuttal against Taylor by calling three additional
witnesses, Campbell, Carole White, and Mia Farrow. Campbell was required to testify as a
witness about a diamond gift she allegedly received from Taylor in South Africa in 1997.
Campbell’s evidence eventually supported the Prosecution’s allegations that the Accused used
rough diamonds for personal enrichment and arms purchases for Sierra Leone, particularly during
the AFRC/RUF period. As the actual recipient of the accused’ gift of diamonds, Campbell was in
a position to provide material evidence about this event. This case indicated that the cooperation
of states whose citizens are subpoenaed is essential to the functioning of these hybrid judicial
bodies. The witness’ voice is of key importance to justify the exercise of extraordinary judicial
power in international criminal law. That being said, concerns remain about the efficacy of hybrid
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courts in carrying forward the mandate of the Rome Statute. Yet, what is the alternative? Perhaps
the problem lies with our expectations from transitional justice, or the rigidity of institutional
forms that the existing framework for international criminal law imposes rather, than the hybrid
courts themselves.
On a final note, although the inherent pluralism of international criminal law has gained
increasing acceptance in recent years, scholarship on sentencing, for instance, remains
surprisingly universalist. Leading scholars advance sentencing principles that are intended to
apply to international crimes, no matter where they are prosecuted.401 Here, I wish to challenge
this viewpoint and the resultant flat reading of ICC jurisprudence in that regard, both empirically
and normatively. Scholarly expectations of sentencing consistency across international courts are
premised on the misguided and factually unsupported notion that international courts constitute
central components of a unified international criminal justice system. Sentencing disparities
across hybrid courts not only can be justified, but are normatively desirable because they respond
to a host of crucial differences in domestic criminal prosecutions pertaining to international
crimes, including differences in the kinds of atrocities that occurred, the rank and status of the
perpetrators who can be prosecuted, and the hybrid courts’ own mandates. These differences
create the need for differentiated sentencing schemes across different tribunals and courts. It is
high time that we accept domestic sentencing norms as a particularly crucial factor that should
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influence every hybrid court’s specific sentencing scheme. As I discussed in the opening chapter
of this dissertation, traditional accounts of international law entertain a distinction between
monist and dualist legal systems.402 In monist systems, courts apply international law directly. In
dualist systems, direct application is not an option, so courts apply international law indirectly, or
not at all. Although this distinction may be formally correct, it tells us very little about the
functional role of domestic courts in the international legal system.
In this chapter, both a functional and a normative account of hybrid courts was presented,
with a particular focus on the distinctions among the horizontal, vertical, and transnational legal
obligations and merits of such courts. Modern international law regulates horizontal relationships
between states, vertical relationships between states and private parties, and transnational
relationships between private parties whose interactions cross state lines. In conjunction, the role
of domestic courts in interpreting and applying international law varies greatly, depending on
whether the international rule at issue is horizontal, vertical, or transnational. As the examples
examined here demonstrate, the willingness or the ability of state-based courts to apply
international law is not solely a legal matter. It depends heavily on the political nature of the
subject matter of the trials. In effect, domestic courts rarely interpret horizontal rules. Rather,
they refer to treaties that regulate the horizontal relationship between states as ultra vires in
nature. As a result, implementation of horizontal obligations as dictated by international law
jurisdiction typically involves executive and not judicial action. Furthermore, this is true for both
monist and dualist regimes. However, the role of domestic courts in interpreting and applying
vertical rules, such as human rights treaties, tends to be different. Particular political relationships
may affect the willingness of domestic or hybrid courts to implement international law, and to
effect legal change based on their own initiative. This chapter drew on materials from several
jurisdictions, all of them situated in the Global South, to present a holistic account of the role
played by hybrid courts in interpreting and applying horizontal, transnational, and vertical
international legal rules. As these cases demonstrate, the history of the application of universal
402
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jurisdiction over core international crimes has been uneven. Non-governmental organization
(NGO) activism has been regarded as a significant factor in this regard, but much less attention
has been paid to the political composition of the public in terms of their willingness to bring
certain matters to the courtroom. After the Pinochet case in the UK, the “amputation” of the
universal jurisdiction laws in Belgium in 2003 and Spain in 2009 and 2014 made it clear that
expecting one’s unfinished business to be settled in another country’s courts was not all that
realistic.
Subsequently, an alternative view of this history emerged. Universal jurisdiction is not
necessarily on the decline. The number of universal jurisdiction-related statutes and trials has
increased significantly in recent years, indicating the fact that the trajectory of universal
jurisdiction is shifting towards hybrid and at-home courts. Perhaps it is time to revise received
wisdom concerning the operation of international criminal law in the Global South. Rather than
seeing the matter as an ongoing competition between two conceptions of the role states play in
the universal jurisdiction regime (i.e. national versus international accountability and
enforcement regimes), the emphasis could be put on the mandate of the jurisdiction itself. States
are not necessarily the “global enforcers” of the Rome Statute verbatim. Although signatory
states have a role in preventing and punishing core international crimes committed anywhere in
the world, which is the “no safe haven” conception, states should not be seen as the guardian of
the victims of crimes perpetrated by other states, either.403 More to the point, the anti-impunity
rationale of international criminal law should not be reduced to legalistic position and a zealously
Northern rhetoric about universal jurisdiction. The “post-colonial legalism” approach to
international law has already established a critical jurisprudential tradition that asks how actors
use and apply law, in order to understand how law obtains meaning, is practised, and changes
over time.404 Combined with TWAIL scholarship, it is possible to ask different questions about
the possibility of life after Rome Statute, so to speak. The rise of transnational activity that led to
an enlarged scope of both national and transnational problem-solving strategies through
403
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international law further enhances this viewpoint. Debates on universal jurisdiction concerning
gross and systemic humanitarian law violations have long suffered from a single focus on
institutional certainties or a neutered state-centric worldview.405 It is time to look closely at the
realities of universal jurisdiction on the ground, and to give up the obsession with what goes on in
the chambers of international courts or national courts in the North, to come up with strategies
and answers about human suffering in the Global South from within.
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Chapter VI. Mea culpa, Sua culpa, Tua Maxima Culpa: Collective Responsibility and Legal
Judgment406

INTRODUCTION
ad auctores reddit sceleris coacti culpa –the guilt of imposed crimes lies on those who impose
them.
Seneca.407
cavendum est ne major poena, quam culpa, sit—care should be taken in all cases, that the
punishment not exceed the guilt.
Cicero.408

If only we would abide by the ethical guidelines offered by the Romans, problematic
aspects of collective responsibility in law and legal morality could perhaps be successfully
avoided. However, a harmonious relationship between social life and political peace is not so
easy to attain or sustain during deep crises and mass violence in our current era. Issues
concerning justice and personal desert at times of turmoil and uproar such as genocidal violence,
ethnic cleansing, or crimes against humanity cannot be reduced to proven links between
punishable individual actions, international criminal law and related regimes of responsibilitycum-accountability. The intricacies of mass political violence and societal crimes render such
direct and methodical solutions lacking. This final chapter of the dissertation thus invites the
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reader to consider the limitations of seeking societal peace and political transformation mainly on
the grounds of achieving criminal accountability concerning the individual perpetrators of mass
atrocities. All of the examples covered in the previous pages pertain to post-WWII applications of
universal jurisdiction concerning egregious crimes. They also belong to a particularly difficult
field of inquiry: transitional justice. The field of transitional justice is increasingly characterized
by the dominance of legalism to the detriment of advocacy, politics, scholarship and practice.409
My fear is that correctives to such leanings are by and large missing in legal scholarship.
Furthermore, the tendency towards aggrandizement of litigation-related measures is further
supported by the success of hybrid courts and other localized applications of universal
jurisdiction in international criminal law. In this closing chapter, I will thus venture a politicophilosophical inquiry underlining the importance of legal humility and contextualizing the
criminology of transitional justice. As law's place at the heart of transition from societal and
political conflicts becomes increasingly secure, the time is right for a more honest appraisal of the
limitations of legalism and a correspondingly greater willingness to countenance the role of
forms of knowledge pertaining to accountability for mass atrocities. Specifically, an endowed
debate on the difficult subject of collective responsibility will both thicken the subject of criminal
accountability for mass violence, and deliver a methodological insight to more effective changes
on the ground.
How far are our lives implicated by what other people do to each other indirectly? How
much responsibility falls on our shoulders from the harms that flow from the social, economic,
and political institutions in which we are embedded, even if we do not inflict harm while
occupying positions of authority? Do our relations as individuals to spheres of collective
existence lead to complicity and collective responsibility in the event that they lead to harm for
select sectors of the society?410 In the following pages, I will argue that the relationship between
collective responsibility, individual guilt and criminal accountability is a very critical albeit
difficult one, often avoided entirely in international criminal law. And yet, it provides a precious
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point of entry to the nature of our relations with society and the state, of which we are a part and
for which we are the harbingers of legitimacy. Here, I posit that international criminal law
scholarship needs a richer theory of accountability, in which our understanding of individual
responsibility in relation to societal acts of violence not only allows for but demands an analysis
of collective action and thus contextualizes litigation in this select area. Specifically, I will argue
that what should be sought after is not more complicated punishment schemes but rather a
substantive way of addressing harm we give to each other both by commission and by
omission. 411 In this context, intentional and purposeful collective action, collective moral
responsibility and collective guilt, individual responsibility for (and in) collective wrongs,
collective legal obligations to victims of societal and political crimes, and individual moral
responsibility with regard to wrongful social and political acts constitute key entries to a
meaningful politico-legal debate on collective responsibility and legal judgment. I will pursue
these questions in a context originally set by Hannah Arendt’s work on legal judgment.
In Eichmann in Jerusalem, her account of the trial of Adolf Eichmann, Arendt used the
phrase “the banality of evil,” describing how a man who was neither a monster nor a demon
could nevertheless be an agent of the most extreme and evil acts of violence and destruction.412
This subsequently prompted her to readdress fundamental questions and concerns about the
nature of [collective] violence and our making of moral choices. Her Responsibility and
Judgment, a sequel to her work on Eichmann in this regard, gathers together unpublished writings
from the last decade of Arendt’s life.413 In these later works, she strived to further explicate the
meaning of the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem. At the heart of this series of essays lies a profound
ethical investigation concerning the use of traditional moral truths as politico-legal standards to
411

On this issue, see Larry May, Crimes Against Humanity: A Normative Account. (Cambridge University Press,
2007). May’s work is the first book-length treatment of the philosophical foundations of international criminal law.
His focus is on the moral, legal, and political questions that arise when individuals who commit collective crimes,
such as crimes against humanity, are held accountable by international criminal tribunals. These tribunals challenge
one of the most sacred prerogatives of states—sovereignty. Breaches in this sovereignty can be justified only in
limited circumstances, which constitutes the minimalist threshold of the justification for international prosecution.
May’s work began an important discussion inside the field of international criminal law. What I purport here is to
carry this discussion forward in conjunction with moral theories of judgment in applied legal philosophy and legal
ethics.
412
See Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem (Penguin, 1963). Also see Jacob Robinson, And the Crooked Shall
Be Made Straight: the Eichmann Trial, the Jewish Catastrophe, and Hannah Arendt's Narrative (MacMillan, 1965);
and Seyla Benhabib, "Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem" in Dana Richard Villa, ed. The Cambridge Companion to
Hannah Arendt (Cambridge University Press, 2000) at 65-85.
413
See Hannah Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment (Schocken Books, 2003).

200

judge criminality as it relates to mass violence. Arendt’s analysis of judgment tests to its limits
our ability to distinguish good from evil and right from wrong. The radical evil she had addressed
in her earlier work on totalitarianism evolves into a much more pernicious account of evil, almost
independent of political ideology, whose execution is limitless when the perpetrator feels no
remorse and can erase the memory of his/her acts as soon as they are committed. For such acts,
individual criminal responsibility, even if it comes tied to mass crimes such as crimes against
humanity, does not suffice for us to understand the true nature of the harm and wrong implicated
by such violent acts. Arendt’s conclusion has serious repercussions for contemporary conceptions
of accountability at the level of international criminal law, and the debate presented here is a
token of dedication to think further in that vein.
We are currently witnessing a bewildering variety of developments in regimes of control
articulated in domestic legislation of criminal justice. These range from demands for execution or
preventive detention for sexual predators, paedophiles, and persistent violent offenders to the
development of dispersed, designed in-control regimes for the continual, silent and largely
invisible work of the assessment, management, communication and control of risk-laden groups
deemed prone to commit crimes. Political programmes of crime control cycle through the
alternatives from “prison works” and “boot camps,” through “community corrections,”
“reintegrative shaming,” “therapeutic rehabilitation” to’ “lifetime imprisonment without parole”
and ultimately the death penalty. Concerns about illegality and crime at the individual level are
clearly articulated both by judicial institutions and security practices. Nonetheless, at a more
general level, little attention is paid to the inner workings of mass political violence and systemic
societal crimes. In an attempt to address this lacuna, I will pinpoint the ways in which
accountability regimes in international criminal law have been severely individualized with
regard to practices of government illegality and state criminality. In the post-Rome Statute era of
international criminal law, the pervasive image of the perpetrator of crime as the juridical subject
of the rule of law is no doubt a great leap forward towards the erosion of unjustified defense of
state sovereignty and related individual immunities. However, the forms of legal knowledge and
modes of jurisprudential expertise that are implicated in these new techniques and rationalities of
criminalization of state conduct also carry the danger of blinding us towards larger socio-political
realities of mass crimes.
201

In criminal justice, individual autonomy is used as a bench-mark and an ideal that refers
to the capacity to be one's own person, and to live one's life according to reasons and motives that
are taken as one's own and not the product of manipulative, coercive or distorting external forces.
Individual autonomy is also the central value in the Enlightenment tradition of moral philosophy.
Starting with Kant, it is given fundamental status in John Stuart Mill's and his successors’
versions of utilitarian liberalism. Examination of the concept of autonomy similarly figures
centrally in debates over legal freedoms and rights (such as freedom of speech and the right to
privacy), as well as moral and political theory pertaining to justice.414 In the realm of moral
theory, seeing autonomy as a foundational value stands in contrast with alternative frameworks,
such as ethics of care and ethics of virtue. Consequently, these concepts are rarely brought into
debates on criminal justice. Autonomy has traditionally been thought to connote independence,
and hence to prioritize individual agency in moral thinking and political decision-making.
In the specific context of individual autonomy and its relation to the banality of evil
connoting societal crimes, the existing arsenal of concepts we have does not suffice to deal with
the massive problem in hand: namely, how to understand the weight of individual choices in
producing unforgivable forms of societal and mass harm. In the following pages, I argue that we
therefore have to turn to another concept, albeit one that Arendt did not contend with at all. In
order to make sense of the conundrum of common-place and rule-bound choices made by
individuals leading to collective forms of violence and societal wrongdoing, I will examine the
idea of collective responsibility.415 In legal philosophy, starting with Joel Feinberg’s work, the
debate on collective responsibility has been kept alive like a slowly burning flame, looming at the
background of questions concerning accountability but rarely entering the registers of litigationoriented takes on applications of international law in the context of transitional justice measures
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and in post-conflict societies.416 It has received ire from many corners, as it goes against the basic
principle that no one can be responsible, in the properly ethical or criminal sense, for the conduct
of another, and that criminal responsibility squarely belongs to the individual. Concerning mass
political violence and state criminality, the implications of exclusive reliance on the principle of
individual criminal liability are more damaging than is evident at first.417 In international criminal
law, reverting to the barbarous notion of collective or group responsibility for litigation purposes
is considered an absolute derogation of rights, and rightfully. What I am pursuing here is rather
different: it is the notion of accountability for atrocities as societal responsibility in a distinctively
moral and socio-political sense, and thus as an element that foregrounds the socio-political
acceptance and legitimacy of criminal trials targeting egregious acts such as crimes against
humanity.418
My purpose is not to attribute a diminishing importance to causation in criminal law,
whether domestic or international in its application. In ideal circumstances where harm is not
involved, the outcome of an act does not and should not effect our assessment of the moral
quality of the act. In cases of acts blameworthy due to their resulting in harm or near harm,
however, should our moral assessment be neutral? Furthermore, concerning acts that are
committed under the aegis of state criminality, should we not look elsewhere than the individual
mens rea component? Do such criminal acts not require societal endorsement, support and
condoning? Should larger outcomes never matter in our assessment of a person's individual
criminal conduct? Back in 1968, when D. E. Cooper proposed the thesis that collectives can be
held responsible in a sense not reducible to the individual responsibility of members of the
collective, he also stated clearly that it is not moral responsibility which is involved in such
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accountability.419 I strongly concur with Cooper, and invite us to revisit the somewhat dated
collective responsibility debate420 at the current historical junction of criminal acts pertaining to
state criminality, civil war, military occupation, and neo-colonialism, almost all of which are now
within the reach of the current regime of accountability in international criminal law and the
universal jurisdiction jurisprudence. We have nothing to lose in this regard, and perhaps much to
gain, by at least temporarily suspending our overdependence on legal institutions for finding
cures to our societal ills via litigation of state criminality and political violence solely based on
individual accountability.

I. BEYOND EICHMANN: ON THE NECESSITY OF JUDGMENT
Half a century ago, while writing Eichmann in Jerusalem, Hannah Arendt struggled to
defend the possibility of judgment against the manifold problems we encounter in our attempts to
offer legally valid and morally meaningful verdicts concerning those who have committed crimes
in morally bankrupt and legally defunct communities.421 No doubt some of Arendt’s conclusions
concerning Eichmann are equivocal. Her theory of judgment in the Eichmann manuscript itself
could even suggest that Arendt may have remained trapped within a set of Kantian assumptions
419
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in her philosophy of history, and thus ended up defining the question of freedom to act in a
binary way. In contradistinction, proposing that judgment has an antinomical character and
emphasizing the importance of elements of reason and sense as well as circumstance and context
may allow for a better understanding of the collective nature of responsibility for societal
crimes.422 In Theodor Adorno’s terms, judgment becomes the very test for the limits of agency
and autonomy suffered by the potentially free but essentially “unfree subjects” of modernity.423
Contemporary readers of Eichmann in Jerusalem sometimes cast it as a juridical text, due
to the fact that it is presumably more concerned with justice than with politics or ethics. Such
juridical readings of Arendt’s treatise on Eichmann in particular, and crimes against humanity in
general, focus attention on what Arendt calls the primary challenge of the case—namely, the trial
of Eichmann's unprecedented crimes against humanity in a domestic court.424 However, putting
so much emphasis on the nature of crimes against humanity legislation leads to our failing to
attend to Arendt's principled resistance to a merely juridical response in such cases. This is
clearly evidenced in her criticism of both procedural and substantive aspects of the Jerusalem
Court's ruling. Taking my cue from Arendt's resistance to the Israeli Court's approach, here I
argue that Eichmann in Jerusalem does not authorize a solely juridical approach to the
422

For a timely discussion on the presence of “ethical” narratives and images of the Holocaust in debates and
demonstrations around the recent conflicts in Gaza and the need for a new form of foundation for legal reflection,
legal judgment and legal justice in the Arendtian tradition of rethinking law, see David Seymour, “From Auschwitz
to Jerusalem to Gaza: Ethics for the Want of Law” (2011) 6 Journal of Global Ethics 205.
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Inquiry 201; Paul Formosa, “Thinking, Conscience and Acting in the Face of Mass Evil” in Andrew Schaap,
Danielle Celermajer and Vrasidas Karalis, eds., Power, Judgement and Political Evil: In Conversation with Arendt
(Ashgate, 2010); Roger Berkowitz, Jeffrey Katz & Thomas Keenan, eds. Thinking in Dark Times: Hannah Arendt on
Ethics and Politics (Fordham University Press, 2010).
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unprecedented and egregious crimes under discussion, namely crimes against humanity. Instead,
it could lead us to think about the importance of an “agonistic understanding of law.”425 Such a
take would foreground law's dependence on the political acceptance or contestation of legal
strictures, maxims, and constraints. Especially with the advent of mass crimes such as crimes
against humanity, Arendt asks us to attend to law's dependence on the human capacity to resist
‘illegal’ compulsions, and urges us to redefine the meaning and merit of legal institutions in light
of the responsibility of all concerned for their maintenance, sustenance, and functioning.426
Foregrounding this debate, in her Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, Arendt
detranscendentalizes Kant by linking Kant’s judgment of taste to empirical sociability and lived
experience.427 However, she does not confuse Kant’s idea of enlarged thinking with an actual
dialogue with others. Instead, she introduces the notion of interdependence between judgment
and speech (or communication). In this sense, Arendt interprets Kant’s Critique of Judgment not
as a theory of aesthetic judgment, but as an answer to the more general question of “how do I
judge?” She also draws a distinction between common sense and community sense, a notion
further explored in the work of Jennifer Nedelsky and others writing in the area of human rights.
Working with the notion of community sense, Arendt uncovers a foundation not only for humans
as political beings but also for the idea of humanity at large, a finding that is often overlooked in
the literature on her theory of judgment.428 Here, I would like to bring back this sense of the
425

See Lida Maxwell, “Towards an Agonistic Understanding of Law: Law and Politics in Hannah Arendt’s
Eichmann in Jerusalem” (2010) 11 Contemporary Political Theory 88. On the issue of morality and politics of law
concerning Nazi crimes, see Diana Taylor, “Hannah Arendt on Judgment: Thinking for Politics” (2002) 10
International Journal of Philosophical Studies 151; Craig Reeves, “Exploding the Limits of Law: Judgment and
Freedom in Arendt and Adorno” (2009) 15 Res Publica 137; Seyla Benhabib, ed. Politics in Dark Times: Encounters
with Hannah Arendt (Cambridge University Press, 2010).
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(3): 331-352; Degryse, Anthony (2011) “Sensus Communis as a Foundation for Men as Political Beings: Arendt’s
Reading of Kant’s Critique of Judgment” Philosophy and Social Criticism 37 (3): 345-358; Villa, Dana (2012)
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On this issue, see Ronald Beiner, “Rereading Hannah Arendt’s Kant Lectures” (1997) 23 Philosophy and Social
Criticism 21; Paul Formosa, “Thiking, Willing, Judging” (2009) 4 Crossroads 53; Avery Goldman, “An Antimony
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political groundedness of collective action vis-à-vis our notion of collective responsibility and
extend this debate to criminal judgments pertaining to individual acts leading to state criminality,
political violence, or both. This is the very category of criminal acts that fall under the purview of
crimes against humanity legislation, the key focus of this dissertation.
Of Arendt's completed works, the “Postscriptum” to Thinking, the first volume of The Life
of the Mind, and her Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy are widely considered to be her
definitive remarks on judgment. These texts are privileged for two reasons. First, they were
written after Arendt's controversial text, Eichmann in Jerusalem. It was Arendt's recognition of
the role that Eichmann's inability to think played in his war crimes which motivated her to
analyze more fully not only the “human activity” of thinking, but those of willing and judging as
well. In addition, in both The Life of the Mind and the Kant Lectures, Arendt treats judgment as a
distinct human activity with a unique potential. In these later works, though Arendt does indeed
reformulate her notion of judgment, she does not depoliticize it. On the contrary, the effects of
what Arendt refers to as “dark times” are long-term and pervasive and, moreover, the function of
making judgments within such an expanded context remains as politically germane as it was in
the immediate aftermath of WWII.
The basic project of Arendt's Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy could be identified
as an attempt to ground the idea of human dignity within the context of the publicly displayed
“words and deeds” that constitute the realm of human affairs and, of course, politics. Her attempt
to redefine human dignity also involves a strong philosophical response to Plato's impugning of
dignity from the polis. The Kant Lectures bring this distinct philosophical take on the political
nature of genuine human conduct to its completion: the enactment of public deeds presupposes a
company of engaged spectators who draw meaning by judging what is enacted in the public
sphere. In other words, Arendt appropriates and reconceptualizes Kant’s work in such a way that
judgment, while a distinct faculty, nonetheless retains an utmost political character. To put
Arendt’s conclusion in a specific international criminal law and crimes against humanity context,
it is not possible to kill, plunder, violate, rape and decimate entire populations using state power
or official condonement unless there was wide-spread complicity for such egregious acts on the
of Judgment” (2010) 26 Philosophy and Social Criticism 1; and Roger Berkowitz, ed. Thinking in Dark Times:
Hannah Arendt on Ethics and Politics (Fordham University Press, 2010).
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ground.

II. TOWARDS AN ENGAGED THEORY OF JUDGMENT AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY
The notion of collective responsibility indeed proves legally and morally unsustainable if
it is taken to be an unqualified application of the Kantian model of individual moral
responsibility to society at large.429 However, it emerges as a more coherent phenomenon if we
choose to formulate it in terms of moral choices leading to willing acts that are above and beyond
the singular capacity of autonomous individual agents.430 Our desire for accountability in the case
of actions of groups and institutions that cause harm and injustice in the society at large could be
satiated, at least partially, if we allow the lens of collective responsibility to refocus our attention
from intentionality of harm to processes concerning its production or possible curtailment.431
In the field of legal theory pertaining to criminal justice, the biggest controversy
429

For a strong philosophical critique of the direct application of the Kantian model with reference to legal
obligations, see David Copp, “What Collectives are: Agency, Individualism and Legal Theory” (1984) 23 Dialogue
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concerning collective responsibility involves the method of its attribution. Without grounds for
ascertaining collective responsibility, received wisdom has it that there is no possibility for
judgment. Legally speaking, collective responsibility is defined mainly in terms of duties to
respond to the victims of collective crimes. Therefore, it invokes a reverse reading that is heavily
situation-bound. Accordingly, reasonable fear on the part of victimized groups and communities
creates duties to respond that concern both members of the perpetrating group and the society at
large. This circumscribed account of collective responsibility may offer us a justification for
making judgments about collective responsibility that are compatible with the separateness and
autonomy of persons. However, it still leaves a number of critical questions unattended. For
instance, could we defend the claim that collective responsibility can be assigned based on group
membership?. For the purpose of examining the nature of legal judgment under the strenuous
circumstances of egregious crimes, collective responsibility is indeed best understood in terms of
societal duties to respond to the victims of collective crimes rather than attribution of collective
guilt and culpability. 432 If applied to individual accountability-based adjudication of state
criminality, this presupposition would translate into the need to determine whether a person in a
position of high office and responsibility used all available means to subvert and constrain
damages that were implicated by egregious acts committed using public resources, in addition to
the determination of whether the individual in question partook in these acts.
The responsibilities moral agents have in relation to global structural social processes
with unjust consequences constitute another good case in point for further debate on the
inadequacies endemic to existing criminal liability schemes when applied to mass crimes. How
ought moral agents, whether individual or institutional, conceptualize their responsibilities in
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Plausibly, only moral agents can bear action-demanding duties and thus only moral agents could be subjected to
criminal attribution. This standard places serious constraints on the determination of which collectives can bear
action-demanding duties or be rendered accountable for societal harm. It is erroneous to assume that individual
agents can bear duties and full scale of legal obligations regarding actions that only a collective could perform. This
leaves us at a loss when assigning duties in circumstances where only a collective could perform some morally
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collective sense of responsibility, which then incurs a duty over collective and cumulative action. However, this
problem cannot be so easily overcome with the adjudication of mass crimes and attribution of guilt. See Marion
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relation to global injustice, for instance, if they do so at all? In this case, a model of collective
responsibility deriving from global social connections and interdependencies may serve as the
foundation for defining obligations of justice that arise from structural social processes. As
detailed in the work of Iris Marion Young, for instance, such a social connection model of
responsibility dictates that all agents who contribute by their actions to the structural processes
that produce injustice have responsibilities to work to remedy these injustices.433 This is quite
different from the standard model of criminal responsibility that puts emphasis on liability. This
alternative model does not isolate perpetrators. Instead, it judges background conditions of action
as well as consequences. It is forward-looking and relies upon shared responsibility. Furthermore,
it can be discharged only through collective action and as such, would not fit into the criminal
justice model per se but would necessitate the inclusion of alternative modes of justice. As such,
Marion Young’s social connection model and Arendt’s notion of community sense have more in
common than at first meets the eye, and this is a hopeful overlap for any future discussion on
collective responsibility in international criminal law under circumstances dictated by mass
atrocities and state criminality.

A. The Threshold Question
In terms of commission of mass crimes such as those defined by crimes against humanity,
which is the subject matter of this work, could we possibly redefine the legal threshold to
determine whether a collective shares the intention to harm a select group, which is the
distinctive feature of collective as opposed to individual responsibility? There are at least three
criteria of adequacy for an account of shared criminal intention, namely disjunction, concurrence,
and obligation.434 Accordingly, people share an intention when and only when they are jointly
committed to intend as a body to commit an act in the future. In other words, there is the element
433
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of premeditation as well as active participation in the commission of a violent act or acts. The
problem is that, in the case of societal and political crimes, many instances of wrongdoing and
violence appear to be of a distinctly spontaneous kind, without clear signs of premeditation. It is
true that when one group commits genocide against another, the genocide is collective in the
sense that the wrongfulness of genocide is morally distinct from the aggregation of individual
murders that make up the genocidal killings in their entirety. Even then, however, it may not be
possible to prove, or indeed to find a clear framework for, determining shared intentions for
genocide for each of the perpetrators of these criminal acts. The problem, which I would rephrase
as the problem of collective wrongdoing, is how to assign blame to individual contributors for
distinctly collective acts of violence, when none of those individual contributors is singularly
guilty of the Wrongdoing (with a capital W) in question.
In such instances, suffice it to say that intention is not merely a private mental act known
only by those who express their intentions in public. Rather, intention is a communal act.
Meanwhile, it is only observable circumstances and consequences that determine the justiciability
of intention in criminal law. Here, Christopher Kutz’s Complicity Principle provides a good
starting point for tackling the problem of intentionality in societal and political mass crimes.435
435
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Kutz’s work examines the relationship between collective responsibility and individual guilt. He
presents a rigorous philosophical account of the nature of our relations to social groups in which
we participate, and then links this debate to contemporary moral theory. For him, there are two
prevailing theories of moral philosophy, Kantianism and consequentialism, both of which have
difficulties dealing with the issue of complicity in a legal context. For Kutz, similar to Arendt, a
richer and more grounded theory of accountability demands that our understanding of collective
action not only allow but call for redefining individual responsibility in collective settings via
complicity.
No doubt Kutz’ principle ought to be expanded to link it with the legal phenomenon of
attribution of collective responsibility. In this context, the view I purport is that individuals are
blameworthy for collective harms insofar as they knowingly participate in those harms, and that
said individuals remain blameworthy regardless of whether they succeed in making a causal
contribution to those harms.436 In this sense, my argument for collective responsibility is based on
contra-factual reasoning. For instance, if a collective takes no active responsibility for the
conservation of life and livelihood of all of its members but especially ignores those with
vulnerabilities, then it is right to presume that there emerges collective responsibility for the harm
that ensues from lack of provision for any necessary protections.437 This is one way to avoid the

That fact on its own gives us a hint about the fluidity of the concepts of liability, culpability, and accountability, even
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problem of intentionality that clouded Arendt’s path, in terms of identifying wrongdoing that is
not seen or known as wrongdoing by either the person who commits it or by those who condone
it.
At this point, the writings of David Miller on national responsibility, read alongside Karl
Jasper’s work on societal responsibility, are of great relevance. In his work on national
responsibility and global justice, Miller conceptualizes and justifies a particular model of national
responsibility—a model that may be helpful in devising a wholesome approach to collective
responsibility in terms of justice.438 His conceptualization proceeds in two steps. He starts by
developing two models of collective responsibility, the like-minded group model and the
cooperative practice model. He then proceeds to discuss national responsibility as a species of
collective responsibility, and argues that nations have features such that both models of collective
responsibility apply to them. I would argue that Miller’s like-minded model does not provide a
plausible conceptualization of collective responsibility in the politico-legal realm at all, as it tends
to rely upon a bucolic, romanticized notion of a nation as an ethically cohesive unit.439 The
collective practice model, on the other hand, could provide a strong argument for formulating
state criminality-related collective responsibility, as is widely present in the context of crimes
against humanity. The standard example used in this context is, of course, the conceptualization
of crimes pertaining to societal and political violence under the Third Reich.440
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In this regard, Miller attempts to attribute to nations the kind of responsibility that is
generally vested in states as legal actors. Unfortunately, models of statist legal responsibility
disregard society’s inner dynamics. In addition, they sanction the differences between intrastate
and interstate forms of law as irremovable. Miller aims to build up the moral and historical
prestige of the nation‐state to make it a viable agent embracing a claim of universal morality.
Miller’s nations thus become political organizations capable of instantiating great moral truths.
This results in an account that is compassionately cosmopolitan, and yet with very little interest
in or engagement with local forms of delivery of justice that relate to mass violence either within
state perimeters or globally.441
Overall, however, Miller’s work raises a number of interesting questions concerning both
weak and strong variants of collective responsibility and state-centric law.442 For instance, he
defends a theory of connections to address remedial responsibilities amongst states. His
interventions on the subject of cosmopolitanism in particular endorse a position where states that
are causally and morally responsible for deprivation and suffering in other states may be held
remedially responsible for their actions. This is despite the fact that there is no international
mechanism to ensure that remedially responsible states would offer assistance to or
accountability for the suffering of affected states and societies, other than instances of victor’s
justice and imposed war reparations. As such, this job squarely falls into the hands of
international public law for purposes of enforcement. In this regard, Miller’s claims of universal
morality as applied to international or transnational law are severely idealistic. In contradiction, I
would argue that we must initiate a kind of deflation of both the nation and the state as
foundational moral agents in international law. Just as the diminution of responsibility for mass
implementation of the regime's racial policies culminated in the mass murder of Jews and other minorities in the
Holocaust. For a detailed account of law during the Third Reich, see the historical pieces written and published
during the Second World War: K. Loewenstein, “Law in the Third Reich” (1936) 45 The Yale Law Journal 716; V.
L. Gott, “The National Socialist theory of international law” (1938) 32 The American Journal of International Law
704; as well as the more recent debates such as D. F. Vagts, “International law in the Third Reich” (1990) 84 The
American Journal of International Law 661; Martin Lippman, “They Shoot Lawyers Don't They: Law in the Third
Reich and the Global Threat to the Independence of the Judiciary” (1992) 23 Cal. W. Int'l LJ 257; and David
Dyzenhaus, "Legal theory in the collapse of Weimar: contemporary lessons?" (1997) 91 American Political Science
Review 121.
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crimes from the collective entirely to the individual is faulty, the aggrandizement of individual
moral agency and accountability to the grandiose entity of the state or the construct of the nation
as the ultimate truth bearer is equally hyperbolical.

B. The Outcomes Perspective
At this point, as an alternative to cosmopolitan and liberal accounts such as Miller’s work,
I will examine collective responsibility from an outcomes perspective. A central feature of my
analysis is to give precision to the idea that moral responsibility for criminal acts implies a
reasonable demand and possibility that an agent should have acted otherwise. Allocation of moral
responsibility to individuals concerning complex collective actions that result in mass harm is an
issue that goes well beyond “the problem of many hands” as exemplified by the classic Frankfurt
counter-examples.443 Philosophers usually discuss responsibility in terms of responsibility for
past actions or as a question about the nature of moral agency. Yet the word responsibility also
ushers in deep concerns about human agency, more than the answers it possibly elicits in legal
terms. This particular take on responsibility also relates it to civic virtues that can be
demonstrated both by individuals and organizations or institutions. Such a virtue-based account
of responsibility occupies a distinctive place in the context of discussions of the moral and
political needs of societies, especially those that have survived mass political violence and
trauma.
This is an opportune moment to bring in Karl Jaspers’ work. When Hitler came to power
in 1933, Jaspers was taken by some degree of surprise, as he had thought that this movement
would destroy itself from within, leading to the reorganization and liberation of other political
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forces active at the time.444 His expectations did not materialize, and because his wife was
Jewish, Jaspers qualified as an enemy of the German state. Consequently, from 1933 onwards, he
was excluded from the higher councils of the university. In 1935 the first part of his work on
logic, entitled Vernunft und Existenz (Reason and Existence, 1955), appeared. This was followed
by a book on Nietzsche in 1936, an essay on Descartes in 1937, and in 1938 his
Existenzphilosophie.445 Meanwhile, a series of decrees were promulgated against him, including
removal from his professorship and a total ban on any further publication. These measures
effectively barred him from living and working in Germany. Permission was finally granted to
him in 1942 to go to Switzerland, but a condition was imposed by the Nazis that required his wife
to remain behind in Germany. Jaspers chose to stay with his wife and remain in Germany. Both
of them had decided, in case of an arrest, to commit suicide. In 1945 he was told that his
deportation was scheduled to take place on April 14. On March 30, Heidelberg was occupied by
the American forces and Jaspers and his wife avoided deportation.
Marked by the events of the pre-war years, Jasper’s detailed philosophical examination of
the contemporary state and nature of humankind, titled Man in the Modern Age. This is a seminal
work that touches upon precisely the issue of our responsibility for our own and others’ future.446
Elucidating his theories on a variety of topics pertaining to contemporary and future human
existence, the volume meditates upon the tension between mass-order and individual human life,
our present conception of human life, and the potential for a better future. Jaspers wrote this work
before the advent of the Second World War, but at a time when Nazi ideology and institutional
practices were beginning to run rampant in Germany. This particular volume constitutes the
departure point for the next section of the present debate on collective responsibility.
Jaspers’ contribution to the literature on collective responsibility took an even more
pointed form with the publication of Die Schuldfrage [The Guilt Question], which addressed the
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question of the collective responsibility of the German people for the criminal actions of their
government.447 In that short treatise, Jaspers listed four types of guilt. The first category, criminal
guilt, derives from violating unequivocal laws and is capable of being determined based on
objective proof. Its jurisdiction rests with the courts. The second category, political guilt,
involves the deeds of statesmen and implicates the citizens of a state as having to bear the
consequences of the deeds of the state whose power governs them and under whose order they
live. Jurisdiction of this type of guilt rests with the power and will of the victor if the state was
defeated militarily, or, again with the courts if this was a civil war situation. The charge would be
failure to exercise political prudence to mitigate arbitrary use of power. Then there is the category
of the moral guilt. It pertains to the actions of those who cannot act otherwise than as an
individual. They are nonetheless deemed morally responsible for all their deeds, including the
execution of political and military orders. Its jurisdiction, however, purely rests with one’s
conscience, and is retained within the community. This text was written prior to the Nuremberg
and Eichmann Trials. In this regard, Jaspers’ last category, that of metaphysical guilt, is the most
troubling one, and it also became a point of contention in his lengthy exchanges with Arendt
during the post-War years. Accordingly, Jaspers assumes that there exists a solidarity among men
as humans that makes each co-responsible for crimes committed in his presence or with his
knowledge.
No doubt, the underlying assumptions of Jasper’s work on guilt can easily lead to the
sanctimonious political moralism that has often been used to justify acts of vengeance and
collective punishment. It may also lead to a conception of war as a crusade that requires
unconditional surrender by the enemy.448 Still, there is still room for further deliberation. For
instance, for Jaspers metaphysical guilt results from confining our solidarity to the closest human
ties—family, friends, neighborus, ethno-religious brethren, etc.—rather than extending it to all of
humanity. It makes us suffer from lack of proportion in terms of judging our world and human
447

See the English translation as Karl Jaspers, The question of German guilt (Fordham University Press, 2009). This
work was translated by E. B. Ashton and it was published in a series edited by John Caputo. The original version
came out in German back in 1946 and the first English edition was published in 1947. See Karl Jaspers, Die
Schuldfrage, Heidelberg: Schneider ([translated as, The Question of German Guilt, trans. E. B. Ashton] The Dial
Press, 1947).
448
See Hannah Arendt et al, Hannah Arendt/Karl Jaspers Correspondence, 1926-1969. (Harcourt Brace Jonakovich,
1992).

217

value. And most importantly, Jaspers acknowledges that jurisdiction over metaphysical guilt for
mass political violence lies with no court. As such, this easily abused concept reminds us of the
myriad ways in which our lives are entangled with, and may profit from, the suffering of others.

III. COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY AND LEGAL JUDGMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE
JASPERS ALTERNATIVE?
Ascertaining litigation for crimes reaching the dimensions of what Jaspers had in mind
remains an ongoing quest, starting with the precedents set by post-WWII trials. Indeed, the trial
of major Nazi war criminals in Nuremberg (1949) is considered a landmark event in the
development of international criminal law, and continues to be highly influential in our
understanding of international criminal law in post-conflict settings.449 The plethora of essays and
manuscripts written on the Trial, discussing key legal, political, and philosophical questions
raised both at the time and in historical perspective, are indicative of the crowned position it
occupies in legal history. Those involved in the tribunal, the establishment of the tribunal, the
trial process itself, and the debate that followed its judgment have all been subject to rigorous
debate. Ranging from the contribution of Nuremberg, to the substantive developments in
international criminal law, to the philosophical evaluation of legalism in post-conflict systems of
justice, the persistent significance of Nuremberg is indeed worthy of attention.450 Examinations
of the Nuremberg legacy in contemporary international criminal justice are already widely
available.
However, the reason why I include a discussion of the Nuremberg Trials in this debate on
collective responsibility for mass crimes is somewhat different than what is covered in the
canonized literature on international criminal law. The Nuremberg Judgment is often counted as
449
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the benchmark in international law for the definition and adjudication of individual accountability
for human rights abuses at a mass scale. In this sense, it did constitute a tipping point in the
context of legal doctrines concerning the nature of legal responsibility. Still, as I will argue in the
following paragraphs, this achievement did not alleviate Jaspers’ concern that, for such crimes,
judgment cannot emanate from the courtroom alone.
During the Trial, the concept of Nullum Crimen Sine Lege was put to the test of war
crimes and, despite a degree of inexactitude, both crimes against humanity and genocide have
been retroactively codified as a result.451 These developments in adjudication of international
crimes were then followed by the codification of slavery, forced labor, torture, forced
disappearances, racial discrimination, and apartheid as indictable crimes. In this sense, the Trial
also redefined the notion of culpability in international law. It introduced significant changes to
our understanding of individual criminal responsibility, and despite statutes of limitations and the
reasonable time period clauses, it opened the path for reinstituting the threshold of legal
requirements for individual accountability for mass crimes. Aside from its importance for the
codification of societal and mass crimes in international law, however, the Nuremberg Trial also
forced us to address the problem of whether and on what basis a successor government must
prosecute the human rights abuses of a prior regime. Contending that the rule of law and natural
justice principles require that the very worst crimes be prosecuted no matter what the rank and
status of the accused person(s), Nuremberg judges proposed that principles of international law,
both in its customary and conventional forms, impose a duty to investigate and prosecute in such
extreme cases.452 This take on legality and judgment has been accepted as a foundational premise
for contemporary international criminal courts.453 However, in terms of the defenses available for
the accused in international criminal law pertaining to war crimes and crimes against humanity,
for instance, the generic standardization of prosecutions in national courts as well as in
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international tribunals is causing an increasing number of problems, with significant sociopolitical repercussions. The most important substantive defenses at the international level include
superior orders, command responsibility, tu quoque as a subcategory of argumentum ad
hominem,454 military necessity, proportionality, and reprisals. Jurisdictional defenses applicable
in national tribunals, on the other hand, include personal jurisdiction, subject-matter jurisdiction,
and double jeopardy. Then there are defenses concerning the issue of the location of the tribunal
or the trial, the status of the presiding judge or judges, and the legitimacy of the court producing
the judgment.455
In this context, if we look at the victor’s justice argument posed about Nuremberg and
Tokto trials from the point of view of the victims, it is possible to posit that although forgiveness
is often taken to bear a close connection to societal reconciliation, there is a good deal of
scepticism about its role in situations where there is no consensus on the moral complexion of the
past and no clear admission of guilt on the part of the perpetrator. In other words, the convictionoriented framework of these post-WWII Military Tribunals are indeed troubling for societal and
political crimes. Forgiveness without perpetrator acknowledgement aggravates the risk of
recidivism, yields a substandard and morally compromised form of political accommodation, and
leads to the silencing and patronizing of the victims, therefore potentially causing further social
and political alienation and victimization. Guilt becomes inscribed in the collective memory of
nations as a dividing line, but neither forgiveness nor true understanding emanates from the
litigation of such crimes alone. Hence the need to underline the importance of legal humility
concerning mass violence as the impetus for the penning of this last chapter.
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IV. MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AS AN EPICURIAN CURE FOR THE CONUNDRUMS OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW?
From Epicurus onwards, the notion of moral responsibility based on a moral agent’s
causal ownership of his/her actions, as opposed to the agent’s ability to act or choose otherwise,
has troubled legal thinking. This is indeed the crux on which aforementioned Frankfurt examples
were built.456 It also relates to the puzzles surrounding Arendt’s view on the banality of evil and
the possibility/impossibility of the punishment of the unforgiveable. Epicurus considered it a
necessary condition for praising or blaming an agent for an action, that it has been the agent and
not anything else that brought the action about. 457 Thus, the central question of moral
responsibility was whether the agent was a cause of the action, or whether the agent was forced to
act by some other force. Accordingly, actions are to be attributed to agents if it is in their actions
that agents, qua moral beings, manifest themselves. Here, the question of moral engagement
becomes the most important component of [criminal] acts, which significantly differs from the
outcomes perspective discussed above.458 In his narration of how humans become moral beings,
Epicurus envisaged a complex theory of moral responsibility and moral development, which
could indeed find application in the area of collective responsibility and mass crimes. Epicurean
ethics does not have the function of developing or justifying a moral system that allows for the
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effective allocation of praise and blame.459 Instead, it looks at the choices people make regardless
of the system they are surrounded by. On the issue of free will and moral responsibility, Harry
Frankfurt's argument that moral responsibility does not require the freedom to do otherwise,
linked with the debate over whether moral responsibility is an essentially historical concept,
indeed echoes the Epicurean call for deciphering individual agency in collective acts. Thus, the
central question of moral responsibility in the context of mass crimes and societal violence
becomes whether the agent was the cause of the action, or whether the agent was forced to act.
Some instances of wrongdoing are of a distinctly collective kind. When, for example, one
group commits genocide against another, this is a collective act of crime in the sense that the
wrongness of genocide is morally distinct from the aggregation of individual murders that make
up the genocide. The problem, which I will refer to as the problem of collective wrongs, is that in
traditional criminal law, how to assign blame for distinctly collective wrongdoing to individual
contributors, when at least some of those individual contributors are not directly guilty of the
wrongdoing in question, is a question habitually left unclear. I have already offered Christopher
Kutz’s Complicity Principle as a starting point for solving this particular problem, although the
principle ought to be expanded to include a broader and more appropriate range of cases than
Kutz initially intended. The view I ultimately defend is that individuals are blameworthy for
collective harms insofar as they knowingly participate in or collaborate in the committal of those
harms, and that said individuals remain blameworthy regardless of whether they succeed in
making a causal contribution to those harms.460 This is a distinctly Epicurean take on societal
crimes and opposes the traditional outcomes oriented litigation methods. Suffice to say, however,
I am not making this suggestion for it to be incorporated into the relevant bodies of international
criminal law. Rather, the issue here is how to address mass crimes in a contextualized manner
and with reference to forms of justice other than restitution.
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Regarding this issue of [criminal] intent, another prominent political philosopher of the
post-WWII era, Michael Bratman, made critical contributions to our understanding of the notion
of intention and how it relates to criminal action in particular. In Bratman's view, when we settle
on a plan for action we are committing ourselves to future conduct. The commitment involved in
intending, and its implications for our understanding of shared intention and shared cooperative
activity, lead to a richer discussion on moral responsibility.461 In the context of philosophy of
action and moral philosophy, issues about the nature of agency, intention and practical reason,
free will and moral responsibility, and shared agency are indeed much more easily brought to the
fore compared to the difficulties we may face with regard to discussing these in the context of
philosophy of law. In this sense, Bratman’s work Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason (1987)
permanently altered the landscape of both the philosophy of action and the theory of practical
rationality by drawing our attention to the complex, constitutive roles that intention plays in
human agency.462 In particular, his essays on shared agency are of utmost significance for the
debate on collective responsibility.463
If we accept Bratman’s description, the notion of collective responsibility would refer to
both the responsibility of moral agents for causing harm in the world and the blameworthiness we
ascribe to them for having caused such harm. Hence, it would assume both a moral and a causal
component. Criminal law does associate causal responsibility and blameworthiness with groups
in rare cases such as genocide and crimes against humanity, but for litigation purposes the line in
the sand is always drawn at individual culpability. Specifically, criminal jurisprudence locates the
source of moral responsibility in collective actions only if collectives were directly involved in
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these acts of harm.464 Here, I beg to differ from this commonplace reference to the notion of
collective responsibility as derivative of an assumed group morality. I am also standing against
the assumption that collective responsibility violates principles of individual responsibility and
fairness concerning criminal attribution. On the contrary, collective responsibility—as well as
group intentions, collective action, and group blameworthiness—is a coherent construct, and can
be ascribed to moral agents fairly in cases of societal and political crimes. This attribution,
however, does not have to be punitive in nature.
My reservations about associating collective responsibility with group morality could
perhaps be explicated further in the context of the structure of the argument that was augmented
by traditions of religious thought, such as those found in the Old Testament (Tanakh) referring to
the accounts of the Flood, the Tower of Babel, or Sodom and Gomorrah, as well as the New
Testament blaming of Jews as an entire race for the killing of Jesus Christ. In these narratives,
entire communities were punished for their supposed deeds, and to set an example for the rest of
humanity. In Biblical narratives pertaining to the death of Jesus, for instance, the blame was cast
not only on the Jews of the time but upon all future generations to come. The core of these
religious arguments relates to a desire for communal forms of punishment for collective harms.
No doubt, secular forms of this logic are equally widespread and troubling. Post-9/11 trends of
anti-Islamism and resultant public policy measures are an all too familiar case in point. Collective
responsibility translated into a rationale for collective punishment is also regularly used as a
disciplinary measure in military units, prisons, and psychiatric facilities used for political crimes,
such as those operated in Russia or in the post-Guantanamo Bay United States.465 Without fail,
these measures breed distrust and desire for vengeance among the members of the punished
group and their communities at large. These punishment schemes are also commonly practiced in
situations of war, based on the presupposition of collective guilt. Collective guilt, or guilt by
association, is a dangerous claim that assumes groups of humans can bear guilt and should be
subject to punishment above and beyond the guilt of individual members. Luckily, contemporary
criminal law operates on the principle that guilt shall only be attributed to a legal person and not
464
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to a group or community. Keeping these intricacies and problem-laden historical examples of
attribution of collective guilt in mind, one must not equate collective responsibility either with
collective punishment or the collective assignment of presumed moral failure to groups,
communities or societies. However, this precaution should not restrain us from seeking a
substantive definition of collective responsibility for mass crimes either.
While the majority of debates on collective responsibility continue to deliberate on the
very possibility of it, a select group of scholars have ushered in two further concerns. The first
has to do with whether groups can meet stringent conditions of moral responsibility that
individuals do. Intentionality, as I touched upon briefly in the above paragraphs, becomes key in
this context. The second concern has to do with the advantages and disadvantages of holding
particular kinds of groups, such as communities or particular ethno-religious groups, or even
states, morally responsible in response to harm caused by their direct or indirect actions.466 One
key example to consider in this area is that of lustration. Often, after a regime-changing war, a
state engages in lustration in order to secure the condemnation and punishment of dangerous,
corrupt, or culpable members of the previous political system. Changes in the political structure
of post-Apartheid South Africa, post-WWII de-Nazification of Germany, or the recent deBa’athification in Iraq are commonly referred cases of lustration. This common practice poses an
important dilemma from the perspective of how to define and put into practice collective
responsibility, because even well planned, legally sound, and nuanced lustration involves
condemning groups of people.467 It also raises important questions about collective agency and
the rectification of historical injustices. While group treatment might be justified on grounds of
convenience and political peace in times of transitional justice, there are also valid arguments
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consistent with due process requirements for wholesale group punishment.468
Concomitantly, I would like posit a theory of combined criminal and political
accountability based on an understanding of collective action and collective responsibility that
not only allows for but demands individual responsibility. 469 In other words, instead of
generalizing the sum total of individuals as a collective, the causation I propose implicates a
movement from the collective back to the individual. No doubt, there isn’t a single, simple, and
all-encompassing solution to the problem of the relationship between individual and collective
responsibility for wrongdoing and harm. The one component that most obscures the fundamental
requirement for ascribing responsibility is that of moral agency. Closer attention to matters of
individual and collective agency may provide a defensible criterion for establishing when an
individual is and isn't responsible for the untoward consequences of a collective act.470 For
instance, not only individuals but organizations and institutions can act and exercise power, and
thus could be deemed as accountable for harm. This is possible because they possess decisionmaking structures that are formal. As such, they could be deemed as “legal persons.” The actions
of such legal actors are not reducible to the actions of their individual members. Since these legal
actors/agents could have acted differently or could have been re-organized to change the course
of their harmful acts, they could also be deemed as morally responsible for the untoward effects
of the power they exercise upon the larger population. Thus, at least in principle, they are
blameworthy and could be subject to legal judgments. The ability to exercise power purposely,
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knowingly as opposed to recklessly or negligently, reveals a particular disposition to abusing
power, since it is concentrated and institutionalized. Furthermore, I would argue that such legal
actors’ disposition is not reducible to the dispositions or degrees of blame of the individual
members who participated in the internal decision-making processes, or even those who led these
organizations and institutions, which is the dictum used for litigation against crimes against
humanity, for instance. Instead, there is a need for a larger discussion on the interdependent
relationship between the individual and the collective in upholding a system of abuse, harm, and
danger. Here, the Epicurean cure for the conundrums of the debate on moral responsibility comes
to our rescue as the foreground allowing us to think about intentionality and causal involvement
in collective acts, and as a call to assume responsibility for our own decisions to act or not to act.

V. COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF BLAMEWORTHINESS
Whether collective responsibility makes sense as a non-distributive phenomenon, that is
to say whether it transcends the contributions of particular group members, is a debate that
remains pivotal for legal theory. In this context, two claims are crucial. The first is that groups,
unlike individuals, cannot be accountable for intentions, and hence cannot act or cause harm qua
groups. The second is that groups, as distinct from their individual members, cannot be
understood as morally blameworthy according to the criteria required by moral responsibility
argument. Accordingly, we cannot isolate genuinely collective actions, as distinct from the
identical actions of many persons; and groups, unlike the individuals who belong to them, cannot
formulate intentions of the kind thought to be necessary to actions. Here, the main worry is about
the fairness of ascribing collective responsibility to individuals who do not themselves directly
cause harm, or who do not bring about harm purposefully.471
If group intention is a necessary condition of attributing collective responsibility, the
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question then becomes how it can be ascertained.472 In this context, collective behaviours are
separated from collective actions, the latter arguably caused by the beliefs, desires and wants of
the collective itself. As such, moral blameworthiness is grounded in the bad intentions of moral
agents who cause harm, in defining both individual and collective responsibility. If so, how can
groups, as distinct from their individual members, have bad intentions and demonstrate the ability
to act on them? Could entire communities be deemed as appropriate bearers of moral
blameworthiness, guilt, or shame? Critics of the collective responsibility argument concentrate on
showing either that actions are associated exclusively with individuals, not groups or
communities, or that groups cannot make choices or hold beliefs in the sense required by the
formulation of intentions as defined by criminal law.473 Meanwhile, these same critics pay much
less attention to the nature of collective actions. It may be true that collectivities may not have
moral faults, since they don't make moral choices in the way that is commonly understood. And
yet, does that mean by default that they cannot properly be ascribed moral responsibility for
harmful actions that are only possible if and when individuals act collectively?
At the other end of the spectrum, defenders of the collective responsibility argument feel
compelled to justify both the moral possibility of collective responsibility and the coherence of
collective responsibility as a moral, and hence possibly legal, construct. To start with, precepts of
methodological individualism are brought under attack.474 Accordingly, the collective blame that
we ascribe in mass crimes cannot be realized in terms of individual blameworthiness.
Furthermore, as exemplified by Larry May’s work, there is a class of predicates that can only be
true of collectives. May uses the relational theory of Jean-Paul Sartre to argue that groups can
legitimately be ascribed actions in cases where individuals act together in a manner that would
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not be possible if they acted alone.475 On the issue of group intentions, however, the legal
problem of ascertaining intentionality is not easy to tackle, and it remains a threshold issue for
criminal law-related determinations. If intentions play a fundamental role in an agent's practical
deliberation and volition, the prospect of a shared intention introduces the specter of shared
mental states. This is not included in the standards of proof for criminal law litigation and for
very valid reasons, as it would lead to collective punishment.
If so, if the possibility of collective responsibility supposedly requires a collective mind,
we might as well give up on the notion of collective responsibility altogether. Groups can
legitimately be said to have shared beliefs and convictions, yet this is quite distinct from the
proposition of a collective mind-set. These convictions are otherwise known as institutional
culture, ideology, political movements, and so on. Hence, looking for a collective mind-set to
ascertain collective responsibility for societal harm and wrongdoings is not the business of
criminal justice litigation.476 And yet, it is a very important component of how to rebuild a sense
of trust and societal peace in the aftermath of mass crimes. In the area of political philosophy, in
Raimo Tuomela and Kaarlo Miller’s work these factors are named as “we intentions,” and they
provide the springboard for joint commitments and actions.477 According to Tuomela, actions by
collectives build upon the actions of the operative members of the collective in such a way that
the properties of collectives, such as their intentions, beliefs, and desires, are both embodied and
determined by the perspectives of individual members or representatives of the collective in
question. This is an unusual intervention, with very important implications for the production of
legal judgments concerning collective wrongs. Larry May similarly offers one of the most
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interesting arguments of this sort in his defense of collective moral agency. Although he rejects
accounts of group intentions that are tied to Kantian notions of moral agency, he reformulates
group intentions with reference to a theory of interdependence and sociality.
Historically, for those who work on collective responsibility as a necessary notion for
applied philosophy, ethics, and legal theory, the focus has been on nations, corporations, and
other groups that have an institutional backbone and well-ordered decision-making procedures in
place. Organizational and institutional mechanisms through which courses of concerted action
have been decided upon and justified as rule-bound are deemed particularly important. Similarly,
enforced standards of conduct for individuals that are stringent and disciplinarian constitute an
important aspect of such forms of action. In turn, purposeful, planned and institutionally
controlled actions could render groups and communities collectively responsible for harm caused
by their joint acts, though most likely not in a criminal sense. In the case of social and political
movements, as discussed in detail by Joel Feinberg in his body of work on collective
responsibility, there is the added element of ideological directives and the resultant group
solidarity leading individuals to pursue projects together as a collective agent.478 All of these are
aspects of a very germane debate on collective responsibility that has been thus far overlooked by
theories of international criminal law pertaining to mass crimes, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity. This is a deep chasm that must be addressed without further ado, and this chapter has
endeavored to provide a critical review of some of the key connections already built in this
regard.
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CONCLUSION: THE DILEMMA OF THE SUM TOTAL VERSUS ITS CONSTITUTIVE PARTS
Since collective responsibility refers to the addressing of widespread harm and
wrongdoing associated with the actions of collectivities, groups, societies and institutional
bodies, the key components of its adjudication are directly related to constitutive aspects of
social, cultural and political life. While there is a broad, often tacit, agreement regarding the basic
model of moral and criminal responsibility when it is applied to individuals, there is considerable
doubt, as we have seen, about how this notion might be applied to collectivities and their
members at large. First and foremost, even the thought of adjudicating collective responsibility
leads to disagreement about the very conception of collective responsibility.479 One version
maintains that only individual human agents can be held morally and criminally responsible for
harmful acts, while another conception insists that groups, collectivities, and institutions can be
held morally and criminally responsible as collectivities, independently of their members’
individual actions. The former conception has, as its departure point, the conviction that
collectivities and institutions are capable of actions that cannot be reduced to the actions and
interests of their individual members. 480 Yet this belief or conviction alone does not render
adjudication of collective responsibility a straightforward process. It does, however, indicate that
the courtroom alone is not the solution for mass crimes. Furthermore, adjudicating egregious acts
such as crimes against humanity does indeed require societal action and willful participation,
particularly if these litigation-oriented strageties of transitional justice are to be pursued at the
local and domestic level.
In this context, Joel Feinberg's now largely forgotten taxonomy of collective
responsibility arrangements constitutes a critical contribution to the exploration of issues
regarding the culpability of collectives and their members. In his classic treatise written back in
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1970, Doing and Deserving, Feinberg presents four distinct responsibility arrangements: (a)
“Whole groups can be held liable even though not all of their members are at fault”; (b) “A group
can be held collectively responsible through the fault, contributory or noncontributory, of each
member”; (c) “Group liability [could be attributed] through the contributory faults of each and
every member”; and (d) “Through the collective … fault of the group itself [the collective] bears
liability independently of its members.”481 If we are to consider each of Feinberg’s constructs in
order to reach a conclusion pertaining to the justiciability of collective acts leading to harm, the
complications involved need to be adequately addressed.482
In Feinberg’s first case, if a whole group is liable for the faulty and harmful actions of one
or several members of the group, there must be the accompanying assumption that this sort of
collectivity possesses a significant degree of solidarity. No doubt, this presumption stands against
the ideal of individual responsibility and autonomy. Punishment of all for the wrongdoing of a
few is not defensible on moral or legal grounds. For both goods and harms to be defined as
collective and shared, would promotion of a mutual sense of collective destiny suffice? Looked at
through the lens of justiciability, the answer is negative. Courts often invoke one of the
justiciability doctrines—standing, ripeness, and mootness—to bring potentially important public
litigation to a definite conclusion. According to orthodox understandings of justiciability, these
481
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doctrines disempower courts from deciding certain kinds of cases. Of the three, mootness is the
most relevant for our purposes, as it has the strongest moral moorings in terms of law’s compass
in society. Collectives are not punishable where individual autonomy is held as a supreme value
in the constitutional order. Furthermore, constitutional schemes often create a presumption in
favour of preserving a degree of legislative control over jurisdiction. In the case of collective
responsibility, courts would need to transform mootness from a constitutional doctrine into a
prudential doctrine that would enable them to decide otherwise “moot cases” whenever a decision
would help give true and concrete meaning to important public values. That is, however, an
idealistic future projection rather than the present-day reality of litigation for societal and political
crimes.
Furthermore, in a standard criminal law setting, arrangements in which the whole group is
punished for the faults or wrongdoing of a few constitute vicarious liability, and a person
punished on account of another's wrongdoing is said to have been punished vicariously.
Vicarious liability squarely conflicts with individual moral responsibility and, of course, the
principle of individual accountability for criminal acts. 483 For litigation purposes, vicarious
attribution of group or collective liability is an arrangement unsuitable for most forms of harm or
wrongdoing.484 However, the issue is not so clear when we are dealing with the actions of state
institutions, for instance. In this changed setting, Feinberg's second arrangement of collective
responsibility comes into the picture, which is based on the examination of implications for a
group of individuals sharing a common agenda, or who could possibly have engaged in a similar
harmful act. As such, the ascription of criminal or moral responsibility requires that an act
causing harm has actually occurred rather than simply been intended.485
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To conclude, as I have discussed thus far, legal-philosophical debates in the field of
collective responsibility clearly prove that an exaggerated conception of fault and responsibility
could easily lead to the ascription of blameworthiness to groups and communities without having
a solid ground for justiciability. This is clearly observable in Feinberg’s categorizations, which
constitute one of the finest examples of the legal-philosophical analysis of collective
responsibility. If so, formal organizations, such as business corporations, nation-states, armies, or
public bureaucracies appear to be the only legal actors to which we could accrue justiciable forms
of collective responsibility. That locks us back into the problem of responsibility being allocated
only to formal units and their representatives thereof, and leaves us astray when it comes to
societal accountability for mass political crimes.
Whether a true and systemic rectification of injury and harm aiming for corrective justice
is at all possible concerning mass political crimes thus remains as a very troubling question. By
whom justice must be performed is where almost all attention seems to have focused on up until
now. If the injuries in question are divided into components of harm and wrong, each
component’s rectification would have to be considered separately. Although pecuniary
compensation for such harms is practically plausible, money cannot act as a mediator between
severely damaged lives and abusers of political power. Not all harms could be compensated, nor
can it be said that when compensation is paid, the status quo ante should be restored. There is no
normative or conceptual reason for compensation to remedy societal harms. On the issue of the
wrong, on the other hand, standard methods of rectification may or may not work, depending on
the specific context of the injustice in question. For instance, to correct wrongdoing by rectifying
harm may not be at all possible in the event of mass civilian deaths and disappearances.
Deploying only punitive damages may not be of much benefit for thousands or millions of
displaced populations, either. The third, most common option embraced by international criminal
law, individual incarceration and punishment, remains by and large symbolic. There may well be
a need for an admission of causal and moral responsibility, public and institutional repudiation of
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the criminal act, substantive reforms at the state level, and, in some cases, disgorgement and
reparations to be performed as a sign of a good faith effort to share the burden of the victims’
suffering by the society at large. Although these cannot be forced onto members of the society,
the state and its institutions are obligated to take an institutional lead in this regard. However,
how much of a restoration these measures would lead to is truly dependent on how the society at
large deals with the issue of collective responsibility for mass crimes in a non-criminal sense, as
well.
In this vein, this chapter has offered a refutation of the litigation-heavy focus of
international criminal law as it has been applied to mass societal and political crimes. Instead, it
embraced the view that if so used, criminal law essentially becomes a stunted system of
corrective and restitutional rather than restorative justice. The concept of corrective justice is
neither capable of offering solutions to society-wide problems nor is it poised to deliver
restorative justice for historical wrongdoings. Rather, what is required in instances such as crimes
against humanity is an essentially protective function and a future-oriented vision. The aim is the
protection of legal subjects and valuable social interests from such harms in future. Here, I have
also tried to address the question of whether a statute of limitations on a historical injustice is
morally justified. In essence, rectificatory justice calls for the ascription of a right to ask for
rectification once an injustice has been perpetrated, without reference to a set time frame. To
claim a statute of limitations on historical injustices amounts to inserting a temporal limit on the
legitimacy of rights to rectification—a set amount of time following injustice after which claims
of rectification could no longer be considered valid. However, since ascribing a right to
rectification for an injustice is a requirement of fundamental justice, and since the temporal limit
called for by a statute of limitations on injustice is a constraint on that requirement, the idea of a
statute of limitations on historical injustices is morally justified only if one has substantive
reasons for accepting this constraint, such as the establishment and maintenance of societal peace.
As a footnote to this entire debate, in legal philosophy there is a peculiar argument that
has been widely applied to substantiate the validity of claims for historic justice. It is known as
the “non-identity argument.”486 Accordingly, the harm to descendants of historically wronged
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peoples could be explained away not as deriving from the historic wrongs, but from the failure to
provide rectification to the previous generation for the harm they suffered. In this chain of
injustices, each failure to provide rectification becomes the source of wrongful harm to the next.
Non-identity philosophers argue that such chains form a bridge between the historic wrong and
the harm suffered by living individuals today. In other words, past wrongs, for which original
wrongdoers are responsible, harm descendants of original victims. Still, how do we distinguish
claims of descendants of historic victims and claims made by others with unrelated interests in
the rectification of the previous generation? A supplementary solution may be offered in the form
of focusing on group harm and group membership. This approach ties individual harm to group
harm rather than limiting justice claims to individual restitution or compensation. For instance,
did slavery not harm the descendants of slaves? This is the classical example proving the
shortcomings of the individual responsibility argument applied to reject the validity of claims for
historic justice based on harms to descendants of victims of historic wrongs. According to the
individual responsibility argument, if descendants are never harmed directly and personally by
historic wrongs, they have no right to ask for rectification. This conclusion may be legally sound
but it is morally unintuitive and must be debunked.
To conclude, due to the extensive nature of harm involved in historic injustices, one must
try in earnest to overcome the hurdle posed by the individual responsibility argument wielded
against justice claims. Many of the crimes adjudicated under the aegis of crimes against humanity
do constitute or lead to historical injustices. These forms of injustice and the harms they generate
are best understood as group or collective harms. The response to group harms has to have a
collective component as well, because the remedies offered are again only meaningful in a social
and political context. Claims for justice under such circumstances have to be grounded in harms
currently suffered by living individuals as a function of the harms their group or community were
subject to as part of historic wrongs. One common form of such harm, constitutive harm,
significantly differs from the aggregative accounts of harm generally used by standard individual
Derek Parfit, Reasons and persons. (Oxford University Press, 1984); James Woodward, "The non-identity
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criminal litigation processes. Constitutive harm could not be addressed in that limited context at
all. It is the type of harm people suffer as members of historically wronged groups and
communities. Therefore, historic injustice cases require a different account of responsibility, one
that cannot be harnessed solely based on individual responsibility argumentation within the
context of criminal justice jurisprudence. With all the reservations carefully examined in this
chapter, we must make room for considerations pertaining to collective responsibility as a moral
obligation, providing a context within which legal judgment should be firmly situated, though
itself not catapulted to the status of a criminal charge.
This chapter might at first seem as an aberration in terms of both its methodology and its
subject matter vis-à-vis the core subject matter of this dissertation: universal jurisdiction and
adjudication of crimes against humanity. However, the frame within which these two issues are
debated throughout includes the parameters of “limitations” and the “Global South,” which
changes the tenor of the arguments made and encourages a layered and historically informed
understanding of how international law works in settings wherein it assumes a very problemladen identity. In this regard, I believe it is apt to look for societal and political sources that
establish or increase the legitimacy of criminal litigation against mass crimes and societal
violence from within as well as through the use of international jurisprudence concerning
egregious acts such as crimes against humanity. This latter, I believe, could significantly benefit
from an integrated discussion of collective responsibility in a non-criminal sense, as a
foundational tenet of establishing the normative grounds for the desirability of trials and courts
that attend to state criminality locally and regionally.
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In Lieu of Conclusion: Deliverance of Justice in International Criminal Law and the Role of
Political Judgment as Purposive Action

...time shall in fine out breake
When Ocean wave shall open every Realme
The wandering World at will shall open lye,
And Thyphis shall some newe founded Land Survay Some travellers shall the Countries
farre escrye, Beyond small Thule, known farthest to this day.
Seneca, Medea (from the John Studley translation of 1581)
Taken from Seneca’s tragedy Medea, these lines have become symbolic of a prediction
that a “new found land” will indeed appear, discovered across the ocean by travellers, located far
beyond the edges of the known world. This utopian impulse, or the commitment to and desire for
imagining a different, better, or even perfect society is nothing new. In fact, there is always a
dramatic increase in expressions of such a utopian impulse when times get harder. This “New
World” of Seneca’s could take many forms, as it offers the potential actualization of novel ways
of doing things, seeing things, and understanding anew. From Platonic dialogues to architectural
treatises and plans, from literary and theatrical works to historical documents and legal texts,
expressions of a yearning for what we are told we cannot have find their way by myriad means
into our existing order of things as an outcry.
Law and its ethos and pathos constitute a triplet that looks perhaps rather unlikely at first
sight as a harbinger for a utopian impulse and a desire to transcend existing delimitations of legal
regimes. They have a fundamental connection: all three have the common function of imposing
structure and discipline while striving for the creation of an ideal order. As so clearly heralded by
Plato’s late dialogues many centuries ago—namely Timaeus, Critias, and the Laws—in which he
outlined the characteristics of the ideal society and of a divine creator as the architect of the
universe, the yearning for a transformative ideal in the form of law has become a foundational
belief. Indeed, while Timaeus, Critias, and Socrates are talking about the ideal society, Socrates
wishes to see this ideal in action and find out if it works. Critias tells him that Athens once was
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this ideal society. He heard that from Solon, who heard from an old man, who heard from an
Egyptian that Athens was that ideal at the time they defeated Atlantis. Having no writing, the
Athenians forgot this and are learning it all afresh. Timaeus then suggests that the world is a
receptacle into which images of the eternal forms are stamped. Thus, physical things are copies of
the eternal forms, and these copies are continually decaying though their essence remains. Then
comes the place for Law. These late dialogues suggest that Athenians who defeated Atlantis have
degenerated to the extent that their laws and thoughts moved away from the original divine form.
The Platonic hope is that the essence of things could be restored and preserved by creating pure
laws and institutions to fight off any diversion from the spirit of the divine presence.487
These dialogues, as distinct from anything law-related as they may appear, speak in a
language that one often hears about erga omnes crimes and jus cogens norms in particular, and
customary international law in general. So does something even more remote from international
law, the Ten Books of Architecture by Vitruvius, which display his belief in perfect geometric
shapes forming the basis for universal order. The Renaissance embellished this idea of “perfect
reflection” further to include the human form: Leonardo da Vinci and Cesare Cesariano
illustrated it in what is now known as “Vitruvian Man,” based on Vitruvius’ discussion of the
proportions of the human body inscribed in a circle and a square. From Plato onwards, the ideal
city, the ideal state, the ideal order have always hinged upon a very strong sense of the existence
of a self-contained order expressed in pure laws.
In the opening chapters of this dissertation, I argued that recent scholarship on theories of
international law with an interdisciplinary bent attributes the post-Cold War rejuvenation of
interest in international law to at least two kinds of developments. On the one hand, I argued that
“critical legal scholarship” has reshaped the discipline so profoundly that it has indeed provided it
with new sensibilities and perspectives, thus rendering it desirable for a variety of other
disciplines and discourses. On the other hand, I asserted that younger generations of international
law scholars have succeeded in reaching out to international relations scholars and linked their
work with theirs, forming a relationship which led to a recasting of the way in which legality,
jurisdictional capabilities, and the state as a legal actor are approached. In the end, however, the
487
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realization of a full-fledged reconciliation and dialogue among these disciplines is far from an
easy task. The increasingly textured, adversarial and divisive debate about how to approach the
study of international law should be regarded as an indication of how Herculean such an attempt
is. In this work, I have hoped to contribute to this (ongoing) debate by focusing on common
conceptions pertaining to the ideal of the state and what they leave behind, the residue, so to
speak.
Deliverance of justice is a central, and yet another highly contested, element in theories
and debates on international law, particularly as far as international courts are concerned. As the
justice claims of non-state actors increasingly clash with the largely statist basis of existing legal
practices and institutions pertaining to the transnational level, it is again becoming increasingly
critical that we question the role of international organizations, including the Courts, in creating
and sustaining the illusion of a perfect global legal order.488
As this detailed and multifaceted debate on the jurisprudential merits of international
criminal law in the area of crimes against humanity proves, international organizations including
courts such as the ICC will have to reconstitute some of their authoritative practices and render
them open to the motives of both new and previously marginalized legal actors.489 Furthermore,
international organizations have to be open to potential norm change and evolution based on
claims unaddressed in the past, as well as claims related to current and newly emerging forms of
injustice.490 This is notwithstanding the limited capacity of existing international organizations
for realizing such claims. If and when they cannot do the job, alternative models of adjudication
should be welcome as a true feature of the fragmented regime of accountability, with both
fragmentation and poli-centricity characterizing the essential nature of international criminal law.
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I have also argued that the institutional masking of the hegemony of certain key actors
within the international legal domain—needless to say not only core states—creates a blind spot.
International organizations have in the past, and might again in the present, become the bulwark
of hegemonic privilege.491 Last but not the least, the tempering of conflicting interests by judicial
idealism does not guarantee that an international organization can or does provide a sufficient,
widely recognized, and inclusive mechanism for dealing with the justice-related claims of
different actors. Ongoing conflicts in global politics are carried onto the institutional and
organizational realm as well, and bodies such as international courts constitute no exception to
this phenomenon.
As posited throughout this dissertation, normative theories of international law at least
promise to adequately address these critical questions regarding the deliverance of justice.492
However, a distinction is to be made between the deliverance of justice as a motive and as an
authoritative legal practice. Accordingly, some international organizations aim at raising the
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specter of lack of just practices in given areas of international law, while others such as the ICC
are built upon the premise of deliverance of justice according to established legal norms and
practices. Why states and other international actors would seek the construction of institutions
that can authoritatively settle disputes about rights and entitlements is not the issue here. On the
surface, the international legal obligations of a state are overwhelmingly based on its consent.
This formal commitment to consent supposedly preserves the power of states, though with a bias
towards the status quo. Historically, the regime of international law has not been equitable to all
states that are a party to it.493 International law, given its background, has developed a variety of
ways to live with the problem of consent. The expectation from international criminal law has
been for it to overcome this hurdle via normative prerogatives such as those exemplified by
universal jurisdiction for crimes against humanity. 494 Meanwhile, when states establish
international organizations such as the ICC, they create an institution with a life of its own. There
is always the risk that the institution would develop its own interests.495 How much of the
existing landscape of international criminal law has been formed by state responses to acts such
as crimes against humanity is somewhat dubious. Rather, what is at stake here is life after the
ICC for international criminal law. As Kantian scholarship in this area has long insisted, seeking
a legalized and institutionally guarded regime of accountability to constrain others has direct
benefits in terms of avoiding random warfare in an age where such wars tend to bring more
damage than profit. 496 In this context, justice delivered via international criminal law is
considered a virtue. This peculiar understanding of political order relies on standardized
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expectations, procedures and entitlements.497 There is no power in it, or no outright conflict. This
brings us back to the longings we hear in Seneca’s play Medea: “The wandering World at will
shall open lye…”
It has also been commonly argued for decades that the essence of any meaningful and
reasonable idea of international governance is the expectation that international law will be
primarily about the rules and procedures that allow states to coexist.498 This take on international
law and its engagement in the deliverance of justice is quite similar in its logic to the way
constitutions are defined as frames within which societies and polities can accommodate change
and conflict without breaking existing political systems apart. Why, then, is international law
often deemed to be “practical” rather than purposive—and thus its organs portrayed as standing
in contradistinction with the institutions through which the laws of national political communities
are created? Is it not so much a maker as it is a protector of the status quo? Even the jus cogens
norms and erga omnes crimes do not constitute major exceptions in this sense. Consequently, in
international criminal law justice is defined mainly in formal procedural terms. Bodies such as
international courts become limited to clarifying the procedures to be observed by states and
other international actors in the event that their actions fall under the purview of international
law. There is very little room left for political judgment or norm creation to enter the debate, even
concerning critical instances that challenge the founding pillars of the entire state system such as
crimes against humanity.499 In this work, I have inquired about whether it is possible to strike a
balance between normative and deliberative purposefulness and authoritative jurisdictional
practices in international criminal law, in such a way that its legislative prowess is not just
“effective” but also legitimate. My examination of the limits of the application of universal
jurisdiction in the context of crimes against humanity and particularly in the Global South was a
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testimony to the intrinsically challenging nature of such yearnings. This problem of disjunct
between what legal theorists such as Hart named as primary and secondary rules is endemic to
the dominant statist model of international law, and bars our vision from seeing it for what it is-–
a transnational and fragmented enterprise. Especially in the last two chapters, I posited that the
whole array of non-state, transnational, individual, regional and communal actors have to be
brought into the discussion concerning the legitimacy of jurisprudence produced by international
criminal law and international courts. Acknowledgement of the wider plurality of political actors,
as well as forms of legal and political action, is essential for achieving large enough scope of
applicability for models of deliverance of justice beyond the confines of international courts.
Needless to say, addressing this plurality alone cannot override the normative centrality of the
state in international criminal law. However, as I indicated throughout my debate on hybrid
courts, formal international criminal law is stagnating in its universalistic claims. Particularly
disconcerting is the status of the treatment of injurious acts such as crimes against humanity,
which have implications for the past, present and future of whole societies.
In this vein, I argued that rather than crowning the achievements of international bodies
such as the ICC as the ultimate point that international criminal law could reach, we must pay
closer attention to “informal lawmaking” that involves new actors, new processes, and new
outputs concerning the most heinous forms of state criminality. On many occasions, existing
institutional structures of formal lawmaking have become shackles rather than instigators of
judicial processes, hence the emergence of bodies such as hybrid courts or regional mediation
mechanisms. The validation requirements of traditional international criminal law as it is spread
through centrifugal adaptation of the Rome Statute have to be rethought. Crimes against
humanity legislation adapted to local realities by hybrid courts and regional organizations vividly
prove this point. It is erroneous to use the example of the Belgian courts as the test case for
universal jurisdiction, as Belgium is a European country with its own heavy history of colonial
crimes and involvements. To recommend that this example should be followed in India, Russia,
China, Brazil, Uganda, Turkey, etc. only points to the continuing blindness of dominant
international law scholarship to both the history and politics of how our post-WWII universe of
state system was built, and at what costs it is maintained. If the ultimate criterion by which to
evaluate the deliverance of justice at the international platform is to see how many legal borders
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have been crossed, rather than what substantive benefits it can provide for societies, perhaps
international organizations such as the ICC could be construed as effective in their mandate.
However, the closure of justice claims as well as methods of deliverance within this model
remains problematic for several reasons. In this work, I have presented these issues in detail,
highlighting the necessary involvement of political judgment in the alignment of international
and domestic law. This is essential for widespread endorsement and application of the current
legal codification of crimes against humanity to become possible. In my view, it is a base
requirement for international criminal law in this area to become purposive rather than remaining
formalistic. Finally, the shift of focus I suggested in the above pages is also meaningful from the
point of view of posing challenges to conventional configurations of power, authority, legality,
and legitimacy at both national and international levels.
The development of a justice-based dialogue above and beyond the confines of the
sovereign state is possible only via political deliberation, legal arguments keen on persuasion
rather than dictation, and the endorsement of multilateral legal premises rather than a monist or
dualist legal framework in international criminal law. Both statist and purely intergovernmentalist
models of international law require that demands for justice be either channeled through domestic
policy processes, or appropriated within a top-down process of international jurisdiction. In the
specific case of crimes against humanity, there are widely observed and profound structural
tensions between the human rights and humanitarian norms introduced into the framework of
international law since World War II, and the Westphalian order according to which such norms
are expected to be pursued. According to the existing model, international criminal law
jurisprudence is attempting to adjudicate the crimes committed by the very actors that it protects,
i.e. the state, by asking them to come to international courts or local courts of other states
empowered by universal jurisdiction in the event these states fail to try their own leaders. In this
sense, I believe the word ‘transnational’ continues to escape universal jurisdiction debates.500 Yet
when it comes to issues such as crimes against humanity, how could such an argument be
maintained: that human rights and human dignity must be met within the parameters determined
by the limits of either the “national” understanding and domestic jurisdiction of such crimes, or
500
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via litigation sought in the chambers of a distant international court or a European domestic court
such as the Belgian ones, armed with universal jurisdiction? This is precisely the conundrum that
triggered the methodological investigations and conceptual worries presented in this work.
As signaled throughout this dissertation, a post-statist and transnational conception of
international law and international organizations no doubt helps the matters a great deal.501
However, this approach is heavily indebted to sociological theory and tends to keep its distance
from legal enterprises such as international courts. At least as far as international criminal law is
concerned, I strongly believe that we need to include both realms and think deeply about their
present and possible future interactions. Ideally, in this new setting, the justice motives of a
variety of actors beyond the state would become favourable to international law scholarship.
However, the static and authoritative perception of law in this field often acts as an impediment
for such a hybrid and well-endowed understanding of [global] justice. It is as if legal debates
about the deliverance of justice are utterly uninterested in dealing with moral dilemmas, ethical
concerns, normative reflections, and political deliberations.
By introducing the notions of political judgment and collective responsibility for state
criminality as necessary components of the debate on the deliverance of justice in international
criminal law, this work exemplifies a concerted effort to bypass the dichotomy between the
domestic and international spheres that is essentialized by the statist model of international
law.502 Just as values and norms are affected by a wide plurality of actors and political forces
both within and beyond states, so are the actual workings of international law, including
international criminal law. There is very little reason to assume that international criminal law is
purely formal and structurally sealed from the purposive claims of various political agents and
legal actors. The crucial matter concerning the category of legal norms such as those pertaining to
501
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crimes against humanity is not so much the presence of value plurality that they have to address,
but whether there are limits and thresholds beyond which their very existence loses its validity.
Whether these limits can be established based on deliberations among different parties, or
whether such an agreement needs to be nurtured and fostered via normatively purposive
international organizations such as the ICC, is a real matter of concern for the future of
international criminal law. Given the weight of its subject matter, international criminal law
cannot turn its back on voices of dissent, particularly those emanating from communities who
currently suffer the most from state brutality and politically organized forms of criminality,
which are no doubt not limited to those nations in the Global South. In this regard, ad hoc and
hybrid tribunals’ jurisprudential contributions, their extra-legal impact and legacies, and the
intrinsic relationship between transitional justice projects and international criminal law have to
be brought into the canonized debates. The concept of state legacy is itself contested and the
appropriateness of international courts’ (such as the ICC) efforts to consolidate it must be
questioned. As attested in the pages of this work, a conceptual critique of the history of
international criminal law pertaining to the legislation of crimes against humanity also provides
an opportune moment to reflect upon the work of both international courts and hybrid courts, ad
hoc tribunals and other transitional justice mechanisms, with a view to enriching the debate by
the inclusion of more voices and with an ear on the ground for historic grievances.503
On a final note, I would like to conclude this treatise on a hopeful note for the future of
international law scholarship pertaining to expanding circles of application of universal
jurisdiction in the context of crimes against humanity. In a series of speeches and occasional
essays delivered in 1999 and 2000, Pierre Bourdieu, one of France’s leading sociologists of
culture, called for a new European social movement to unite existing and future unions, new
social movements, and intellectuals to struggle against globalization.504 In his outcry, Bourdieu
denounced numerous evils of globalization, especially its guiding philosophy of neoliberalism,
and he sketched specific roles that writers, scholars, artists, and research workers—otherwise
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known as Bourdieu’s “intellectuals”—could play in this new composite movement. While this
call to arms is not without contradictions, it offered encouragement to intellectuals to join the
working classes (unionized and not), farmers, the unemployed, immigrants, activists, students,
and militants to struggle against the depredations of the new world order. For Bourdieu, as for
many other critics of globalization, what is particularly vexing is the recent retreat of national
governments from funding welfare, medical care, housing, public transportation, education, and,
of course, culture. The neoliberal focus of the past few decades on privatization, deregulation,
and self-help, characteristic of the economies in the Global North but also becoming widespread
policy initiatives in the Global South, argued Bourdieu, were unabashedly supported by
international organizations such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World
Trade Organization (WTO). The quest for maximum short-term profits and reduced expenditures
is seeping into the everyday life of citizens in an exponentially increasing number of states and
creating a perpetual condition of insecurity. Ironically, noted Bourdieu, the transnational spread
of this neoliberal social insecurity provides a solid and tangible foundation for a new form of
politics.505
If one was to echo this quintessential call to unite all possible forces against unjust
practices endorsed by institutions of global governance and against entrenched state criminality,
whom could we call upon? Surely, the work of Pierre Bourdieu offers a potentially productive
way to practice research in international relations. Does it also offer clues concerning how to
practice international legal scholarship and advocacy perhaps with less jurisdictional certitude but
more moral conviction and normative involvement with global injustices perpetuated by the very
states that international criminal law deals with in such a circumscribed manner? Bourdieu’s
work explores the alternatives in such a way that academia is invited to refuse an opposition
between general theory and everyday life. His preference for this relational approach acts as a
protective shield against two of the biggest handicaps affecting academic work in the area of
international criminal law, as well: namely, essentialization and ahistoricism. In order to untie
state centrism and to discuss the possible adaptations and transformations of international
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criminal law, we must show the courage to reveal the power relations hidden beneath the perfect
spectre of universal jurisdiction at national, subnational, and transnational levels. This
dissertation attempted to do so within the specific context of the applications of the normative
framework of universal jurisdiction to crimes that fall under the aegis of crimes against humanity,
both within and beyond the confines of the ICC. Its findings encourage us to renew the debate on
the growing network of international law institutions and the underpinnings of the transnational
legal regime of accountability from the lens of an important web of regional, national, and subnational authorities and spaces along with non-governmental organizations, political movements
and civic initiatives. These developments seriously undermine the substantive claims of a
centrifugal theory of international [criminal] law. The complex nature of the transnational
dimensions of universal jurisdiction as it pertains to some of the most egregious crimes
committed by states against their own people or in lands where they reside as occupying forces
renders such a change of optics necessary in both the short and medium terms. Amidst the rising
tide of seeking justice for political and mass crimes, using the rubric of international criminal law
for the questioning of individual responsibility for societal crimes at the local and domestic levels
has indeed been a very important first step in that direction.506 This issue has been explicated in
depth in my discussion on hybrid courts and other mechanisms that do not rely on the direct
involvement of an international court such as the ICC in matters concerning states and societies
in the Global South. However, I also urge the reader to take one more step forward and extend
the normative frame of reference used to adjudicate crimes against humanity in the direction of a
rejuvenated debate on the notion of collective societal responsibility for mass crimes. The
resultant opening up of the horizon of jurisprudential scholarship in such a way as to allow for
concerns about transitional justice and overall socio-political transformation of the societies in
question would not erode the basis of universal jurisdiction in international law. On the contrary,
it would engender new debates about its usefulness in domestic and local settings and thus
introduce the elements of choice and volitional consent in the Global South for future uses of
international law jurisprudence.
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Only then, would the prediction of Seneca I cited in the opening of this conclusion find
true meaning in international law scholarship: “...time shall in fine out breake / When Ocean
wave shall open every Realme…”
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